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Chapter 1
General Introduction

3"In 2000 I thought that most people I met, from all walks of life, were puzzled over the
apparently high levels of the stock market. It seemed very unsure whether the market levels
made any sense, or whether they were indeed the result of some human tendency that might be
called irrational exuberance. [...] Lacking answers from our wisest experts, many are inclined
to turn to wisdom of the markets to answer our questions, to use the turns of the stock market
as fortune tellers use tea leaves. But before we assume that the market is revealing some truth
about this new era, it behooves us to reflect on the real determinants of market moves and
how these market moves, in their effects, filter through the economy and our lives."
(Irrational Exuberance, Shiller, p. 9-10)
Macroeconomic theories have traditionally been tested using field data, while a recent and
growing body of literature has resorted to experimental methods to address macroeconomic
questions. On the one hand, changes in macroeconomic modelling towards more micro-
founded models and the tendency to abandon the representative agent paradigm favoured
the use of controlled laboratory experiments with paid human subjects. On the other hand,
however, the recursive structure of equilibria arising in widely used dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium models constituted a challenge for experimental testing. This complexity
was overcome by experimental designs simplifying the macroeconomic environments to their
essence. By doing so, experimental methods could shed light on important macroeconomic
questions which otherwise would be difficult to be address with field data, ranging from the
assessment of underlying microeconomic assumptions to validation of models predictions,
from macro-coordination problems to equilibrium selections in models featuring multiple
equilibria.
The potential of laboratory tests to study self-referential dynamics revealed to be partic-
ularly appealing in asset pricing theory, where expectations of future endogenous variables
played a critical role in the determination of the current values of the same endogenous vari-
ables; in other words, beliefs affect prices which in turn, affect beliefs which affect prices, and
so on and so forth. Since early contributions in asset pricing theory, a common assumption
adopted to get around with the self-fulfilling feature was endowing agents with fully rational
expectations. The controlled environment of the lab proved to be ideal since the experimenter
could control the data generating process avoiding confounding effects present in field data,
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and could reproduce a framework where these feedback loops were at stake, while monitoring
expectations dynamics.
This dissertation covers topics of research in the area of experimental macroeconomics,
in particular in the field of experimental asset pricing. First, the literature related to
consumption-based asset pricing à la Lucas (1978) is surveyed, with a focus on the liter-
ature that, by abandoning the full rationality assumption, can match empirical features of
asset prices, such as asset returns predictability, equity premium and excessively volatile re-
turns. From a methodological point of view, laboratory experiments emerge as a well suited
tool to explore expectational feedback loops into prices. Using the latter as a starting point,
the two consecutive chapters aim at providing a convincing explanation to two observed asset
price patterns: the cyclicality of asset market booms and busts (chapter 3) and the sources
of asset price volatility (chapter 4).
A survey of the consumption-based asset pricing literature constitutes the second chapter
of this thesis. The Lucas (1978) model has been the fulcrum of modern asset pricing theory
in the last forty years. By relating intertemporal investment and consumption decisions,
equilibrium asset prices are determined as shadow prices in a no-trade equilibrium. Not-
withstanding becoming a benchmark for the later literature, the Lucas (1978) model failed to
predict the observed asset prices patterns. This review considers methodologically very differ-
ent contributions that, by relaxing the model assumptions, can provide theoretical, empirical
or experimental explanations to peculiar price behaviours, including cyclical deviations from
fundamentals (so called bubbles) and asset price volatility patterns. Central to the analysis
of the related literature is the abandon of the full rationality assumption. Relaxing this as-
sumption appeared to be the most promising way to understand price patterns, especially
when individual expectations emerged as a key driver of prices in a vast body of experimental
and behavioural literature, starting from the pioneering work of Smith et al. (1988). These
self-reinforcing price-beliefs dynamics have been incorporated in the adaptive learning lit-
erature that, on the one hand, relaxes the rational expectation assumption by introducing
the concept of internal rationality and, on the other hand, borrows from the experimental
and behavioural findings on adaptive expectations formation to shed light on observed price
patterns.
The third chapter examines the cyclicality of asset market booms and busts in an exper-
imental framework. A newly defined experimental set-up is designed to test an extended
5version of a consumption-based asset pricing model à la Lucas (1978) where expectational
feedback loops are central for obtaining the cyclical pattern of asset prices, as in Adam et al.
(2014). In line with recent experimental contributions by Crockett and Duffy (2013) and As-
parouhova et al. (2016), I bring to the lab an infinite horizon stationary economy, that, given
the practical limitations, is approximated by indefinite horizon with constant continuation
probability. During the experiment, participants are asked to trade a storable asset on a com-
petitive market and their expectations about future returns of the asset are elicited. On the
one hand, the individual intertemporal asset allocation decisions affect prices as driven by a
consumption-smoothing motive, and on the other hand self-reinforcing price-beliefs dynamics
could drive market prices away from the fundamental value of the asset. I provide evidence
that, despite the high degree of heterogeneity across experimental sessions, beliefs about the
future profitability of the asset can contribute explaining these price deviations. Moreover,
more optimistic subjects react to past price increases by demanding more of the asset, hence
pushing the price even further away from fundamentals. Finally, a categorization of players
according to the way their beliefs are revised hints at weakly cyclical prices in correspondence
of a balanced mix of players revising their beliefs in an adaptive manner (adaptive learners)
and players revising their beliefs in the opposite direction than the market (contrarians).
The fourth chapter presents a joint project with Timo Hoffmann aiming at assessing the
sources of asset price volatility in a Lucas (1978) framework. By borrowing features of the
experimental design specified in the second chapter, a two-treatment-design is defined to study
the theoretical sources of asset price volatility. In one treatment, only a volatile stochastic
discount factor is accountable for the asset price volatility, while in the other treatment the
volatility of payoffs is the only driver of the volatility of asset prices. Aligned with previous
implementation of the Lucas (1978) model in a lab, participants trade a perishable asset
in a stationary economy for an a priori unspecified number of periods and are asked to
provide their expectations about future asset profitability, so that expectational feedback is
also controlled by the experimenters. We find that market clearing prices are substantially
less volatile than the fundamental value of the asset, i.e. negative excess volatility. The latter
is puzzling since, over a sufficiently long horizon, the price should reflect the fundamental
value of the asset and its volatility. This is indeed not the case, as average market clearing
prices are co-moving with the state of the world, but less than what the theory would have
predicted. Moreover, price volatility in the two treatments does not statistically differ, even
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though it is slightly higher in the treatment where payoffs are the only source of volatility.
The latter could be interpreted as the subjects’ difficulty in understanding (or applying)
optimal intertemporal trading decisions. Particularly, in the treatment where the stochastic
discount factor is accountable for the asset price volatility, the price clears the market most of
the times at a value in between the two state-dependent fundamental values and expectations
dynamics are shown to display a weak link with individual asset allocation decisions.
Finally, a general remark for the reader of this Ph.D. thesis. All chapters are written as
independent essays. Each of them contains its own introduction and appendices providing
supplementary materials such as an English translation of the original instructions of the
experiments, as well as additional graphs and tables. Hence, the essays can be read in any
order of preference. References from all three chapters can be found in one bibliography at
the end of this dissertation.
Chapter 2
Asset Price Volatility:
A Survey

92.1 Introduction
The behaviour of asset prices has fascinated generations of investors, policy makers and
economists, alike. Stock markets display common patterns, including high average returns,
volatile and cyclical movements of prices that economists still struggle to understand com-
pletely. Moreover, if one considers consumption growth, this is much lower than dividend
growth and the two are weakly correlated. These facts raise two important questions for
macroeconomists: why are real stock returns so high compared to average short-term real
interest rate? And why is the volatility of real stock returns so high compared to the volatility
of short-term real interest rate?
The latter two perplexing behaviours are known respectively as the equity premium puzzle
and the equity volatility puzzle. Trying to answer these questions has been at the core of the
consumption-based asset pricing literature in the last thirty years. In this survey, I review
the theoretical, empirical and experimental attempts to provide an answer to the second
question, being aware that its response shed light on the first puzzle too.
In the late seventies, Lucas (1978) developed a consumption-based asset pricing model that
became a workhorse for modern asset pricing theory. In a one-good pure exchange economy,
a representative agent with standard time separable utility and rational expectations (RE)
has to choose how to optimally allocate consumption intertemporally over an infinite horizon.
In the model, the stock market risk is measured by the covariance of consumption growth
with asset return in excess of the risk free rate, whilst the coefficient of relative risk aversion
of the representative investor determines the price of risk. Mehra and Prescott (1985) studied
the congruence of Lucas model with the historical US data and found that the average stock
return is about seven percent per year, while the the average annual return of the Treasury
bills is approximately one percent per year. They show that the difference in the covariances
of these returns with consumption growth is not large enough to explain the differences in
terms of returns, unless the representative agent is extremely risk averse. This fact is known
as equity premium puzzle, i.e. quantitatively stocks are not sufficiently riskier than the risk
free rate to explain the observed premium.
To understand the second puzzle, instead, possible sources of stock market volatility should
be considered. Since prices, dividends and returns are linked via an accounting identity, then
if the price of a stock is high today, it has to be the case that either its dividend is expected
to be higher tomorrow, or its return to be low between today and tomorrow, or its price is
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expected to be even higher tomorrow. If one excludes the possibility that asset prices grow
ad infinitum, then a high stock price today can only be explained by some combination of
changing expectations about future dividends and future returns over the infinite horizon.
Hence, future expectations are the key for explaining the equity volatility puzzle.
Explaining the equity premium puzzle in a general equilibrium framework is thus linked
to solving also the equity volatility puzzle. LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981a)
have shown that measures of expected dividends are far less volatile than real stock prices,
setting the path for future research on expectations about future returns being pivotal for
understanding asset price volatility. Namely, the observed stock prices tended to be often
higher than the discounted sum of dividends, the so called fundamentals. For such episodes,
Allen et al. (1993) coined the term “bubble”. They define a bubble as "the situation in which
the price of an asset is higher than it would be warranted given the fundamentals of the
asset".1 Although the economic literature is not unanimous on a definition, for the purpose
of this review, this is the definition of bubbles adopted hereafter.
The goal of this survey is to study those anomalous price behaviours by having as a reference
point the consumption-based asset pricing model à la Lucas (1978). Since the model fails to
explain both price deviations from fundamentals and observed asset price volatility patterns,
I review the literature that by relaxing its key assumptions, can account for both price and
volatility dynamics. I start my analysis by introducing frictions that can help explaining
the puzzles: I consider a change of the preference specification (Epstein-Zin preferences and
consumption habits), then move to frictions related to the asset markets, by first looking at
market incompleteness and then to the presence of trading costs. Nevertheless, the core of
the review relates to relaxing the assumption of rational expectations in the light of recent
empirical and experimental contributions.
The abandon of the efficient market hypothesis, as originally developed by Fama (1965),
gave birth to the behavioural finance literature. The latter explains excessively volatile prices
as resulting from non-fully rational behaviours, being those disagreement among agents con-
cerning the fundamental value of the stock, momentum trading or overconfidence. Those
models abandon the representative agent paradigm, introduce the behavioural heterogen-
eity of agents as key element of the modelling framework and stress the central role played
by the expectation formation side. Future expectations about market outcomes have been
investigated in different streams of literature: the empirical one by means of survey data,
1Allen et al. (1993) p. 208.
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the experimental one in the field of macroeconomic experiments and in both theoretical and
applied adaptive learning approach. The picture emerging from these methodologically dif-
ferent contributions is that investigating future expectations and their feedback into prices is
essential for understanding bubble phenomena and asset price volatility. The adaptive learn-
ing literature explores further those self-reinforcing price-beliefs mechanisms, by borrowing
from the behavioural, experimental and survey data the individual expectation formation
dynamics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a baseline consumption
asset pricing model and its fundamental modelling assumptions. Section 3 explores the
potential for explaining the two puzzles by relaxing each key assumption, with a particular
focus on relaxing full rationality. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Consumption-based asset pricing: baseline model
Due to its centrality in asset pricing literature, Lucas (1978) asset pricing model is the
reference point of the latter analysis. The section describes its main features, focusing in
particular on its key assumptions, as relaxing them lead to interesting explanations for the
observed equity premium and equity volatility puzzle.
The original version of Lucas (1978) model is a one-good pure exchange economy with a
single agent, interpreted as a representative for a large number of identical consumers, facing
an intertemporal investment decision. The agent wishes to maximize a discounted infinite
sum of strictly concave utility functions (constant relative risk aversion utility functions) by
choosing at each point in time the quantities of a consumption good and the asset holdings
to be held in the consecutive period. Output is produced via an exogenous production
function following a stochastic Markov process and its units are perishable every period.
They are perfectly divisible and their ownership is determined every period on a competitive
stock market. Frictionless trading of the shares (“trees”) is possible in each period (complete
markets) and holding the asset entitles the unit mass agent to all output (“fruits”) produced.
Every period the market clears, i.e. all the output is consumed and all shares are held.
Since all individuals have identical constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA)
over future consumption streams, they want consumption in different states of the world to
be similar, as they dislike risk, but they also want consumption at different point in times
to be similar, as they dislike consumption growth. In such an environment, the equilibrium
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price supported is a no-trade general equilibrium price. Moreover, if the representative agent’s
expectations over future consumption streams are assumed to be rational expectations, then
the market clearing price function implied by the consumer’s optimal behaviour will be the
same as the price function on which his optimal consumption and portfolio decisions are
based. Hence, the price of the asset can be determined by solving recursively the agent
stochastic Euler equation.2 In this stationary framework, aggregate risk is measured by
aggregate consumption and the price of an asset reflects essentially both the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution of consumption and risk aversion, i.e. the more desirable is an
asset, the higher is its ability to smooth consumption over time and across different states of
the world.
To quantitatively evaluate the consumption-based asset pricing model, Mehra and Prescott
(1985) compute the risk premium implied by the model pricing equation. They construct
an economy replicating the main features of Lucas (1978) model and by looking at US data,
they provide empirical evidence of a large differential in the average real yield of the S&P500
and the average yield on short-term debt.3 The striking finding, afterwards called equity
premium puzzle, is that the model predicted average yield on equity is, in the largest case,
0.35 percent, in sharp contrast to the 6 percent premium observed in the data. In order to
get the latter value, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of around 10 needed to be
chosen, i.e. agents would need to be extremely risk averse for the real equity premium to
be observed. This is at odds with previous findings regarding the willingness of agents to
substitute consumption between successive years that instead consider the coefficient of risk
aversion to range between 0 and 2.
The authors point at some possible ways of solving this puzzle such as introducing het-
erogeneous agents, non-time-additive separable preferences or introducing features making
intertemporal trades infeasible (e.g. contracts with unborns in an OLG framework).4 These
lines of reasoning were indeed pursued in a later asset pricing literature and revealed them-
selves to be successful in explaining the patterns observed in the data.
In the following, along the line of Kocherlakota (1996), I discuss the literature relaxing the
key assumptions of the Lucas (1978) model in the attempt to solving asset pricing puzzles.
2A transversality condition is defined to avoid explosive price paths and market clearing conditions ensuring
that all output is consumed and all shares are held are also imposed.
3Consumption growth rates are targeted to the mean, variance and serial correlation observed for the US
economy in 1889-1978 period, whilst intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is consistent
with micro and macro data.
4Mehra and Prescott (1985) explicitly state that matching price volatility is out of the scope of the paper.
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2.3 Relaxing assumptions
2.3.1 Preferences
In the original version of the Lucas (1978) model, all individuals have CRRA preferences
over future consumption streams. From a modelling perspective, these preferences have
attractive features as they allow for aggregation, time-consistent planning and they are scale
invariant. However, in the specific context of asset pricing they have the drawback to directly
link the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with the degree of risk aversion, i.e. the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is constrained to be equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. This implies that, in order to match the equity premium, a
high coefficient of risk aversion forces the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be low,
that is highly risk averse agents must view consumption in different time periods as being
highly complementary.
An alternative utility specification that bypasses this problem and still nests the CRRA
preferences is the Epstein-Zin specification. In the generalized expected utility specification,
utility today is a constant elasticity function of current consumption and future utility, with
intertemporal rate of substitution being separated from the degree of risk aversion. Altern-
atively said, those preferences can explain the puzzle by allowing intertemporal substitution
and risk aversion to be high simultaneously. Bansal and Yaron (2004) resorted to Epstein-
Zin time non-separable preferences to solve the equity premium puzzle. The change in the
specification of the preferences goes hand-in-hand with other peculiar features of the model
that are essential to arrive at the magnitude of the premium, i.e. consumption and dividend
growth rates processes. Based on empirical evidence, both consumption and dividends have
a small persistent expected growth rate component and a fluctuating volatility term which
captures time-varying economic uncertainty, i.e. time-varying conditional volatility of con-
sumption. Essentially, news regarding future expected growth rates transmits into persistent
large reactions of the price-dividend ratio and determines the risk premium on the asset.
Since those reactions positively co-vary with the marginal rate of substitution of the repres-
entative agent, large equity premia can be observed. Furthermore, price-dividend ratios are
also affected directly by the fluctuations of conditional volatility of consumption (economic
uncertainty), as a rise in economic uncertainty leads to a fall in asset prices. This channel is
therefore important for capturing the volatility feedback effect; that is news about the returns
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and news about return volatility are negatively correlated. For parameter values that are in
line with Mehra and Prescott (1985) they show that more than the half of the volatility of
price dividend ratio is due to the variation in expected growth rates and the other half can
be attributed to variation in economic uncertainty.
In contrast to Bansal and Yaron (2004), Abel (1990), Gali (1994) and Campbell and Co-
chrane (1999) introduce a consumption habit component affecting the curvature of the utility
function, hence risk aversion, by modifying the standard CRRA preferences but retaining
time-separability. The habit component takes either the form of an individual consumption
habit or it depends on the aggregate consumption which is unaffected by any individual’s
decisions. The latter is known as catching up with the Joneses pattern. Abel (1990) spe-
cifies the agent utility as a power function of the consumption-habit ratio, where the habit
is meant as the aggregate past consumption, i.e. in a representative agent world, the agent’s
own past consumption level. Holding consumption today and expected consumption tomor-
row constant, an increase in yesterday’s consumption increases the marginal utility of today’s
consumption. This makes the representative agent willing to borrow from the future, driv-
ing up the interest rate, hence affecting the risk premium. However, these preferences make
marginal utility volatile even when consumption is smooth, because agents derive utility also
from their recent past consumption levels. By affecting also the expected marginal utility of
consumption, the real interest rate is also highly volatile.
Differently from Abel (1990) and Gali (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) solved the
equity premium puzzle by producing time-varying risk aversion. In their framework, the rep-
resentative agent derives utility from the difference between consumption and a time-varying
subsistence level (habit level) that evolves over time in response to aggregate consumption
following an autoregressive process. The mechanism proposed is aligned with Abel (1990),
with the main difference being the presence of an autoregressive component of the habit
that forces the agent to smooth gradually to the new level of consumption, creating mean
reversion in marginal utility. Moreover, their habit specification allows for precautionary
saving motives that make the consumer more willing to save, driving the interest rate up, as
uncertainty about the marginal utility increases. If consumption is low relative to the habit
component (in a recession), then prices are low relative to dividends. The time variation of
risk aversion generates predictable movements in the expected stock returns with respect to
the risk free rate that are aligned with Shiller (1981a) findings.
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2.3.2 Incomplete markets
In Mehra and Prescott (1985) individuals diversify away any idiosyncratic differences in
consumption streams thanks to market completeness. This results into consumption streams
that look similar to each other and so does the per capita consumption. Significant examples
of the Lucas framework in presence of market incompleteness are Heaton and Lucas (1995)
and Constantinides and Duffie (1996). Constantinides and Duffie (1996) find that an equity
premium can be observed even with low risk aversion, if heterogeneous agents face different
labour income shock realizations. Since labour income shocks are permanent, uncorrelated
with market returns and more volatile than market returns, agents cannot smooth consump-
tion by trading with each other. Hence, the equity premium results from the fact that agents
are facing a higher risk of low consumption due to low labour income realization when market
returns are low.
2.3.3 Frictionless markets
In Lucas (1978) trading happens at zero cost for any amount of available securities. If
we introduce borrowing constraints, only few investors could afford trading, i.e. those that
are not borrowing constrained. Therefore, when solving the first order condition, one should
consider that only per capita consumption of those actively trading should be considered and
not the overall per capita consumption growth as in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Borrowing
constraints lower the risk free rate by reducing the borrowing side of the market, hence
affecting the equilibrium interest rate via market clearing. However, for this effect to be
present, a sizeable fraction of agents need to face borrowing constraints both on equity and
bond market. If agents are simultaneously borrowing constrained on both markets, then no
shift of resources from the bond to the equity market (or vice versa) takes place and such
constraint would imply that both the risk free rate would fall in order to clear the bond
market in the present of fewer agents trading, with the average stock return also falling as
result of the stock market clears. Moreover, for the equity premium to be affected, trading
on the stock market would have to be substantially more expensive than on the bond market.
In this context, the premium on stock would be a compensation for bearing additional costs,
rather than a compensation for risk.
However, using households panel data, Campbell (1993) and Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)
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show that market segmentation alone cannot explain the equity premium as consumption
growth of stockholders co-varies substantially more with stock returns than with consumption
growth of non-stockholders. Hence only if stockholders are highly risk averse, they would be
marginally indifferent between stocks and bonds, i.e. an equity premium would be observed
if consumption only of those involved in trading would be considered.
2.3.4 Rationality
Another key assumption of the traditional Lucas (1978) framework is that agents are
rational. The following section reviews the literature that relaxes the rationality assumption
focusing first on an early behavioural finance approach.5 Subsequently, the section analyses
the surveys and experimental evidence, finally the adaptive learning literature and the recent
development of the internal rationality concept.
2.3.4.1 Behavioural finance
In a rational frictionless economy à la Lucas (1978) the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
by Fama (1965) holds, hence the price of an asset equals its fundamental value. Behavioural
finance argues that some features of asset prices could be interpreted as resulting from de-
viations from rationality and that those deviations are brought about by some forms of non
rationality. The EMH lost part of its charm following the publication in early eighties by
Shiller (1981b) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) papers on volatility tests. Both of them found
that stock market volatility, measured as price variance, is too high to be justified "in terms of
random arrival of new information about the fundamental determinants of price" suggesting
that "markets are irrational and subjects to fads".6
An early objection to rational agents due to Friedman (1953) and further developed in
De Long et al. (1990) relates to the concept of the of so called noise traders. Those agents
are irrational investors buying the asset when its price is high and selling it when the price is
low. In doing so, they destabilize the market by pushing the price away from its fundamental
value. These irrational traders are taking more risk than rational agents (arbitrageurs) as
they are consistently overly optimistic (or pessimistic). If noise traders are pessimistic about
the future prices, they drive the price down and a rational agent buying the asset should
5A good compendium of early behavioural finance literature is provided by Barberis and Thaler (2003) in
the Handbook of the Economics of Finance.
6Shiller (1981b), p.291 and 304.
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recognize that in the future noise traders might become even more pessimistic and drive the
price further down with the rational agent potentially incurring a loss. Conversely, in the case
of bullish noise traders the rational agents need to consider that if they want to buy back the
asset, the price at which they will execute the trade might have been pushed by the optimistic
beliefs of the noise traders. Because of the unpredictability of noise traders’ future opinions,
the arbitrage opportunities for rational agents are limited, prices are diverging significantly
from fundamental values even when there is no fundamental risk and be excessively volatile.
Shiller (2003) reviews excess volatility in recent behavioural finance works. From a model-
ling perspective, three are the dominant approaches: difference-of-opinion, feedback trading
and biased self-attribution.
The most representative contribution of in the difference-of-opinion stream of literature is
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). In their continuous time framework, agents’ overconfidence
generate disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset, as in Miller (1977). Het-
erogeneous agents are facing short-sale constraints. When an agent buys an asset, the agent
acquires the option to re-sell the asset to other overoptimistic agents. This re-sale option
("bubble") has a recursive structure that causes in each period a significant deviation of the
price from fundamentals that is higher, the greater is the divergence of opinion about the
return from the security. Similarly to Harrison and Kreps (1978), even small differences in
beliefs are sufficient to generate trade, since agents are willing to pay a price exceeding the
value of future dividend streams, believing that they will be able to find a future buyer will-
ing an even higher price. In equilibrium, the model generates market prices that are above
fundamentals, accompanied by large trading volumes and excess volatility.
On the contrary, DeLong et al. (1990) and Hong and Stein (1999) present feedback trading
as a key feature to explain asset prices bubbles and excess volatility. Both frameworks are
characterized by the presence of a group of irrational traders that pushes the price above
fundamentals, reacting excessively to a price increase due to the arrival of positive news.
DeLong et al. (1990) model contains three group of traders: passive investors, feedback traders
and informed rational speculators. When the rational speculators receive good news and
subsequently trade on this news, they speculate that the initial price increase is stimulating
asset demand by feedback traders in the consecutive trading period. In anticipation of these
additional purchases, informed traders buy even more, driving the price even further away
from fundamentals. At the point when feedback traders are willing to buy the asset, the price
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is already inflated and, foreseeing returns opportunities, rational traders are then selling the
asset, stabilizing the asset price. Even if part of the price increase is rational, trading by
rational investors destabilizes the market triggering momentum. Hong and Stein (1999)
instead consider two types of agents: news watchers and momentum traders, i.e. feedback
traders. Both types are boundedly rational, i.e. agents are able to process only a subset of
the available public information. News watchers forecast prices based on observed private
signals of asset fundamentals, but without conditioning their trades on past price changes. In
contrast, momentum traders do not observe any signals about fundamentals, but condition
their expectations on past price changes basing their forecast on simple functions of past
price movements. In particular, their trading strategy is profitable early in the momentum
cycle, i.e. shortly after substantial news has arrived to news watchers, whilst when prices
overshoot the long run equilibrium price they incur a loss. Information spread among the
news watcher is slow and the price reacts slowly to news. For this reason, ideally momentum
strategy should be applied whenever a price increase is observed, as this signals the arrival
of good news on fundamentals that is not yet fully incorporated into the price. However,
a price increase can also be the result of previous rounds of momentum trading. Because
momentum traders cannot detect whether or not the news has arrived, they do not know if
they are in an early stage of the momentum cycle, hence tend to overreact pushing the price
to overshoot fundamentals in the long run. The resulting asset returns are therefore highly
autocorrelated and predictable.
Finally, the biased self-attribution literature identifies a cognitive bias extensively studied
in psychology, i.e. people tend to take into account signals that confirm their beliefs and
dismiss contradictory signals as noise. Daniel et al. (1998) introduce a model in which biased
self-attribution generates a bubble. If an investor overestimates his ability to identify the
significance of existing data that others neglect, then the investor will tend to underestimate
forecast errors. If on the other hand the investor is overconfident, in the sense that she
overestimates the precision of her private signal, then she would tend to give more weight
to her signal relative to publicly available signals. This behaviour causes price overreaction,
while the arrival of public signal determines price underreaction. The overreaction correction
pattern due to overconfidence is consistent with long run negative autocorrelation of stock
returns and unconditional volatility exceeding the one corresponding to fully rational agents.
Overconfidence is also identified by Odean (1999) as the source of excessive trading, since
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overconfident agents might trade even when their expected trading gains are not enough to
offset the trading costs incurred.
2.3.4.2 Survey data
Early behavioural finance contributions raised quite some scepticism among economists as
the resulting behavioural picture seemed rather at odds with the fully rationality assumption.
However, the availability of survey data on individual expectations supported the behavioural
models and assumptions.
A prominent example of this stream of literature is a seminal paper by Vissing-Jorgensen
(2004). Her research provided direct evidence that investor beliefs and actions are important
for assessing whether the assumptions made in the behavioural asset pricing models are valid
and convincing. Her innovative approach is based on the analysis of individual survey data
- the UBS Gallup for US investors - on wealthy investor beliefs from 1998 and 2002, mainly
focusing on aggregate stock market expectations. She provides evidence that individual
expected returns were at the peak of the market during the dot-com bubble, pointing at the
most optimistic agent driving up the demand for the asset, hence its price. The higher the
expectations about future returns of the asset, the more the investor is willing to buy it,
even though the market was thought to be overvalued. Moreover, investors beliefs on own
past performance are consistent with a biased self-attribution and affect their stock holdings.
Finally, at odds with the rational expectations models, the data shows a stunning degree of
belief heterogeneity that varies across age groups and experience.
Experience emerged as an important dimension affecting investors’ expectations and asset
allocations as seen in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Amromin and Sharpe (2014). The
latter, using the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes, shows that investors expectations
about future returns are formed extrapolating from recent years realized returns. However,
differently from Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), they find that there is no substantial difference
between wealthy and less wealthy investors. Moreover, they provide evidence about the pro-
cyclicality of expected returns, i.e. when expectations about the macroeconomic conditions
are positive, then expectations about future asset returns are also optimistic and perceived
economic uncertainty is lower. Together these results imply that a forward-looking Sharpe
ratio is also procyclical, and is at odds with the predictions of rational asset pricing models
that would imply a countercyclical ratio.
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Pattern of expectations that are inconsistent with the fully rational ones are also emerging
from the empirical analysis in Bacchetta et al. (2009) and Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
Bacchetta et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence based on a broad set of surveys that
the predictability of excess returns goes hand-in-hand with the predictability of forecast
errors, suggesting that understanding expectations is crucial for explaining excess returns.
Their findings are also supported by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) that show that future
market beliefs tend to be extrapolative and are negatively correlated with expected returns
as implied by the asset pricing model. This pattern could be interpreted as rejection of the
rational expectation hypothesis "with considerable confidence".7 By exploiting the time series
dimension of survey data about future stock market expectations, regardless of how expected
returns are measured, expectations are persistent and positively correlated with the price-
dividend ratio. At odds with previous literature, consumption and its growth rate do not
seem to have explanatory power for investor expectations.
2.3.4.3 Experimental evidence
An alternative innovative approach that is achieving resounding success is the use of ex-
periments in macroeconomics.8 For the purpose of this review, this paper will concentrate on
experiments studying asset price anomalies and focusing more on those experiments where
beliefs are key for the understanding such peculiarities.
While experimental economics had been around since the forties, addressing questions such
as the competitiveness of different markets, only in the late eighties, experiments begin to
appeal also for studying asset market dynamics. A laboratory seemed to be a perfectly
neutral environment where the experimenter had full control of the fundamental value of the
asset and could measure the key parameters of theoretical models, like risk aversion, discount
factor and beliefs and isolate their contribution to the variability of prices.
For these reasons, it is possible to identify the presence of a bubble as a situation in which
the price of an asset exceeds the fundamental value of that asset because its current owner
believes that he can earn a capital gain by reselling it at an even higher price in the future.
The extent of these deviations are measured in experiments via several metrics, including the
average bias (difference between the actual price and the fundamental price), total dispersion
7Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), p. 2.
8For a survey of the laboratory experiments addressing a broad spectrum of macroeconomic phenomena see
Duffy (2008).
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(sum of absolute value of all differences between actual price and fundamentals), turnover
(trading volumes), amplitude (magnitude of all price changes relative to fundamentals) and
normalized deviations weighted by the corresponding trading volumes.9
The great advantage of resorting to the lab to test asset markets efficiency and the price
formation mechanism became widely accepted after the publication of the seminal paper by
Smith et al. (1988) (SSW).
SSW’s experimental design to study asset market price dynamics remained for a long time
the benchmark for a vast literature of experiments trying to provide an explanation for price
deviations. The experiment studied the patterns of bubbles and crashes in asset prices in a
double auction market where 9 or 12 subjects had to trade an asset for a finite number of
periods, either 15 or 30. The number of periods subjects could trade the asset was known
ex-ante, as well as the dividend process common to all subjects within one session. Every
period the asset paid a random dividend extracted from a uniform distribution with positive
expected value. Hence, the fundamental value of the asset for a risk-neutral participant was
declining over time. By design, subjects differ only because of their initial cash and asset
endowments: some are endowed with relatively more cash and fewer stocks, i.e. in the first
period the buyers, while others are endowed with relatively less cash and more stocks, i.e. in
the first trading period the sellers.
Even though there is no asymmetric information and the probability distribution of the
dividend process is known, substantial trades were observed and the price of the asset initially
raised despite a declining fundamental value. The market clearing price pattern displayed
three distinct phases: it initially started out below the fundamental value of the asset, then
overshooting it around the second to fourth period and crashed reaching fundamentals in
the last periods played. This evidence of bubble-crash in the asset market was robust to
different time horizons (it is common to 15 and 30 periods living asset) and to both sizes of
the markets (it is common to both 9 and 12 participants markets) and it was at odds with
rational expectation theoretical predictions that would imply a price tracking fundamentals.
Smith et al. (1988) experimental results appeared to be puzzling and several modifications
of their design were performed in an attempt to find an explanation for the price patterns
displayed, varying the fundamental value structure (Smith et al. (2000), Noussair et al. (2001)
and Kirchler et al. (2012)), the level of experience of participants (Dufwenberg et al. (2005)
and Lahav (2011)), introducing forms of irrationality (Lei et al. (2001) and Oechssler et al.
9See Stöckl et al. (2010) for a review of bubble measures in experimental asset markets.
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(2011)) and long run expectations (Haruvy et al. (2007)).
Smith et al. (2000), Noussair et al. (2001) and Kirchler et al. (2012) try to assess whether
high prices compared to fundamentals are related to a particular structure of declining fun-
damentals, by considering either an asset not paying dividends, i.e. an asset with constant
fundamentals or different structure of fundamentals (increasing, constant or decreasing) com-
bined with different structure of the cash-to-asset (C/A) value ratio. Mispricing of the asset
appears as a robust finding that Kirchler et al. (2012) associated in the case of declining fun-
damentals with confusion in the case of declining fundamental value coupled with increasing
C/A ratio, as in the SSW framework. Overvaluation of the asset significantly reduces when
confusion reduces, i.e. when the stock is defined as "stock of depletable gold mine" instead of
"stock" it is clear to subjects that the fundamentals are decreasing over time, hence prices are
tracking fundamentals closer and the typical SSW price pattern is not observed any longer.
In line with the previously highlighted survey evidence, Dufwenberg et al. (2005) find that
experience matters for the systematic deviation of price from fundamental pricing of the
asset.10 In fact, even the presence of a small fraction (one third) of experienced players
is sufficient to eliminate or substantially reduce asset mispricing, i.e. the more experienced
traders are, the more prices tend to closely track fundamental values. However, if the cause of
bubbles and crashes is the lack of experience, then it would remain unexplained why in field
asset markets multiple bubbles and crashes are typically observed. Lahav (2011) attempts
to provide experimental evidence of this fact by designing a long horizon experimental asset
market where subjects are asked to trade the asset for 200 periods.11 If experience mattered
for bubbles to disappear, then one would expect that independently of the number of periods
played, after few rounds prices should converge to the fundamentals and should not move
further away after few consecutive rounds of trade. Instead, Lahav (2011) observed multiple
bubbles and crashes which cast some doubts on the external validity of experience as a
convergence device to fundamentals. However, those cyclical patterns would be consistent
with individual expectations following adaptive dynamics.
An alternative explanation to the price patterns observed is related to some form of irra-
tionality. Oechssler et al. (2011) focus on irrationality à la Shiller (2016), i.e. the spreading of
10In this context experience is defined as subjects having previously participated in an experimental market
of the same design.
11In Lahav (2011) experiment subjects trade the asset on a call market rather than on a double auction as in
the SSW design. Despite the different trading institution, Van Boening et al. (1993) show that the market
microstructure does not matter for the presence of bubbles, as similar price patterns are observed in both
double auction and call markets.
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news of a price change spurs traders’ enthusiasm and is contagious via person-to-person com-
munication. Essentially, insider’s information and communications are potential ingredients
for bubble formation. All participants in their framework are experienced of asset markets
and they understand the fundamental value of the asset, so both sources of bubble formation
analysed before are excluded as possible drivers of price deviation from fundamentals. Rather
than communication among players, the presence of informed traders is a key ingredient for
the bubble formation, with overconfidence being a driver for a bubble to appear. Overconfid-
ent traders are aware of mispricing when it occurs, but speculate on being able to resell the
asset at an even higher price. When at least one trader considers the asset to be overvalued,
then it is more likely that the bubble is pricked.
Lei et al. (2001) form of irrationality, instead, is related to speculation arising from lack of
common knowledge of rationality. If traders are uncertain about future prices tracking the
fundamental value because they doubt of the rationality of other traders, then they might
expect to earn capital gains whenever they think that there might be irrational traders on the
market. A rational trader would then buy the asset even if its price exceeds its fundamental
value in anticipation of a gain from reselling it to an irrational trader. The authors do
not find convincing evidence that bubble phenomena arise necessarily from speculation. In
the beginning of the experiment, participants might be confused about the asset market
functioning and their trading decision might per se be irrational and this might explain why
prices initially overshoot fundamental values. Later on in the experiment, some traders might
realize that others might act irrationally and speculation might arise. Through practice,
confusion reduces and irrationality may vanish and the information of the change in the
environment transmits into the price, i.e. a market crash would make the rationality of
participants common knowledge. However, rather than a lack of common knowledge of
rationality, rational traders might simply believe that others make small mistakes (instead of
being irrational), such as purchasing at prices above the maximum possible dividend stream
and selling below the minimum dividend stream and base their trading decisions accordingly.
Hence, a promising way to understand price dynamics relates to exploring the link between
future expectations and prices.
In the SSW framework the feedback mechanism of expectations into prices was analysed for
the first time by Haruvy et al. (2007). Prior to trading on a call market, subjects were asked
to predict market prices in every future period over the periods remaining for trading on that
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market. Prediction accuracy was rewarded according to a linear rule along with payoffs for
the transactions. Despite a clear hedging problem in the sense of Blanco et al. (2010), beliefs
elicitation did not affect the qualitative price patterns, i.e. observed prices were aligned with
the SSW ones. Interestingly, as the price tracked closer the fundamental value, individual
long term price expectations were getting more and more precise and the degree of belief
heterogeneity was reducing. However, along this convergence process, individual predictions
of market peaks tended to be inaccurate and on average price peaks occurred earlier than
predicted. Hence, individuals’ price expectations were not unbiased predictors of future price
movements, but were useful in predicting future short-term market price movements, despite
knowing the entire history of past prices and the true fundamental value of the asset. If
traders were to form their expectations in an adaptive manner, past prices would affect their
current trading strategy which in turn would affect the trajectory of future prices via a
beliefs-price feedback mechanism.
The centrality of beliefs in asset market experiments was the focus of a separate stream of
the experimental literature aiming at understanding expectation formation per se. Differently
from the SSW design, those experiments elicit beliefs about future variables of interest for
the purpose of assessing whether the considered theoretical model is robust to expectation
dynamics, mostly providing supportive evidence of adaptive learning behaviours. The stream
of literature originated from a paper by Marimon and Sunder (1994) highlighting that in
designing experiments one has “to be able to study individual learning rules and to distinguish
between learning to forecast and learning to solve intertemporal optimization problem".12 In
a rational expectations model, on one side, agents are asked to forecast of a future economic
variable (learning to forecast - LtF), on the other hand they are asked to take economic
decisions (learning to optimize - LtO). To reduce the dimensionality of the problem that
subjects faced in the lab, those two dimensions have often been kept separate, i.e. participants
were asked to either forecast or to take an optimal decision.
Most of the market experiments investigating expectations formation in an asset pricing
perspective followed the LtF approach: participants were only asked to provide their expect-
ations about the following period price of an unspecified risky asset.13 Subjects did not know
the underlying market equations, they only knew the history of past prices and their own
12Marimon and Sunder (1994), p. 134.
13The learning-to-forecast approach has been widely used also in other macro experiments eliciting expecta-
tions, see for example Adam (2007) for inflation expectations and Bernasconi et al. (2009) for expectations
about fiscal variables.
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past predictions, while a computer program computed the associated aggregate demand for
the asset and consequently the market equilibrium price. The simplicity of this experimental
design is at the core of a series of experiments conducted by Hommes focusing on expect-
ations dynamics in Lucas asset pricing framework (Hommes et al. (2005), Hommes et al.
(2008), Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Hommes (2011)). His experiments explore heterogeneity
of beliefs, coordination of expectations and adaptive learning dynamics as source of price
deviations from fundamental value and excess volatility. If one considers the market as an
expectations feedback system, expectations about past market behaviour influence individual
expectations which, in turn, determine current market behaviour. Depending on the type
of price expectation feedback mechanism, two types of markets can be distinguished: those
characterized by positive feedback and those by negative feedback. In the first case, if many
agents were to expect a price increase, then they would buy the asset and this would trans-
mit positively into prices. If subjects were to form their expectations extrapolating from
past prices, then the expected price increase would be self-fulfilling and purely-expectations-
driven price bubbles could emerge. This is the case for most speculative markets that are
demand-driven, like the stock markets. The opposite is true for supply-driven markets, e.g.
commodity markets, where the expectational feedback is negative, i.e. an increase in expected
price leads to an increase in production, hence a lower realized asset price.
For the scope of this review, this paper will focus only on the positive feedback mechanisms
as these are the ones characterizing asset markets. In positive feedback markets, individuals
mostly form expectations in an adaptive manner, i.e. when forecasting future prices, they take
into account the information provided by past price movements. Trend following behaviours
can trigger price bubbles if once observed a small price increase, the future price is predicted
to increase even further. This self-reinforcing mechanism drives the price even away from
fundamentals, up to a point where the revision of expectations forces participants to realize
that the price exceeds the true value of the asset, hence they revise their beliefs along a path
of convergence to the fundamental value of the asset. Those price patterns correspond to
heterogeneous individual expectations that are on average overly-optimistic at the peak of the
market, whilst they tend to converge to a common prediction strategy, i.e. belief heterogeneity
shrinks, along the convergence path to reach the fundamental value. Convergence takes place
thanks to a learning process that guides an equilibrium outcome that is sustained by the
expectation dynamics, as in Marimon et al. (1993).
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However, a big methodological caveat of these experiments is that since participants in
the experiment are not asked to actively trade, the feedback mechanism that the adaptive
learning literature identifies as source of price deviation from fundamentals could not be
assessed entirely and it is questionable whether subjects could understand the underlying
price process related to rational expectations pricing. On the other hand, Bao et al. (2013)
show that when performing both a forecasting and an optimizing task concurrently, subjects
tend to forecast without conditioning on their optimal decisions and convergence to the
rational expectations equilibrium happens at a slower rate than when participants had to
solve only one of the two tasks.
All these experiments, although providing highly influential results, depart in significant
ways from the original general equilibrium consumption based asset pricing models à la Lucas
mainly because the asset traded was living for a finite number of periods and the economy was
not stationary. Those two important peculiarities of the asset market experimental design are
abandoned in Crockett and Duffy (2013), Asparouhova et al. (2016), Donini (2016) and Donini
and Hoffmann (2016) in favour of a greater proximity to the original theoretical framework.
The latter experiments implement a simple version of an infinite horizon general equilibrium
consumption-based asset pricing model where income and dividend processes are chosen in
line with the SSW design. Differently from the SSW framework, the stationarity associated
with an infinite horizon model is induced and time discounting is introduced by proxing it
with an indefinite horizon with constant continuation probability. All those features allow to
consider the consumption smoothing motive driving asset prices in the model.
With exception of Donini (2016), the asset is traded on a double auction for an a priori
unknown number of periods. Following Camerer and Weigelt (1993), the infinite horizon
economy is converted into one with a stochastic number of periods. Subjects participate in
a number of sequences with each sequence being composed of a number of trading periods.
Each trading period has a pre-specified length during which subjects can trade the asset on
the market. At the end of each period, a random draw determines if there is another period
with a constant continuation probability. By choosing this continuation probability, the
experimenter defines the average length of a sequence, hence determines the discount factor
common to all subjects. In the original Lucas’ spirit, asset holdings are carried over from
one period to the next, while the dividend is perishable in the sense that it goes out of the
economy at the end of each trading period. The fact that the asset becomes worthless at the
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end of a period (a sort of bankruptcy risk) is a novelty with respect to the SSW design, where
the only risk faced by participants is the price risk and the experiment abstracts completely
from consumption smoothing rationale for the trading of the asset. Additionally, to ensure
the stationarity of the economy, a termination protocol is defined and followed as not to alter
the equilibrium price in the last periods played as participants could foresee that the asset
could become worthless soon.
The potentiality of these new experimental designs lies in the fact that the core of the
mechanism driving asset pricing can be fully explored by monitoring individual consumption,
asset holdings and beliefs. Asparouhova et al. (2016) bring to the lab a version of Lucas’
model with heterogeneous agents and time-varying private income streams. The longed-lived
asset is then a vehicle for smoothing intertemporally consumption, given the exploiting of the
price differential between stocks and bonds in the different states. Aligned with the model
predictions, agents are able to offset income differences across periods and trade so to have
high consumption in high states (when the asset pays high dividends) of the world and vice-
versa in low states. The resulting market clearing prices from these individual behaviours
co-move with fundamentals, but appear to be excessively volatile in the meaning of Shiller
(1981a) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). The authors relate that to a failure of one of the key
assumptions of the model, i.e. agents have perfect foresight and their beliefs about dividend
and prices are exactly correct. In the experiment, participants are told the dividend process,
but they would still need to learn about the price process. In a way, beliefs about the price
process can be approximately correct and still be far from the price process predicted by the
Lucas model in line with Adam et al. (2016). This would explain why subjects are able to
solve optimally the investment problem and smooth their consumption accordingly, but still
make small mistake in beliefs about the price process. Since the price process is endogenous,
those little mistakes are then creating a positive feedback.
A similar picture is provided in Donini (2016), bringing to the lab a version of the Lucas
model in line with Crockett and Duffy (2013), that mainly differs in the degree of heterogen-
eity, the market microstructure and eliciting subjects’ beliefs about future returns of the asset.
In the experiment, subjects are homogeneous with respect to their initial endowments, partly
in stocks and partly in cash, whilst being heterogeneous with respect to their homeground
beliefs. Risk aversion is induced, similarly to Crockett and Duffy (2013), via a concave pay-
ment function for consumption that translates consumption levels into consumption points,
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hence into monetary payoffs. The participants are asked to solve two tasks, first to forecast
the expected return of the asset, then to trade the asset on a call market. Differently from
previous implementations of a call market, participants have to indicate price thresholds
corresponding to their willingness to buy, to hold and to sell the asset. Demand and supply
functions will then be determined accordingly by aggregating the specified individual demand
and supply schedules. The novelty of this approach lies in the fact that the self-reinforcing
price-beliefs dynamics can be studied, as both future expectations about the asset profitabil-
ity and trading decisions are observable. The observed trading prices tend to often be above
fundamentals and display excessive volatility that can be linked to adaptive beliefs dynamics,
as in Asparouhova et al. (2016). Aligned with Crockett and Duffy (2013), the paper finds
that individuals are willing to smooth their consumption across states of the world, with more
participants with more optimistic future return expectations more willing to buy the asset.
However, in both experiments the asset is traded in few occasions at a price below funda-
mentals, displaying an underpricing that is at odds with asset pricing experiments following
the SSW design.
Excess volatility and its sources are studied in more detail in a related paper by Donini
and Hoffmann (2016). This experiment is designed to assess whether asset price volatility is
driven by a volatile stochastic discount factor or volatile future payoffs. The authors define
two treatments where in each of them one of the two sources of price volatility under rational
expectations is at place. Similarly to previous lab experiments on the Lucas model, parti-
cipants are asked to forecast the return of the asset and trade it on a double auction market.
The observed market clearing prices are substantially less volatile than the fundamental value
of the assets, i.e. negative excess volatility is observed and a between treatment comparison
reveals that the realized price volatility arising from volatile payoffs is higher than in the
one of a volatile stochastic discount factor. This seems to be related to that fact that it is
difficult for subjects to apply a trading strategy which would lead to optimal intertemporal
consumption smoothing. The latter difficulty translates into prices co-moving with the state
of the world, as in Crockett and Duffy (2013) and in Asparouhova et al. (2016), but way less
than the theory would predict.
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2.3.4.4 Adaptive learning
Behavioural finance and experimental economics provided a clear evidence that asset price
dynamics and excess volatility in a consumption-based asset pricing model are related to the
abandoning of full rationality. The rational expectation approach underlying asset pricing
model à la Lucas presupposes that agents know the structure of the model and the values
of the parameters. This appears to be unrealistic, whilst it seems more natural to assume
that agents have only a limited knowledge of the economy (i.e. bounded rationality) and
act as econometricians when forecasting the future state of the relevant variables, adjusting
their forecasts as new data becomes available over time. Adaptive learning introduces dy-
namics that are not present in the rational expectations model and provides an asymptotic
justification of the rational expectation hypothesis.14
In the case of asset pricing, adaptive learning has been shown to be a powerful tool in
explaining features of asset prices. Agents in those models are learning about the dividend
process (Timmermann (1993) and Timmermann (1996)) or about mean and variance of the
stock returns (Branch and Evans (2011) ) or are internally rational and learn about price
growth rates (Adam and Marcet (2011), Adam et al. (2016) and Adam, Marcet and Beutel
(2014) ) .
Timmermann (Timmermann (1993) and Timmermann (1996)) argues that adaptive learn-
ing can explain predictability of stock market returns and the excess volatility displayed in
the data by amplifying the effect of dividend shock to prices. In his framework, agents know
the form of the dividend process, but not the true parameter values of the dividend process
and they use dividends to predict future prices. If there is positive shock to the dividend and
agents estimate the growth rate of the dividend to be above the true value, then the shock
to the stock price with learning is unambiguously higher than the rational expectation shock
to the stock price. In substance, learning about the fundamentals amplifies the magnitude of
the shocks and affects prices volatility and excess returns predictability.
The observed volatility of asset prices is also matched in Branch and Evans (2011). The
authors develop a theoretical framework in which the recursive updating of expected returns
and conditional variance impact stock prices. Bubbles and crashes emerge as endogenous
responses of shocks to fundamentals to which agents adjust their estimate of risk and expected
returns. In a period of small shocks to the prices, assets are considered relatively non risky,
14See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for an exhaustive review of adaptive learning models in macroeconomics.
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hence their demand increases and this pushes the price well above the fundamental value
of the asset, while on the bubble path, the estimate of the risk increases over time. This
countervailing effect might contract the demand of the asset until price collapses well below
fundamentals and a market crash materializes.
A recent stream of adaptive learning literature spearheaded by Adam and Marcet (2011)
that has significant potential in explaining the observed patterns of asset prices has been
developed around the concept of internal rationality. Essentially the authors decompose
the standard rationality requirements into two components: the internal and the external
component. Internally rational agents maximize their discounted expected utility given a
dynamically consistent system of subjective probability beliefs about the future variables
beyond their control, including prices. External rationality, instead, assumes that agents’
subjective probability beliefs equals the objective ones of the external variables (including
future market outcomes and fundamentals) in equilibrium. By applying this approach to
a simple asset pricing model, they show that the equilibrium asset price is determined by
investors’ price and dividend expectations next period, rather than by the discounted sum of
dividends. In contrast with Timmermann’s approach, but in line with Shiller’s interpretation,
they show that learning about price behaviour affects equilibrium prices, while learning about
the discounted sum of dividends does not have any impact on the equilibrium outcome. In this
framework, expectations about future outcomes become essential determinants of the current
market price (independently of expectations about fundamentals) and this lack of complete
market knowledge of the agents is essential for the propagation of beliefs-price feedback.
This new modelling approach of learning is particularly appealing because it is fully con-
sistent with the optimizing agent behaviour, but it gives rise to equilibrium outcomes that
differ from the ones under the rational expectations hypothesis and are more aligned with
the ones in Lansing (2010). Adam et al. (2014) and Adam et al. (2016) develop models that
can explain asset pricing behaviours with agents being internally rational. The first provides
an explanation for the cyclicality of asset market booms and busts, while in the second one
the model is able to replicate volatility and persistence of the price-dividend ratio and the
predictability of long horizon excess returns.
In Adam et al. (2014), asset prices deviate substantially and cyclically from the fundamental
value of the asset due to beliefs dynamics in a simple asset pricing model à la Lucas (1978).
Imperfect knowledge about the price behaviour has strong implications for equilibrium asset
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prices as it can temporarily push asset prices away from the fundamental values of the asset
and give rise to booms and bust cycles in stock prices that are driven by beliefs dynamics. In
an attempt to learn about the process governing the behaviour of capital gains, agents make
use of past observed capital gains. This learning process is accountable for feedback between
expectations about future capital gains and realized gains and gives rise to momentum in asset
prices, i.e. when beliefs about future capital gains are optimistic, prices tend to increase
pushed by substitution effects dominating the wealth effect. On the contrary, the price
increase comes to a halt when the wealth effect dominates, as too optimistic expectations do
not lead to further price increases and investors realize that their expectations are too far
from the realized outcomes and revise downwards their expectations, leading to a reversal of
the asset price.
Differently from the latter contribution, Adam et al. (2016) develop a simple asset pricing
model à la Lucas with time-separable preferences that is able to replicate the observed asset
price volatility by allowing for small deviations of future price expectations from the rational
expectation ones. In their framework, agents learn about the average growth rate of stock
market prices and revise their expectations using a constant gain learning. Asset prices
volatility emerges over time from the belief updating process of one-step-ahead expectations,
since subjective price expectations contribute to fluctuations in actual prices. Asset prices
departure from fundamentals, momentum and mean reversion are sustained from the feedback
mechanism generated by the learning dynamics.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper reviews the academic literature on asset price puzzles that developed having
Lucas (1978) asset pricing model as the baseline model. By relaxing each key assumption of
the model, this paper studies the mechanism driving asset prices away from the fundamental
value of the asset and the sources of excessive volatility, focusing in particular on the abandon
of the rationality assumption.
In an attempt to solve the puzzles arising in a consumption-based asset pricing model, the
earlier literature proposed changes in preferences, incomplete markets and the introduction
of transaction costs, whilst more recent streams of literature abandoned the assumption of
full rationality. Relaxing the rationality assumption appeared to be the most promising way
to explore for understanding price patterns, as soon as individual expectations emerged as
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a key driver of prices in behavioural finance and in the experimental literature. The latter
dynamics have been incorporated in the most recent contributions in the adaptive learning
literature that, on one side relaxes the rational expectation assumption by introducing the
concept of internal rationality, on the other, borrows from the experimental and behavioural
findings on expectations formation mechanism to shed light on observed price patterns.
However, much still remains to be learned also on the instance of recurrent bubbles in
different markets and their relationship with individual asset demand and investment decision
in a framework with heterogeneous agents. Abandoning the paradigm of a representative
agent constitutes, in my view, the next necessary step to bridge the gap between theoretical,
empirical and experimental literature. Gaining a deeper understanding on the interaction of
individual decision making process and expectations formation can be beneficial for assessing
the impact of policy measures affecting the feedback price-beliefs, e.g. the Tobin Tax.
Chapter 3
Can Price Expectations Feedback
Generate Persistent Asset Market
Booms and Busts?
A Laboratory Test
I am particularly indebted to Klaus Adam, Dirk Engelmann, Timo Hoffmann and Stefan Penczynski for
fruitful discussions and suggestions. Thanks go also to participants at Macro Brown Bag Lunch Seminar
in Mannheim, ESA World Meeting in Zurich and Barcelona GSE Summer Forum.
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3.1 Introduction
Asset markets display persistent price movements, where booms are cyclically followed
by busts. Both theoretical and experimental literature have been studying bubbles and
their causes extensively, though rather little attention has been given to understanding what
drives this cyclical behaviour of asset market prices.1 The workhorse model used in the
macro-finance literature to address such issues is the consumption-based asset pricing model
introduced by Lucas (1978). In Lucas (1978) framework asset prices are determined as a no
trade equilibrium where all agents have rational expectations, correctly forecast future prices
and optimally decide their asset holdings so to intertemporally smooth their consumption
plans.
Recently the adaptive learning literature has relaxed these requirements by introducing the
possibility that agents have imperfect knowledge of the price process, see Branch and Evans
(2011), LeBaron (2012) or Adam et al. (2014). The latter presents a simple consumption-
based asset price model with heterogeneous agents who hold priors infinitesimally different
from the rational expectations priors. Bayesian updates of agents’ beliefs about future returns
of the asset causes low frequency booms and busts. While investors are improving their
knowledge about the behaviour of asset returns, self-reinforcing dynamics might appear as a
consequence to expectation feedback into price.
This price-beliefs dynamic is particularly difficult to test by means of field data as it requires
assessing how investors’ return expectations influence on the one hand the asset demand and
on the other hand how expectations are updated in the light of new information embedded
in the price. Expectations about the future profitability of an asset (market) have been
traditionally proxied by means of survey data, see Bacchetta et al. (2009), Hurd et al. (2011)
or Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Though return expectations can be measured with errors,
no causal link between investors’ beliefs, individual trading decisions and market outcomes
can be assessed via surveys, owing to the lack of control of the information available to each
market participant and how information is processed.
To avoid these two critical dimensions, I follow a different path and design a lab experiment.
On the one hand, in a lab I have the full control of the information disclosed, on the other
hand I can measure individual beliefs. Those two elements are key for studying the theoretical
1Hereafter, the term bubble refers to “the situation in which the price of an asset is higher than it would be
warranted given the fundamentals of the asset” as in Allen et al. (1993).
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beliefs-price feedback mechanism that generates asset market booms and busts. I implement
a simple version of an infinite horizon consumption-based asset pricing model in line with
other recent experimental contributions, additionally eliciting individual beliefs about future
returns of the asset. Moreover, in the lab the experimenter can determine the intrinsic value
of the asset by choosing the income and dividend process that are faced by the participants in
the experiment. A clear definition of the fundamental value of the asset facilitates the study
of bubbles (busts) as defined by excessively optimistic (pessimistic) stock valuations reflected
by the market clearing price. Furthermore, the lab allows me to draw near to Lucas (1978)
model by re-creating a stationary environment where infinite horizon feature is approximated
by an indefinite horizon with constant continuation probability.
Experimental economics has studied extensively asset market bubbles, both in finite and
infinite horizon model, starting from the early nineties paper by Smith et al. (1988). Their
experimental design became the benchmark for several other finite horizon bubble experi-
ments, such as the one by Haruvy et al. (2007) where beliefs about future prices are seen,
for the first time, as drivers for bubbles. Infinite horizon asset pricing models, though very
popular in theoretical literature, have not been the focal point of interest for experimentalist,
if not in recent times. Crockett and Duffy (2013) and Asparouhova et al. (2016) brought
the workhorse model of the macro-finance literature, the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model,
to the lab to study both intertemporal (e.g. consumption smoothing) and cross-sectional
predictions (e.g. equity premium puzzle). Differently from the Smith et al. (1988) design,
in the latter studies the original infinite horizon feature of the model is preserved. In their
framework, the asset traded lives for an a priori unknown number of periods and its trade
affects the individual period-by-period budget constraint. At the end of each trading period,
each subject carries over the next (if any) the asset holdings, while the subject’s cash balance
denominated in experimental currency (Taler) leaks out of the economy, i.e. it is consumed.
In Lucas (1978) terminology, the asset represents the “tree”, while the Taler are the “fruits”.
According to the adaptive learning literature, studying expectations dynamics is crucial
for understanding asset pricing persistence, as price expectations feedback are responsible for
the cyclicality of asset market booms and busts. Adam et al. (2014) have shown that a simple
consumption-based asset pricing model with agents learning about future asset returns can
generate bubbles and crashes as endogenous response to waves of optimism and pessimism
à la Shiller (2016). In a pure exchange economy where agents have imperfect knowledge of
37
the returns process and interpret differently the information embedded in the price, adaptive
learning can induce momentum. Namely, in a boom, agents become optimistic about future
asset returns, hence demand more of the asset and have even more optimistic consumption
plans. At the peak of a boom phase, return expectations are too optimistic when compared
to the realized outcomes, but as soon as the agents notice this misalignment, they start
revising their expectations downwards. Consequently the asset boom can come to an end,
due to negative price momentum.2 In this context, a bubble is forming as beliefs are driving
the market price far away from its fundamental value, as defined by a Rational Expectation
Equilibrium (REE) price.
The aim of this paper is to test experimentally the cyclicality of the asset market booms
and busts resulting from these learning behaviours. I propose a new experimental design,
where the mechanism highlighted by Adam et al. (2014) can be verified in the lab. I bring
to the lab a consumption-based asset pricing model where the expected length of the life of
the asset is long enough for participants to experience a boom and a bust phase. Before each
trading decision is taken, I elicit participants’ beliefs about future returns of the asset so
as to observe how agents process the information conveyed by the prices and assess whether
learning is taking place.3 Furthermore, having the full control of the beliefs structure permits,
on the one hand, to study the beliefs-price link by relating beliefs to the individual demand
and trading decisions, and on the other hand, to focus on the revision of beliefs as a reaction
to market price changes. The novelty of this paper is therefore studying the self-reinforcing
mechanism from both sides.
In the experiment I find that the market price exceeds the fundamental value of the asset
in a substantial number of periods. These deviations can be attributed to beliefs and to a
great extent to cross-sectional heterogeneity of expectations that do not vanish over time.
The latter comes from a twofold source of heterogeneity: subjects react heterogeneously to
observed price changes and adjust their asset demand accordingly (more optimistic subjects
demanding more of the asset), but also update heterogeneously their beliefs as a reaction
to price realizations. Moreover, it is the case that returns display weak form of momentum
whenever adaptive behaviours are balanced with contrarians behaviours. On the contrary,
2Similar mechanisms have been proposed in the adaptive learning literature also by Branch and Evans
(2011)and LeBaron (2012).
3Other experiments in the so called learning-to-forecast literature have studied expectation formation, see
Hommes et al. (2008). In this experiment, participants were not actively trading, therefore changes in the
demand of the assets were not tracked.
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mean reversion in returns appears as a limiting case in the session where adaptive learning
is not taking place.
In terms of price dynamics, the results are in line with previous experiments that imple-
mented the Lucas model, while the contribution that beliefs gives in explaining asset markets
bubbles seems milder in my framework than in Haruvy et al. (2007). The latter might be
related to the fact that it is hard for participants to provide return expectations first and
think in terms of prices once they have to trade. This issue has been recently pointed out by
Bao et al. (2013), where the fact that participants have to perform both a forecasting and a
trading task seem to lead to more unstable price dynamics.
The next section describes the key features of the theoretical model relevant for the exper-
imental design. Section 3 presents in detail the experimental set-up, while section 4 discusses
the experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical model
In the following, I present a simplified version of Adam et al. (2014), focusing on the
features relevant for the design of the experiment.4
The core of their model is a consumption-based asset pricing à la Lucas (1978) with het-
erogeneous agents having time-separable consumption preferences and imperfect information
about the asset return process. This endowment economy is populated by I infinitely living
agents (i = 1, 2, 3, 4...I) trading one unit of a risky asset St (stock) on a competitive market.
The stock is exchanged at an ex-dividend price Pt and pays a dividend Dt at the beginning
of each period.5 Dividends follow a simple persistent Markov process of the following type:
Dt =
D
H
DL
with M =
 p 1− p
1− p p
 (3.1)
with DH , DL > 0 being respectively the dividend in the high state (DH) and in the low state (DL)
and M being the transition matrix where p indicates the probability that in the consecutive period,
the state of the world will remain unchanged.
Each agent i is a risk averse utility maximizer who has to choose period-by-period how
much to consume ( Cit ) and invest (Sit) given her period-by-period budget constraint and
4The main simplification consists in having discrete persistent dividends, while in the original version of the
model dividends are following an AR(1) process.
5Time sub-index always indicates beginning-of-period variables.
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her subjective set of beliefs about the asset returns. Therefore, the individual investment
problem can be stated as follows:
max
Ci
t
>0,Si
t
∈[0,S]
EP
i
t
∞∑
t=0
δt · (C
i
t)1−γ
1− γ (3.2)
subject to
Cit + PtSit = (Pt +Dt)Sit−1 + Yt (3.3)
Sit ≥ 0 ∀t (3.4)
Sit ≤ S¯ ∀t (3.5)
Cit ≥ C with C > 0 ∀t (3.6)
Si−1 given (3.7)
where δ denotes a common discount factor, Cit individual consumption at time t, Sit the
individual stock holdings at time t while Si−1 indicates the individual initial endowment,
Yt = αDt , α > 0 an exogenous income proportional to the dividends, S¯ the number of
outstanding shares, and P i indicates the subjective probability measure of each agent i, as
in Adam et al. (2016).
Concerning the expectations formation (P i), each agent is internally rational in Adam
and Marcet (2011) sense, i.e. taking fully optimal decisions, given her system of beliefs. An
internally rational agent forms beliefs about both price realizations and future dividends, i.e.
about ω = {Pt, Dt}∞t=0, where ω ∈ Ω, element of the space of all possible realizations.
Hence, an agent makes contingent consumption plans subject to a resource constraint of
the usual type, a no-short selling constraint, an upper bound on asset holding S¯ and cannot
consume less than a minimum positive level of consumption C.
Under the assumption that beliefs are not overly optimistic and intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is smaller than one (γ−1 > 1), the optimal consumption plan is uniquely defined.6
Hence, the individual implicit asset demand function resulting from the optimization problem
described is
6See assumption 1 in Adam et al. (2014).
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[
(Sit−1 − Sit) ·
Pt
Dt
+ (Sit+1 + α)
]−γ
= δEP
i
t
[(
(Sit − Sit+1) ·Rt+1 ·
Pt
Dt
+ (Sit+1 + α) ·
Dt+1
Dt
)−γ
Rt+1
]
(3.8)
where Rt+1 = Pt+1+Dt+1Pt indicates the gross expected return that an agent has at the
beginning of time t for the end of period t+ 1. The demand for the asset is a function of the
individual stock holdings, the price-dividend ratio and the agent’s subjective beliefs about
the future profitability of the asset.
Clearly the demand function does not have a close form solution, hence three price thresholds
are defined to approximate it: the sell-all price PSAt , the indifference price P INDt and the
buy-all price PBAt . The first price threshold
(
PSAt
)
represents the lowest price at which an
agent is willing to sell all her assets, the middle price
(
P INDt
)
the inaction point at which
she wants to hold her stock endowments, while
(
PBAt
)
the highest one at which the agent is
willing to buy as many assets so as to exhaust her budget. For the derivations of these price
thresholds, see Appendix 3.6. Interestingly, these thresholds can be interpreted as proxy for
the degree of optimism (pessimism) of an agent at time t about the return of the asset in
period t+ 1.
If all the agents entertain the same set of rational beliefs P i about the return of the asset,
know the beliefs of all other traders, and have full knowledge of the two sources of risks,
i.e. the continuation probability δ and the dividend process, then the market clearing price
corresponds to the Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE). Therefore, the above-mentioned
infinite horizon investment problem would have the following solution:
PREEt = Et
 ∞∑
j=1
δj
(
Dt+j
Dt
)−γ (3.9)
= δ1− δD
γ
t · Et
 ∞∑
j=1
(Dt+j)1−γ
 (3.10)
= δ1− δD
γ
t B (3.11)
where B is a constant defined as B ≡ p · (DH)1−γ + (1− p) · (DL)1−γ .7
In the specific case, the REE price depends on the discount factor, on a constant defined by
7See Adam and Marcet (2011) for further discussion on the underlying probability space.
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the transition probability of the dividend realizations corrected for the risk aversion parameter
and on the same period dividend Dt. Given the dividend structure specified above, two
prices are possible in rational expectations depending on the state of the world: one in
correspondence of DL and one of DH . Similarly, the REE stock return will also be dependent
on state of the world.
In the REE, the price of the asset is equal to its fundamental value, so no bubble is taking
place. However, if one considers agents doubting that the asset return is constant over time,
beliefs dynamics might cause deviation from an REE, hence asset price booms or busts might
appear. If agents entertain beliefs about the future returns of the asset deviating from the
fully rational outcome, then the market clearing price can deviate from the intrinsic value
of the stock. These deviations are shown in Adam et al. (2014) to be dependent on agents’
adaptive beliefs, i.e. more optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs might drive the price above (below)
the fundamentals. Moreover, if beliefs revision is taking place according to an adaptive rule,
then price displays a cyclical behaviour. Unlike rational expectations models, learning can
generate endogenously asset market price swings, by associating high values of price-dividend
ratio to optimistic return expectations.
The following section describes the experimental set-up designed to test the proposed
mechanism in a lab.
3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 General set-up
The experiment constitutes of one unique treatment composed of rounds and sequences.
A sequence is defined by a random number of rounds and it has a stochastic end, whilst
each round consists of a forecasting and a trading task. In a round, each participant first
forecasts the return of the asset, then decides at which price will buy/ hold/ sell the asset on
a computerized market.
At the start of a sequence (at time t = 0), twelve participants are endowed with equal
initial endowments, made up of 50 units of stock and (Sit = 50∀i = 1, 2...12, so S¯ = 600) and
a positive balance of tradable income denominated in the experimental currency, the Taler.
Before forecasting the return of the asset, the subjects know the first dividend drawn and
the additional income, their initial endowments and the number of stock outstanding, S¯. S¯
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remains constant throughout the experiment.
Dividends follow a simple persistent Markov process, as specified in Section 3.2, where
DH = 5 and DL = 1, with probability p = 0.7 to be in the same state in the consecutive
period and 1 − p = 0.3 to move to the other state. The income process is proportional to
the dividend draw, Yt = αDt, where α = 100. Similarly to Asparouhova et al. (2016), the
additional income co-moved with the dividend draw, i.e. income is high-dividend state and
vice versa for in the low-dividend state.8
Below is a description of the structure of one round starting at time t. See figure 3.1.
1. A random draw from a known distribution determines the state of the world, hence the
dividend Dt and the correspondent tradable income Yt for the period starting.
2. Each participant is asked to forecast the expected return of the asset at the end of
the consecutive period conditional on an information set ωt , EPit (Rt+1 | ωt), knowing
Pt−1, Dt, Rt−1, Sit−1 and Sit .
3. Participants submit individual demand/supply schedules by specifying three price thresholds:
the price at which they are willing to sell all assets they own (PSAt ), the one at which
they neither want to buy nor to sell (P INDt ) and the one at which they would like to
buy as many assets as they can (PBAt ).
4. After the trading phase ends, aggregate supply and demand schedule are determined via
piecewise linear interpolation between the price thresholds. Hence, a market clearing
price (Pt) is defined. Given the asset price, the individual stock (Sit) and cash holdings
can be updated.
5. Consumption points (CP) and forecasting points (FP) can be assigned to each par-
ticipant. CP are assigned via induced utility method and forecasting points (FP) by
means of a scoring rule assigning more points to more precise forecasts. Participants
were only informed about their individual CP and FP on a feedback screen, though
they were not aware of CP and FP of other subjects taking part in the experiment.
6. The computer determines via a random number if another round in the same sequence
takes place. If there is another round, then the there is another round with the same
structure for all subjects within a session. If the sequence continued, then another
round with an identical structure starts. If there are no further periods the sequence
8This should mimic real economy cycles, as dividend are high when economy is in a boom phase and low
when we are in a downturn. Moreover, the positive correlation between income and dividend should help
participants understanding consumption smoothing across periods.
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ends.9
Figure 3.1: Structure of a sequence
3.3.2 Stating the returns expectation
At the beginning of each round, the state of the world is determined, therefore subjects
know the cash endowments in experimental currency (Taler) that they have available for
trading in that period. The first task they have to perform is forecasting the return of the
asset (in percentage) that they are anticipating to realize at the end of the following round,
i.e. EPit (Rt+1 | ωt). On one hand, eliciting those beliefs allows me to stay close to the theory,
while on the other hand it makes it difficult for subjects to predict the return correctly, as
participants need to forecast both the end of period market clearing price and the end of the
consecutive period price. To facilitate the task, an intuitive definition of asset returns and
some illustrative numerical examples on how to compute the returns were provided in the
instructions. See Appendix 3.8 for an English translation of the instructions. Moreover, in
line with other asset market experiments, see Hommes et al. (2008), subjects visualize the
entire time series of realized returns. In addition to the graphical representation of the realized
returns, on the trading screen the entire history of past market clearing prices, dividends and
realized returns up to t−1 together with their previous round individual asset holdings, Sit−1
, are displayed. Information about other participants’ asset holdings or other participants’
9Further, there was a protocol in place that ensured that a session did not go over the 2:45 h time limit.
After 120 min of the experiment a sequence was put on hold. "Synthetic" periods were added to the
actually played rounds in which subjects received CP based on their asset holdings at the end of the
last played period. No FP could be earned for these synthetic periods. This procedure was explained in
the instructions and ensured that subjects’ behaviour in later rounds were not distorted because subjects
expected the session to end due to time limits.
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return expectations are not disclosed, as the information set of each agent includes only her
own past predictions, the market price and market outcomes.
Participants’ beliefs are incentivised via a scoring function that attributes more points,
the closer the individual prediction is to the realized return for the correspondent period.
The smaller is the forecast error for each individual prediction, the higher is the number of
forecasting points the participant gets. In particular, forecasting points are attributed as
follows:
FP = max{20− f, 0} (3.12)
where f =| EPit (Rt+1) − Rt+1 | is the forecast error in percentage terms, i.e. a positive
number of forecasting points is associated with individual forecast smaller than twenty per
cent, while the maximum number of points (20) corresponds to no forecast error. Since the
precision of the forecast cannot be evaluated in the first period of each sequence due to the
fact that the first return realizes at the end of the second period played, these rounds were
excluded for payment.
3.3.3 Trading the asset
Once participants have entered their predictions for next round return of the asset, they
can observe graphically the time series of the market clearing prices and must specify three
positive price thresholds. First, the one at which they want to sell all of the assets (“Sell-all”
point, SA), then the one at which they are indifferent between buying and selling (“Indiffer-
ence” point, IND), finally the one at which they are willing to buy as much as they can given
their individual resources (“Buy-all” point, BA). The SA price is the lowest price at which a
participant is willing to sell all her stocks on the market, the IND price is the one at which
she does not want to participate in the market, i.e. neither buying nor selling, while the BA
price represents the highest price at which she wants to use all her available cash to buy as
many stocks as she can. In other words, the price at which a participant is willing to exhaust
all the resources for the current round, that is to use the income she got at the beginning of
the round and the dividend paid on her previous round asset holdings to buy stocks, knowing
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that each round the subject has to consume at least C = 1.10 The latter three thresholds
define the individual excess demand schedule that, for simplicity, I assume to be piecewise
linear with a kink in correspondence of the indifference point. To have consistent demand and
supply schedules, participants were asked to enter price thresholds respecting the following
ordering: PSA > PIN > PBA, i.e. the price participants have to enter at the SA point needs
to be at least 0.1 units higher than the one at the indifference point that in turns needs to
be at least 0.1 higher than the one at the BA point. In case this ordering was not respected,
an error message was displayed on the screen and a new price needed to be specified.11
When everyone has specified the extremes of their schedule, a market clearing price can be
determined. Since all participants are willing to supply stocks above the maximum indiffer-
ence price, while above the minimum indifference price everyone demands, then the market
clearing price would be between these indifference price thresholds, i.e. Pt ∈ (PminIN,t, PmaxIN,t ).
Given that one can only buy/hold/sell a unit of stock and not fractions of it, multiplicity of
market clearing prices is possible with this clearing mechanism. If the price is not unique,
then the mean of the prices is considered to be as the one clearing the market. However, it
can also be the case that a price clearing the market does not exist as supply and demand
schedules do not match exactly. In the latter case, the switching point where excess supply
turns into excess demand would be used to determine the market clearing price for the round.
At that point rationing of demand (if demand exceeds supply) or of supply (if supply exceeds
demand) is taking place, so a rule to specify how to attribute the extra unit available is
deemed necessary. The extra units of assets were then randomly assigned to the participants
that, at that particular price, had demand for the asset or were willing to supply the asset on
the market. This clearing mechanism is close to that used in experimental call markets, see
Van Boening et al. (1993). Differently from the other experimental work on testing the Lucas
(1978) asset pricing where double auction is adopted, this study follows Haruvy et al. (2007)
approach to the market microstructure and implements a call market, as it is better suited
for the purpose of belief elicitation.12 The call market as defined above was programmed in
zTree (Fischbacher (2007)).
10The lowest value for consumption corresponds to the dividend paid by one stock in the low state of the
world.
11Tolerance level of 0.1 corresponds to the unit of the grid defined for the interpolation in between the points.
12A double auction makes beliefs about future returns more difficult to elicit, since a “period price” is not
unambiguously defined. For pros and cons of the two types of clearing mechanisms, see Sunder (1995).
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3.3.4 Result of a period
Once a market clearing price Pt was defined, participants were informed about the resulting
return of the asset (if the round was not the first of a sequence), their individual end-of-period
balances were determined as from their individual budget constraint, their end of period cash
and individual stock holdings.
At this point, each individual cash endowment was converted to consumption points and
then disappeared from the economy.
In line with Crockett and Duffy (2013), consumption points were attributed via induced-
utility method. Using a concave payment function for rewarding consumption decision has a
twofold goal: on one side it should facilitate consumption smoothing, on the other it induces
risk aversion to those participants that by nature would be risk neutral or slightly risk lover,
while making the risk averse participants even further risk averse.
Differently from their approach, consumption values denominated in Taler are converted
into consumption points via a CRRA specification, where the risk aversion coefficient (γ) is
set to be equal to 0.7. 13
CP = U(Cit) =
(Cit)1−γ
1− γ =
1
0.3 · (C
i
t)0.3 (3.13)
The conversion was explained to participants intuitively in the instructions, both via the
formula itself and a table converting the most common Taler values to CP. See Appendix 3.8
for details.
3.3.5 Length of a sequence
In line with previous experiments (Crockett and Duffy (2013) and Asparouhova et al.
(2016)) the infinite horizon of the Lucas (1978) model is approximated via indefinite horizon.
At the end of each round of trade, a random number is drawn from a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1. If the selected number is above 0.972 then the sequence stops. In all other
cases, another round is played, i.e. in expectation in 1 out of 36 cases the sequences comes to
an end. Should a sequence continue with another round, then the individual asset holdings
13A γ = 0.7 is consistent with Holt and Laury (2002) measure for risk aversion and with an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution bigger than one, as required by the model.
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are carried over to the next round, while if the sequence ends, the asset became worthless.
Since the scope of this paper is to study the cyclicality of asset market prices, an asset has
an expected life of 35 rounds, way longer than the above-mentioned experimental papers,
where the continuation probability was five sixths. Hommes et al. (2008) have shown that
prices in an experimental asset market display a second boom phase around the 40th round
played, which should ensure that participants experience at least a boom and a bust phase
within the same sequence. This complex procedure is explained to the subjects intuitively
by means of a dice example and participants are asked to answer a test question about it
before the beginning of the experiment to make sure that they understood fully the constant
continuation probability.
Moreover, to be consistent with the original Lucas (1978) framework, stationarity of the
economy needs to be ensured. To do so, at the beginning of the experiment it was announced
that the experiment lasts until a pre-specified time (i.e. two lecture blocks, approximately 3
hours) and that there would have been as many replications (sequences) of the economy as
possible during this time, similarly to Asparouhova et al. (2016). If a sequence ended and more
than 30 minutes are left, then a new sequence started. Otherwise it was announced to the
participants that the experiment was over. On the contrary, if a sequence was still running by
closing time, then the sequence was kept on hold. In order to achieve stationarity, 35 synthetic
periods were added to the individual consumption to ensure stationarity of the economy. In
case artificial consumption periods were considered, participants were getting credit for their
expected consumption in each period, that is the expected income (150 Taler) and expected
dividend paid on their individual asset holdings in the last round played. Hence, in case
these synthetic periods were to be selected for the final payment, participants received their
expected number of consumption points assuming no trade took place from the last round
played. Forecasting periods were instead drawn for the periods participants have effectively
played.
3.3.6 Subjects’ payments
Participants could earn money from both tasks they performed, i.e. from the forecasting
task and from trading. Additionally, participants receive a 7 Euro show-up fee. Since both
tasks were incentivised as explained earlier in this Section, to the avoid the hedging problems
pointed out inBlanco et al. (2010), I randomly selected 10 rounds for payment. Of those, 5
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were randomly selected for forecasting and 5 different ones for consumption.
Consumption points, as attributed via induced-utility measure, and forecasting points, as
from the scoring rule, were converted into Euro at a unique exchange rate: 1CP = 1FP =
0.15 Euro . The exchange rate was computed based on the no-trade average equilibrium
for consumption and the average trial sessions forecast error, taking into account that a
participant should earn at least 9 Euro per hour. On average participants have earned
23 Euro.14
3.4 Results
The experiment was run in September 2013 in the experimental lab of the University
of Mannheim. Five repetitions of the experiment took place, with participants being mostly
undergraduate students of the same university. Each session involved 12 subjects with no prior
experience of my experimental design (60 subjects in total) and no individual participated in
more than one session. Each session lasted approximately 3 hours, including the time reading
the instructions and the time for participants to familiarize with the trading interface. Table
3.1 provides details of the five experimental sessions, with each session composed of several
sequences of different lengths. In total 13 sequences (313 periods) were played by 60 subjects.
The longest sequence was played in the third session, while the shortest one lasted only one
period during the first session.
Number of Number of Periods
Session Sequences (Total by Session, Min within Session, Max) Subjects
1 4 (66, 1, 52) 12
2 3 (76, 9, 38) 12
3 1 (64, 64, 64) 12
4 2 (57, 24, 33) 12
5 3 (50, 7, 28) 12
Overall 13 (313, 1, 64) 60
Table 3.1: Summary data of all experimental sessions
In the following sections I turn to the analysis of the experimental results, first presenting
the overall patterns in market prices and turnover, then analysing the elicited beliefs. For
many rounds, the market price is above the fundamental value of the asset, defined as the
14On average participants earned a little less than a 27 Euro targeted due to high volatility of the realized
returns, that made forecasting a relatively difficult task.
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REE price and it is about 3 times more volatile than the fundamental. Mean and dispersion
of the expected return distribution can explain a substantial fraction of those deviations,
once I control for session and sequence-specific effects. Moreover, heterogeneity in beliefs
does not vanish over time, but rather comes as a reaction to past price changes reflected
into different individual demand schedule. In such a complex context adaptive learning as
suggested by theory seems to take place for a limited fraction of participants. Interestingly,
when the fraction of adaptive learners is relatively higher, market price displays a weak form
of momentum, as the theory would predict.
3.4.1 Price and quantity dynamics
Figure 3.2 illustrates the time series of the market clearing price and the fundamental value
of the asset in each period, in every session. Each panel corresponds to one session, where the
transaction price is displayed along with its fundamental value. Since multiple sequences were
played in one session, a vertical dashed line identifies the end of a sequence and the beginning
of a new one. Despite the similarities with Crockett and Duffy (2013) set-up, undershooting
of the fundamentals is observed only in the second session where the market clearing price
is half as much as the fundamental value. Instead, it is the case that the asset tends to be
overvalued for the majority of the rounds played. Prices exceed fundamentals in the low (41.5
Taler) as well as in the high state (154.8 Taler), though they tend to get closer to the REE price
towards the last rounds played, without fully converging to it. The highest transaction price
levels are reached in the fourth session, peaking at 1249.5 Taler. Since no short selling was
allowed, at this level no trade could occur given the endowments defined in the set-up; the
stock was too expensive and no participants could afford buying any unit of the asset. In
this regard, trade occurred infrequently and price was not informative of a match between
demand and supply. This problem was particularly severe in the fourth session, and for this
reason session four is discarded from most of the analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Market clearing price and fundamental value of the asset
Market clearing price (blue) and fundamental value of the asset (red). Dashed vertical lines (green) indicate
the end of a sequence.
However, the overvaluation of the asset does not correspond to peaks in the quantity ex-
changed. Since the market price is determined based on the price thresholds each participant
enters, it is possible that market clearing occurs at price levels at which no trade can take
place, either because stocks are not affordable or because there is no supply at that level. In
this sense, the asset is not in a bubble, as high prices are not associated with excessive trading,
but rather low. Volumes of trade are actually very high for prices close to the fundamental
value of the asset or below it, as the market is very liquid. A simple measure of trading
volumes is represented by the turnover index, i.e. the ratio of the stocks exchanged over the
total outstanding. Figure 3.3 shows the time series of the index for all sessions.
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Figure 3.3: Turnover index
Turnover is expressed as number of stocks exchanged over the ones outstanding, expressed in percentage.
Dashed vertical lines (green) indicate the end of a sequence.
The magnitude of the asset overvaluation is assessed in Table 3.2. I report by column the
average transaction price and fundamental value by sequence, together with the Relative Ab-
solute Deviation (RAD) and the Relative Deviation (RD) as proposed by Stöckl et al. (2010).
The last two measures allow the comparison between the extent of the mispricing and the
overvaluation (undervaluation) across sequences. The RAD measures the average mispricing
by averaging the absolute deviations of the price from the fundamental and rescaling them
by the average fundamental value for that session, while the RD measures the overvaluation
(undervaluation) of the asset relying on the raw price deviations. In most of the sessions,
the two indices point to mispricing as overvaluation of the stock that is diminishing towards
the end of the session, without vanishing completely.15 For example, in the fifth session, the
price differs from the average fundamental value by 427%. Such difference shrinks to 238% in
the second sequence and drops to 78% in the last session. In contrast, in the second session,
the dynamics are reversed, i.e. the transaction price starts close to the fundamentals and
15A formal test of convergence of the price to the REE price is presented in Appendix 3.7.1. Strong convergence
of the market price to fundamentals is not rejected for the first and the last session in the experiment.
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ends halving the REE price. A t-test of equality of the market price to the fundamentals at
sequence level leads to accepting the alternative hypothesis that the average market clear-
ing price is statistically different from the fundamental value of the asset. In particular the
difference between the two is strictly positive (t = 13.408, p-value: 0.00 ).
Number of Average Average
Sequence Periods Price Fundamentals RAD RD
Session 1 1 11 386.93 93.04 3.15 3.15
2 1 242.2 41.51 4.83 4.83
3 2 311.9 154.88 1.01 1.01
4 52 246.02 106.91 1.34 1.30
Session 2 1 38 90.48 83.27 0.59 0.08
2 9 68.82 117.09 0.52 -0.41
3 29 57.84 100.14 0.59 -0.42
Session 3 1 64 355.44 76.93 3.81 3.61
Session 4 1 33 611.75 106.78 4.72 4.72
2 24 564.15 60.40 8.33 8.33
Session 5 1 7 215.45 41.51 4.27 4.19
2 15 229.07 71.74 2.38 2.19
3 28 127.43 86.04 0.78 0.48
Table 3.2: Measures of mispricing
By column: number of sequences by session and number of periods by sequence, average market clearing price
and correspondent fundamental value by sequence. The last two columns contain a measure of mispricing,
the Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) and one of overvaluation, the Relative Deviation (RD). See Stoeckle
et al. (2010) for a precise definition of these indices.
Moreover, transaction prices appear significantly more volatile than fundamentals, up to
6 times more. This excess volatility displayed in Table 3.3 is also found in a similar set-up
by Asparouhova et al. (2016). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms it by rejecting the null
hypothesis of equality of average standard deviations of the market clearing price and the
fundamentals (z = 2.657, p-value: 0.0079 ). Similarly to the average price pattern, there is
no convergence to the volatility of the fundamentals at the end of a sequence, but volatility
seems to be a rather persistent phenomenon.
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Number of Stand. Dev. Stand. Dev.
Sequence Periods Price Fundamentals
Session 1 1 11 188.12 56.66
2 1 0 0
3 2 6.02 0
4 52 80.82 56.05
Session 2 1 38 54.88 54.74
2 9 15.26 53.69
3 29 64.49 56.73
Session 3 1 64 261.61 52.58
Session 4 1 33 260.24 56.10
2 24 313.30 42.32
Session 5 1 7 156.05 0
2 15 151.59 50.27
3 28 91.02 55.45
Table 3.3: Volatility market clearing prices and fundamentals
By column: number of sequences by session and number of periods by sequence, standard deviation of the
market clearing price and of fundamental value by sequence. Volatility of zero corresponds to the case of flat
fundamentals.
3.4.2 Beliefs dynamics
At the beginning of each round of trade, beliefs about the future returns of the asset are
elicited. In Table 3.4, the mean of the expected returns distribution (third column) and the
realized returns by sequence (fourth column) are reported.
In about half of the sequences played (in 7 out of 13 sequences), participants tend to over-
estimate the return of the asset if compared to the return that realizes in the correspondent
round, though as the experiment progresses, their predictions tend to become more precise.
On average, though, the average forecast error does not converge to zero, except in Session
1 and 5. A formal test of strong convergence as performed in Bao et al. (2013) reveals that
the average expected return converges to the long run expected value of the realised returns
for these sessions. In other words, the average forecast error in these sessions shrinks and
approaches zero, hinting at a possible presence of adaptive learning dynamics. See Appendix
3.7.1 for an econometric specification of the test.
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Number of Mean Mean
Sequence Periods Expected Return Realized Return
Session 1 1 11 3.09 -3.45
2 1 34.08 .
3 2 9.5 5.49
4 52 11.07 18.07
Session 2 1 38 6.15 14.83
2 9 12.08 18.96
3 29 50.41 29.74
Session 3 1 64 20.96 200.06
Session 4 1 33 9.95 2.66
2 24 359.84 29.69
Session 5 1 7 15.89 203.64
2 15 81.34 131.07
3 28 59.63 43.13
Table 3.4: Expected and realized returns
By column: number of sequences by session and number of periods by sequence, mean expected returns and
mean of the realized returns by sequence.
Moreover, participants’ excessive optimism about returns appears to be time-varying. In
particular after an unexpectedly high (low) realized return, not only the mean of the expected
return increases (decreases), but also the dispersion of the beliefs distribution. The latter is
essentially never vanishing, i.e. beliefs heterogeneity is present at every round of trade. In
line with previous literature, the degree of beliefs heterogeneity is proxied by the standard
deviation of the expected return distribution. As observed in Figure 3.4 a high degree of
beliefs dispersion is common to all sessions.16 Moreover, it rises when the market clearing
price is far away from the fundamental value of the asset. On the one hand, high disagreement
between participants is associated with high demand for the asset which raises the market
clearing price and pushes it further away from the fundamental value. On the other hand,
a high degree of beliefs dispersion might provide evidence of an heterogeneous reaction to
realized returns. The latter aspects are further investigated in the coming sections.
16An extremely high volatility of the realized returns is observed in the third session, though this results from
several consecutive rounds where no trade took place.
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Figure 3.4: Cross-sectional belief dispersion by session
Beliefs heterogeneity by session, measured by the time series of the standard deviation of the expected return
distribution (blue). Dashed vertical lines indicate the end of a sequence (green).
3.4.3 Explaining price deviations
As pointed out previously, the price observed on the market deviates substantially from
the fundamental value of the asset. Hence, understanding these deviations might shed fur-
ther light on the nature of the asset overvaluation. Since in the lab returns expectations at
individual level are elicited in every round played, it is interesting to consider whether these
divergences can be attributed to beliefs. To explore the link between beliefs and mispricing
from fundamentals, I run several regression specifications with the time series of the devi-
ation of the market clearing price from the fundamental value (computed at period level)
as dependent variable and the mean and variance of the expected returns distribution as
independent variables, controlling for sequence-specific effects.
Table 3.5 summarises the results, with each column corresponding to a different specific-
ation. First, I consider a specification where the sequence dummies are the only regressors,
then the set of regressors is enriched by including the average expected return for the the cor-
respondent period (second column), then the dispersion measure is included (third column),
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and finally both moments of the expected return distributions are included (fourth column).17
Due to a substantial degree of mispricing from fundamentals across sessions, a high fraction
of the deviations is explained by the time dummies, as acknowledged by an R-squared of 0.47
in the first specification. Once the mean and the variance of the expected returns distribution
are inserted as independent variables, then the goodness of fit improves till about 0.50, i.e.
even in the presence of big differences across sessions, beliefs seem to have some explanatory
power. Aligned with theoretical predictions, the deviations from fundamentals are increasing
when beliefs are more optimistic and more dispersed. This relates to the fact that more
optimistic participants might want to increase their stock endowments, therefore demand
more of the asset. Since stocks are in fixed supply, then demand will push the price up,
further away from the rational expectations outcome. Moreover, when the beliefs are more
dispersed, i.e. there is disagreement about the profitability of the asset, then price divergence
from fundamentals increases. Dispersion of beliefs seems to matter more than the degree
of optimism, as confirmed also by smaller values of both information criteria, Akaike and
Bayesian, in correspondence of the third specification, indicating it as sightly more preferable
than the others.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FV ∆FV ∆FV ∆FV
Mean Expectation 0.187∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.05) (0.04)
Stand. Dev. Expectation 0.544∗∗ 0.465∗∗
(0.22) (0.23)
Sequence dummies
√ √ √ √
Session dummies
√ √ √ √
Obs. 253 253 253 253
R-squared 0.476 0.484 0.491 0.494
AIC 3326.884 3325.040 3321.719 3322.233
BIC 3348.085 3349.774 3346.453 3350.500
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3.5: OLS regression deviation from fundamentals
∆FV (distance market clearing price from fundamental value computed) regressed on the mean and standard
deviation of the expected return distribution controlling for sequence specific fixed effects. Every variable is
constructed at period level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Session 4 and the second and
third sequence in Session 2 are excluded from the sample.
17The sequence dummies are such that the first sequence dummy is one if the sequence corresponds to the first
one played in each session and zeros otherwise, the second sequence dummy is one in the second session
played and zeros otherwise etc. This allows me to control for the within session trends.
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Understanding the source of beliefs heterogeneity emerges as key to explain the overpricing
of the asset. The latter can stem from heterogeneity in processing the information embedded
in past prices (or returns), so from an individual-specific adjustment of the individual demand
schedule, or from an heterogeneous reactions to price changes, hence from an individual-
specific adjustment of the beliefs about the future profitability of the asset.
Both elements determining the feedback loop beliefs-prices are considered separately in
the following sections aiming at disentangling the two components of the self-reinforcing
price dynamics. In Section 3.4.4, to gain further understanding of the belief heterogeneity, I
first assess how subjects adjust their demand-supply schedule as a reaction to price changes
(beliefs-demand side). Subsequently, in Section 3.4.5, I focus on the individual expectations
revision, analysing how beliefs are revised once trading took place (price-beliefs revision).
3.4.4 Explaining beliefs heterogeneity: link beliefs-demand
If theory predictions were verified, one should observe a positive correlation between in-
dividual expectations and asset holdings, i.e. more optimistic subjects demand more of the
asset at a given price. To explore the relationship between expectations and subsequent
trading decisions, I rank subjects in each period according to their expectations on future
asset returns, from the lowest to the highest, assigning the mid-rank should two subjects
enter identical expected returns. Each participant is ranked in each period played so that
larger ranks indicate higher optimism about the return for the correspondent period. This
ranking procedure have a twofold goal: providing a measure of optimism that is not sensitive
to session specificities, since the range of ranks is constant and extreme outliers would have
no effect on mean and standard deviation.
The rank of each subject is considered to connect individual expectations with individual
trading decisions to assess first if there is a positive link between beliefs and net purchases,
then to study the relationship of beliefs and share holdings, while controlling for sequence-
specific effects. The results of these regressions at session level and the pooled ones controlling
for sequence specific effects are reported in Table 3.6.
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Net Sequence Share Sequence
Purchases Dummies Holdings Dummies
Session 1 0.055∗∗∗
√
1.348∗∗∗
√
(0.01) (0.29)
Session 2 0.107∗∗
√
0.575
√
(0.03) (0.35)
Session 3 0.018
√ −1.134∗∗ √
(0.02) (0.41)
Session 4 0.0006
√
0.342
√
(0.003) (0.28)
Session 5 0.079∗∗
√
0.034
√
(0.02) (0.22)
Pooled 0.0435∗∗
√
0.1877
√
(0.02) (0.16)
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3.6: OLS regression net purchases and share holdings
Net purchases regressed on the ranking of subjects in the expected return distribution and sequence dummies
in the first two columns, share holdings regressed on the ranking of subjects in the expected return distribution
and sequence dummies in the third and fourth column. Pooled regressions controlling for sequence fixed effects
are reported in the last two rows of the table. Regressions run at period level.
In three out of five sessions considered, the ranking of the beliefs is a significant predictor of
net purchases, with more positive beliefs associated with greater net purchases. The pattern
is also confirmed at pooled level. If I consider the total share holdings at the beginning of a
period instead, the ranking of the beliefs display a positive correlation with the share holdings
only in one session in the experiment, hinting at optimistic behaviours in correspondence of
those participants with high stock endowments in the first session.
To check the robustness of beliefs as determinants of individual behaviours, a regression
where net sales are depending on the ranking in the beliefs distribution is also considered
in Appendix 3.7.2. The results suggest that beliefs influence more the buying than selling
decisions. The latter asymmetry might be related to the fact that purchases involve anti-
cipation of future resale, while the profitability of a sale, once concluded, is not affected by
future returns.
To further investigate the relevance of beliefs on demand, I then consider the relationship
between beliefs and the demand schedule participants specified in each trading period. In my
set-up, a higher demand for the asset translates into an upward shift of the price thresholds,
conditionally on the past prices. In Table 3.7 the results of a panel regression with individual
fixed effects are reported, with the three price thresholds as dependant variables. The latter
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are regressed on the individual ranking of the beliefs, the last market clearing price, the first
lag of the respective price threshold, as the price thresholds display persistence over time, the
dividend to capture state-specific dynamics and the change in the asset holdings with respect
to the previous trading period.
A marginal increase of the individual degree of optimism is associated with an increase
in the three price thresholds, although with different magnitudes. Given the way individual
demand-supply function is determined, this corresponds to an outwards shift of the schedule,
i.e. a relatively more optimistic subject is willing to buy/sell stocks at a higher price. The
same type of reasoning can be applied for the reaction to the last market clearing price
observed and changes in the asset holdings from one period to the next one. A difference in
the magnitude of the reaction between the sell-all and the buy-all price is remarkable and
confirms a relatively smaller influence of beliefs on individual sale decisions.
PSA P IND PBA
Ranking Beliefs 2.942∗∗ 3.668∗∗ 4.805∗∗
(1.19) (1.79) (2.04)
1st lag market price 0.178∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
1st lag dep. variable 0.359∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Dividend 9.589∗∗∗ 11.864∗∗∗ 15.532∗∗∗
(2.29) (2.68) (3.28)
Asset change 1.166∗∗∗ 2.580∗∗∗ 3.980∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.45) (0.71)
Individual Fixed Effect
√ √ √
Sequence Fixed effect
√ √ √
Obs 3596 3596 3596
R-squared 0.513 0.525 0.491
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Panel regression price thresholds
Price thresholds regressed on the average expected return, first lag of the market clearing price, first lag of the
price threshold, dividend and change in asset holding, sequence dummies and individual specific fixed effects.
Entire sample.
3.4.5 Explaining beliefs heterogeneity: learning
A closer look at the individual data will shed further light into a second dimension of the
cross sectional beliefs heterogeneity: the reaction to realized returns. To analyse whether
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adaptive learning is taking place, I follow Bao et al. (2013) and classify participants accord-
ing to the way they process the information embedded in the price. Differently from their
specification, realized returns are considered as independent variables and not prices, in line
with the theory that assumes participants are learning about the realization of the returns
rather than prices. For each participant, the two specifications were run as follows:
EP
i
t (Rt+1) = Rit + λi(Rt − EP
i
t (Rt)) (3.14)
EP
i
t (Rt+1) = Rt + γi(Rt −Rt−1) (3.15)
where EPit (Rt+1) indicates the expected return of subject i as asked at the beginning of
period t for the end of period t + 1, EPit (Rt) indicates the expected return of subject i had
at the beginning of period t− 1 for the end of period t, while Rt, Rt−1 stands for the realized
return respectively at time tand at t− 1.
For each subject I estimate the learning specifications and assign a type to each participant
in the experiment depending on the model with the highest explanatory power. A subject
can therefore be considered an adaptive learner or following a trend extrapolating rule. In
the latter case, the participant will be considered: a contrarian if γi < 0 or a trend follower if
γi > 0 or ’Other ’ should the coefficients of both specifications not be statistically significant.
Results follow in Table 3.8, where each cell contains the number of subjects per type and
the last column contains the observed autocorrelation of the realized returns, as a measure
of cyclicality of asset returns.
Adaptive Trend Autocorrelation
learner follower Contrarian Other Realized Return
Session 1 4 2 4 2 0.073
Session 2 0 6 0 6 -0.152
Session 3 1 5 1 5 -0.065
Session 4 1 5 3 3 -0.161
Session 5 3 2 4 3 -0.089
Table 3.8: Categorization of participants and autocorrelation of returns
Categorization of participants by type for each Session and corresponding autocorrelation of the realized
returns.
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Though no causal inference can be drawn from this classification of individuals according
to the reaction of their expectations to past realized returns, a balanced mixed of adaptive
learners and contrarians is associated with a weak form of momentum. On the contrary, if
one excludes the fourth session, as earlier in the analysis, the absence of adaptive behaviours
is associated with a limiting case of mean reversion. In line with the findings by Bao et al.
(2013), the price seems to be more stable, the more subjects follow adaptive behaviours, hence
it is easier for participants to predict future returns. In my set-up this would correspond to
realized returns that are positively autocorrelated, i.e. a high return in the past would be
an indication of future returns moving in the same direction. In particular, it is interesting
to note that in the first and the fifth session strong convergence of beliefs to their long run
equilibrium is also observed. However, given that the latter pattern occurs only in two of the
sessions, more replications of the experiment would be required to prove the robustness of
this phenomenon.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents a new experimental design for testing the cyclicality of asset market
booms and busts. In line with recent experimental contributions bringing the Lucas (1978)
model to the laboratory, I design an experiment where the price feedback mechanism emerging
in a consumption-based asset pricing by beliefs dynamics can be studied. Both the beliefs-
demand side and the price-beliefs side can be analysed in a set-up that combines the previous
experimental literature of the learning-to-forecast with the learning-to-optimize.
My results show that the market price tends to deviate from the the fundamental value of
the asset. Despite the high heterogeneity across experimental sessions, beliefs can account,
even though marginally, for those deviations. Unlike theoretical predictions, market returns
are rarely cyclical, but rather tend to display mean reversion. Weak cyclicality is displayed in
sessions where the fraction of participants revising their expectations adaptively is balanced
with respect to those revising their expectations as contrarians, whilst mean reversion seems
to be associated with a limiting case where no adaptive subject was classified.
The contribution of beliefs in explaining price deviations from fundamentals seems, how-
ever, rather mild when compared to finite horizon experiment, as Haruvy et al. (2007). To a
certain extent, this might be related to a higher complexity of my experimental set-up res-
ulting from bringing to the lab Lucas (1978) model, preserving all its main features so as to
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study price-beliefs feedback. Moreover, as pointed out by Bao et al. (2013), when participants
have to perform both an optimization and a forecasting task, i.e. when learning-to-forecast
and learning-to-optimize set-ups are combined, the observed price dynamics are relatively
more unstable than when they are asked to solve either one or the other task. The latter
issue might be even more severe in my experimental design since subjects have to think in two
different measurement units: first think in returns (while forecasting), then in prices (when
trading). Favouring either a learning-to-forecast or a learning-to-optimize approach, however,
would impede the study of the price-beliefs feedback highlighted in Adam et al. (2014).
My experiment provides a first attempt to test experimentally the price-expectation feed-
back mechanism highlighted in the adaptive learning literature accounting for cyclical de-
viations of prices from fundamentals. While the proposed experimental design might be
functional for testing this mechanism, it might be too complex for some participants, hence
leading, in some cases, to trading behaviours that are unrelated to their future return expect-
ations. This could eventually break the link expectations-price, making it generally difficult
to observe optimistic beliefs associated with the higher asset demand. Further research is
encouraged in the field to confirm these results in a possibly simpler experimental set-up.
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3.6 Appendix I: derivations price thresholds
At PSAt , an agent prefers selling all the stock holdings and consume at time t, to keeping
her stock holdings and consuming at time t+ 1. Therefore, in period t consumption is equal
to Cit = Sit−1Pt + (α + Sit−1)Dt, while consumption in t + 1 can never be higher than Yt+1
. Hence, substituting the latter into the first order condition and using the definition of
expected return, PSAt can be derived as
PSAt ≥ δEP
i
t

[
Yt+1
Sit−1P
SA
t +
(
α+ Sit−1
)
Dt
]−γ
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
 (3.16)
= δEP
i
t
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Sit−1P
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)
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]−γ (
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)
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−γ
t+1
(
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︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rt+1
 (3.18)
[
Sit−1P
SA
t +
(
α+ Sit−1
)
Dt
]−γ ≥ δEPit {Y −γt+1Rt+1} (3.19)
Applying Jensen’s inequality,
Sit−1P
SA
t +
(
α+ Sit−1
)
Dt ≤ δ− 1γEPit
[(
Y −γt+1Rt+1
)− 1γ ] (3.20)
⇒ PSAt ≤
δ−
1
γEP
i
t
[
Yt+1R
− 1γ
t+1
]
− (α+ Sit−1)Dt
Sit−1
(3.21)
=
δ−
1
γEP
i
t
[
αDt+1R
− 1γ
t+1
]
− (α+ Sit−1)Dt
Sit−1
(3.22)
PSAt is then a function of the asset holdings and expectations of future returns, i.e. it can
be interpreted as a measure of how pessimistic an agent is at time t about the return of the
asset in period t+ 1.
Similarly, the highest price at which an agent is willing to use her entire income in order
to buy assets is determined. At PBAt , an agent prefers to buy stocks today (t) and bring her
consumption to its lowest level C, than consuming in period t+ 1 . Consumption in period
t+1 can never be higher than Cit+1 = (Pt+1 +Dt+1) ·
[
Sit−1(Pt+Dt)+Yt−C
Pt
]
+Yt+1. Substituting
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the latter one with equality in the first order condition we get that
C−γt ≥ δEP
i
t
{[
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)Sit + Yt+1
]−γ
Rt+1
}
(3.23)
= δEP
i
t
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(
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)
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)
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 (3.24)
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(3.25)
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Applying Jensen’s inequality,
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⇒ PBAt ≥
Ct − δ− 1γEPit
{
R
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}
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1
γ St−1EP
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{
R
1− 1γ
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} (3.31)
Once again, the price PBAt is also a function of the asset holdings and of the expectations
of future returns and dividends, i.e. it can be interpreted as a measure of an agent’s optimism
at time t about the return of the asset at time t+ 1.
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3.7 Appendix II: additional analysis
3.7.1 Expectations convergence tests
Convergence of the average expected return to the long run average of the realized returns is
tested following the Section 2.1 of Duffy (2008). The test was run for each session, considering
all periods when a realisation of the return was available.
The following AR(1) model is estimated
yj,t = αj,tyj,t−1 + βj + j,t
with yj,t being the time series of the average expected return for session j, yj,t−1being its
first lag and βj being a session specific constant.
For strong convergence to take place, the estimate of the long run coefficient β̂j1−α̂j should
not be significantly different from the long run average of the REE returns for the session.
For weak convergence, instead, α̂j needs to be significant smaller than the unit. To note that
strong convergence implies weak convergence, but the opposite is not true.
The table below report the long run average of the returns in the rational expectation
equilibrium and the p-value of the test having as a null hypothesis that the long run estimate
of the average expected returns is equal to the long run average of the realised returns. In
other words, under the null the average forecast error should tend to zero.
Long Run Strong
β̂ α̂ REE Returns P-value Convergence
Session 1 6.456 0.342 1.177 0.001
√
Session 2 13.213 -0.025 1.248 0.108 -
Session 3 21.237 -0.005 1.383 0.126 -
Session 4 164.977 -0.150 1.314 0.280 -
Session 5 39.354 -0.002 1.381 0.047
√
Table 3.9: Test of convergence to REE return
By column: long run average of the REE return, p-value of the test and strong convergence check.
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3.7.2 Beliefs as determinant of selling decisions
In Table 3.10 the results of a linear regression of ranking of subjects in the expected return
distribution on the net sale of the assets in the correspondent period are summarised. The
sign of the relationship is correct, though the effect appears to be insignificant at session level,
while a pooled regression indicate a small negative correlation between selling behaviours and
the degree of optimism of subjects.
Net Sequence
Sales Dummies
Session 1 −0.017 √
(0.03)
Session 2 −0.149∗∗ √
(0.73)
Session 3 −0.069 √
(0.04)
Session 4 −0.008 √
(0.008)
Session 5 −0.090 √
(0.05)
Pooled −0.077∗∗ √
(0.029)
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3.10: OLS regression net sales
Net sales regressed on the ranking of subjects in the expected return distribution and sequence dummies by
column. Pooled regressions controlling for sequence fixed effects are reported in the last two rows of the table.
Regressions run at period level.
3.7.3 Categorizations of players: estimation of forecasting strategies
Players are assigned a category depending to the forecasting rule that better fits (higher R-
squared) their forecasting strategies as illustrated in Section 3.4.5. In case the coefficients of
chosen specification are not statistically significant, the alternative specification is preferred.
The reported coefficient indicates the estimated value of λ̂i if should a subject’s forecasting
rule be the adaptive rule specified in Equation 3.14 or of γ̂i should the subject’s forecasting
rule be the extrapolative one specified in Equation 3.15. If neither λ̂i nor γ̂i is statistically
significant at least at 10 percent level in none of the two specifications, the subject is assigned
to the ’Other’ category.
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Participant Coefficient P-value R-squared Type
Session 1
1 0.244 0.000 0.189 A
2 0.147 0.001 0.194 A
3 - - - O
4 0.178 0.001 0.254 T
5 -0.210 0.055 0.656 C
6 -0.315 0.057 0.279 C
7 -0.273 0.002 0.6145 C
8 0.067 0.030 0.115 A
9 0.251 0.000 0.258 A
10 0.142 0.012 0.460 T
11 -0.278 0.006 0.553 C
12 - - - O
Table 3.11: Categorization of players Session 1
Categorization of players depending on their forecasting rule in the first Session. By column: the estim-
ated coefficient for the selected forecasting rule, its p-value, the R squared of the selected model and the
correspondent type assigned.
In the Type column, A means adaptive, C means contrarian, T trend extrapolation rule, while O means ’other’.
Participant Coefficient P-value R-squared Type
Session 2
1 0.060 0.003 0.211 T
2 0.062 0.088 0.168 T
3 - - - O
4 - - - O
5 0.141 0.000 0.410 T
6 - - - O
7 - - - O
8 0.092 0.000 0.391 T
9 0.039 0.000 0.082 T
10 - - - O
11 - - - O
12 0.108 0.027 0.069 T
Table 3.12: Categorization of players Session 2
Categorization of players depending on their forecasting rule in the second Session. By column: the estim-
ated coefficient for the selected forecasting rule, its p-value, the R squared of the selected model and the
correspondent type assigned.
In the Type column, A means adaptive, C means contrarian, T trend extrapolation rule, while O means ’other’.
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Participant Coefficient P-value R-squared Type
Session 3
1 0.001 0.020 0.014 T
2 0.006 0.000 0.166 T
3 - - - O
4 0.010 0.000 0.196 T
5 0.001 0.003 0.036 T
6 - - - O
7 0.009 0.000 0.485 T
8 -0.052 0.000 0.521 C
9 - - - O
10 - - - O
11 0.008 0.000 0.020 A
12 - - - O
Table 3.13: Categorization of players Session 3
Categorization of players depending on their forecasting rule in the third Session. By column: the estim-
ated coefficient for the selected forecasting rule, its p-value, the R squared of the selected model and the
correspondent type assigned.
In the Type column, A means adaptive, C means contrarian, T trend extrapolation rule, while O means ’other’.
Participant Coefficient P-value R-squared Type
Session 4
1 -1.030 0.000 0.461 C
2 -0.353 0.000 0.630 C
3 0.085 0.036 0.096 T
4 0.074 0.072 0.051 T
5 0.224 0.000 0.300 T
6 -0.313 0.000 0.391 C
7 - - - O
8 0.150 0.000 0.345 T
9 0.060 0.072 0.137 T
10 0.369 0.026 0.335 A
11 - - - O
12 - - - O
Table 3.14: Categorization of players Session 4
Categorization of players depending on their forecasting rule in the fourth Session. By column: the estim-
ated coefficient for the selected forecasting rule, its p-value, the R squared of the selected model and the
correspondent type assigned.
In the Type column, A means adaptive, C means contrarian, T trend extrapolation rule, while O means ’other’.
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Participant Coefficient P-value R-squared Type
Session 5
1 - - - O
2 0.035 0.054 0.012 T
3 -0.179 0.014 0.403 C
4 0.020 0.010 0.027 A
5 -0.318 0.049 0.569 C
6 0.014 0.016 0.159 A
7 -0.189 0.001 0.568 C
8 0.042 0.003 0.270 T
9 -0.288 0.001 0.590 C
10 0.010 0.001 0.221 A
11 - - - O
12 - - - O
Table 3.15: Categorization of players Session 5
Categorization of players depending on their forecasting rule in the fifth Session. By column: the estim-
ated coefficient for the selected forecasting rule, its p-value, the R squared of the selected model and the
correspondent type assigned.
In the Type column, A means adaptive, C means contrarian, T trend extrapolation rule, while O means ’other’.
70 CHAPTER 3. ASSET MARKET BOOMS AND BUSTS
3.8 Appendix III: Instructions (English translation)
Welcome
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. The experiment lasts approximately 3 hours
and you will be paid cash directly at the end of the experiment.
It is very important that you do not talk to the other participants during the entire exper-
iment. If you still have questions after reading the instructions, please raise your hand. An
experimenter will come to you and answer directly to your question.
General explanations
Today’s experiment consists of one or more sequences. Each sequence is composed of one
or more periods. The exact number of periods and sequences is random and therefore it is
not known beforehand. At the end of each period randomness decides whether there will be
another period in the same sequence or not.
In this experiment you can earn two types of points. The number of points you earn in
this experiment determines how much you will earn at the end of the experiment (for more
details see section Payment). You earn points for two different tasks.
In every period you will be asked to perform two tasks. First, we will ask you to state your
expectations about the future return of a stock. Second, you will have the opportunity to
trade this stock with other participants.
At the beginning of each sequence you are endowed with a certain number of stocks and at
the beginning of each period you receive also some cash. While you can use cash only within
a period, you can keep stocks for the entire duration of a sequence, i.e. for multiple periods,
if you do not sell the stocks. You cannot carry cash over from one period to the next.
In each period you get points for the return expectation you state (see more details in the
section Stating your Return Expectations) and for the result of your trading (see more
details in the section Trading of the Stocks). In each period you can use cash to buy
additional stocks or you can sell your stocks and get cash from your sale. The cash you have
at the end of a period, after buying or selling stocks, is converted into consumption points.
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Structure of one period
Each period is composed by three parts. First, we ask you to state your stock return
expectations. Then, you can use your cash to trade your stocks with other participants.
Finally, you know how many stocks you bought/sold in this period and how many points you
earned.
At the beginning of each sequence you receive 50 stocks. Additionally, you receive cash
at the start of each period. The currency in this experiment is called Taler. The number of
Taler you get depends on (1) how many stocks you own and (2) how high the dividend is.
At the beginning of each period you receive a dividend for every stock you own. This
dividend is either 1 or 5 Taler per stock. In the first period of a sequence both dividends are
equally probable.
In every subsequent period, the dividend is also random, but the probability of one of the
two possible dividends depends on the size of the dividend in the previous period. If the
dividend in the first period was 5 Taler, then the probability that the dividend is again at 5
Taler in the second period is 70%. That is in 7 out of 10 cases the dividend is again 5 Taler
and in 3 out of 10 cases (30% probability) the dividend is 1 Taler.
Example:
If the dividend was 1 Taler in the previous period, than the dividend in the next period
would be again at 1 Taler in 7 out of 10 cases (70%). In 3 out of 10 cases (30%) the dividend
will be 5 Taler. On the contrary, in the first period of a sequence both dividends are equally
probable.
In each period you receive an additional income, independent of the number of stocks you
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own. In periods where the dividend is 1 you get 100 Taler, while if the dividend is 5 you
receive an income of 500 Taler.
You own 50 stocks. If the dividend is one Taler you receive 150 Taler in total: 50*1 Taler
as from dividend payment and additionally an income of 100 Taler. In the next period the
dividend will be in 7 out of 10 cases again 1 Taler, in 3 out of 10 cases 5 Taler.
Both, income and dividend are paid at the beginning of each period. This means in every
period you earn cash for each stock you own at the start of the period. Therefore there are
two reasons to hold stocks: (1) you earn additional money in each period via the dividend
and (2) you can possibly sell the stock in a later period and earn other cash.
Stating your return expectations
In each period we will ask you to state your expectations about the future return of the
stock. A stock return measures how profitable it would be to buy a stock in this period and
sell it in the next period. The return is computed as follows:
Return = Dividend in the next period+ Price change from this to the next period
Price in this period
Returns are stated in percent. If the return of the stock is positive, then the price change
plus the dividend will be positive. If you buy a stock in this period and sell it in the next,
you earn some money. The higher your expected return is, the larger is the gain you expect
from buying a stock.
If the return is negative in a certain period, then the price decrease will be larger than the
size of the dividend. If you had bought a stock in a period like this one and had sold the
stock one period later, you would have lost money.
Two examples on how to calculate the return are following. All stock prices in these
calculations are only examples. They are not suggestions on how to act in the experi-
ment.
For example, if you expect that the price of the stock in this period is 1850 Taler, the
dividend next period 5 Taler and the price of the stock will increase to 2150, then your
expected return is +16.5%.
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Expected Return = 5 + 2150− 18501850 · 100 = 16.5
If you expect instead that the dividend in the next period will be 1 Taler and the stock price
will be 1600 Taler, your expected return is -13.5%.
Expected Return = 1 + 1600− 18501850 · 100 = −13.5
You have to enter your expected return in percentage, in steps of 0.1% point. When you
state your expectations you know the dividend in this period. You do not know neither this
period stock price, nor the price or the dividend for the next round. You do not know this
period stock price yet, since it is determined by the trading of the stock, which will take place
after you have stated you expectation.
At the end of the following period you receive points depending on the precision of your
expectations. The closer you predicted the return, the higher is the number of points you
receive. The number of points you will get is calculated as follows:
Points for return expectations = max {20− f, 0}
where f indicates the absolute error of your prediction expressed in percentage points.
That is, if f = 8.5, then your expectation was 8.5% higher or lower compared to the realized
return.
Examples for the calculation of points for the return expectation:
Assume that you stated an expectation of 8% in the previous period. If the market price,
which is determined by the buy and sell orders of all subjects, is 2.1 Taler, the dividend is
1 Taler and the market price at 1 Taler, then the realized return is−4.8%. This means your
expectation overstates the realized return by 12.8 percentage points:f = |8 − −4.8| = 12.8.
Hence you receive 2–12.8 = 7.2 points for your expectation.
If your expectation is exactly the true return, then you receive 20 points. The larger is the
difference between your expectation and the true return, the lower is the number of points
you receive for you guess. If you state a return that is higher/lower than 20 percentage points,
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then you do not receive any points for your expectation.
There is a difference in the first period of each sequence. Since in this period there is no
previous market price you cannot earn any points for your expectation in the first period of
each sequence. The expectation you state in the first period determines your payout in the
second period (and the expectation you state in the second period determines you possible
payout in the third period and so on).
Trading the stock
Once you have stated your return expectations, you have to state the prices at which you
are willing to buy additional stocks or sell some.
You can use all your available Taler to buy stocks. The Taler available for purchasing
stocks are those you have in a period minus one Taler. This Taler represents your minimal
consumption. This means you must at least consume this Taler at the end of each period,
therefore you cannot use it for buying additional stocks.
You have to state three prices:
(a) First, the price at which you are willing to sell ALL stocks you currently own.
(b) Second, the price at which you are neither willing to sell one of your stocks, nor are
willing to buy additional stocks.
(c) Third, the price at which you are willing to buy as many stocks as possible.
All these prices are prices per unit of stock, which means that all prices are relevant for
buying/selling one stock.
You have to specify a price at which you are willing to sell all your stocks (a) higher than
the price at which you are neither willing to buy nor sell any stocks (b). This price (b) must
also be larger than the price at which you are willing to buy as many stocks as possible (c).
So, price (a) > price (b) > price (c).
Assume that this period market price is between the price (a), at which you are willing to
sell all your stocks, and (b), the price at which you are neither willing to buy nor to sell any
of your stocks. It means that at this market price that you are willing to sell some, but not
all of your stocks. The higher the market price is, the higher is the number of stocks are you
willing to sell.
If the market price of the stock in this period equals the price (a) you stated or it is above,
then the computer tries to sell as many of your stocks as possible to other participants. If
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the market price is between the price (a) and the price at which you neither want to buy nor
sell stocks (b), then the computer tries to sell some, but not all of your stocks. The closer is
the market price to the price (a), at which you want to sell all your stocks, the more stocks
the computer tries to sell. The closer the price is to the price (b), the fewer of your stocks
are going to be sold.
Conversely, a market price that is lower than the price (b) you stated means that you are
willing to buy more stocks. Exactly as in the case of a market clearing price that are larger
than (b), for all prices between (b) and (c), the price at which you are willing to buy as many
stocks as possible, the computer tries to buy more stocks from other participants the closer
the market price is to (c). The lower the market price is, the more stocks you are willing to
buy.
Clearly, you can only sell as many stocks as you own in this period and you can only buy
as many stocks as you can afford. All prices can be stated in steps of 0.1 Taler.
After every participant stated these three prices the computer computes the stock market
price. By doing this, it tries to find the price at which some participants state to sell as many
stocks as some other participants want to buy. Therefore it searches for the price at which
the number of stocks demanded and the number of stocks supplied are equal. This market
price determines if you buy or sell stocks in this period.
Assume you would like to sell all your stocks at a price of 2400.0 Taler (a). At a price
of 1850 Taler you neither want to buy nor sell any stocks (b) and at a price of 1719.2 you
are willing to buy as many stocks as possible (c). If now the price of the stock is above 1850
Taler, for example at 2008.5 Taler, than the computer will compute how many stocks you
can and want to sell at this price. If the price is below 1850 Taler, for example at 1747.3
Taler, the computer calculates how many stocks you want and can buy in this case. Note that
the numbers used in this and other examples are only indicative. They do not provide any
information about the prices or your suggested actions in the experiment.
The exact calculation of the market price is not given here, due to space constraints. It
is only important for you that the number of stocks you buy or sell depends on the prices
thresholds you state, the amount of stocks you own, the amount of Taler you hold and depends
on other participants’ stated inputs.
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Result of a period
All transactions within a period take place at the same market price. As soon as this
market price is computed for the stock, you visualize the realized price on the screen. The
market price will be shown together with the number of stocks you bought or sold in this
period and the return, which derives from this market price.
You see how many points you earned for your expectation in the previous period. You also
see how many points you earned for your consumption. You consume all Taler, which you
have left after buying and selling stocks. The higher the amount of Taler you own at the end
of a period, the higher the number of consumption points you earn. Taler will be converted
into consumption points with a formula. More Taler always result in more consumption
points, but the difference between the consumption points is larger between low values e.g.
10 and 20 Taler, than the difference between higher amounts, e.g. 90 and 100 Taler.
How many Taler you have at the end of a period depends on how many stocks you bought
or sold at a certain market price. Table 1 indicates how some values in Taler are converted
into consumption points. All the other possible Taler values not stated in the table are
converted using the same formula. So, for example, the number of consumption points you
receive for 56,57 etc. Taler is above the number for 50 Taler but below the one corresponding
to 60 Taler.
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Taler Consumption Points Taler Consumption Points
1 3.3 400 20.1
2 4.1 500 21.5
3 4.6 600 22.7
5 5.4 700 23.8
10 6.7 800 24.8
20 8.2 900 25.7
30 9.2 1000 26.5
40 10.1 1100 27.2
50 10.8 1200 28.0
60 11.4 1300 28.6
70 11.9 1400 29.3
80 12.4 1500 29.9
90 12.9 1600 30.5
100 13.3 1800 31.6
110 13.7 2000 32.6
120 14.0 2200 33.5
130 14.4 2400 34.4
140 14.7 2600 35.3
150 15.0 2800 36.1
170 15.6 3000 36.8
190 16.1 3500 38.6
200 16.3 4000 40.1
220 16.8 4500 41.6
240 17.3 5000 42.9
260 17.7 5500 44.2
280 18.1 6000 45.3
300 18.5 6500 46.3
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Determining the number of periods and sequences
As mentioned above, the experiment consists of one more multiple sequences, and each
sequence consists of one or more periods. At the end of each period the computer randomly
determines whether there is an additional period in the same sequence. In 35 out of 36 cases
(about 97.2%) there is another period in the same sequence. In one out of 36 cases the
sequence ends after this period.
This is the same as a situation in which you throw two six-sided dice at the end of each
period. If BOTH dice show the number 6, then this is the last period of this sequence. If
one or both of the dice show a different number, then there is another period within the same
sequence.
In case a sequence ends, a message is displayed on your screen. All stocks you hold at that
point are worthless. The next period is then the start of a new sequence. This means you
receive again 50 stocks, independently from how many stocks you owned at the end of the
previous sequence.
If the sequence does NOT end this period, a new period follows automatically. In the new
period you own the amount of stocks you had in the previous period. This means within a
sequence you carry over all your stocks from one period to the next.
Please note that the probability that a sequence ends does not depend on the number of
periods you have already played in the same sequence. The procedure is as if you throw two
dice after each period and only if both dice show a six there is no additional period in the
same sequence. This means at the end of each period the chance that there is another period
in the same sequence is the same.
There will be as many sequences as possible within the 3 hours of the experiment. Therefore
after a sequence ends, we always start a new sequence, as long as the first sequence has started
less than 90 minutes before.
In the unlikely event that the last sequence does not end within the 3 hours planned for
the experiment, we will put the last sequence on hold. In this case the sequence does not end,
but we add the expected number of periods to this last sequence which would most likely
be played if the sequence had not put on hold. The stocks you own in the last period are
therefore not worthless.
Since these periods are not played due to time restrictions, for each period we add the
expected number of consumption points. The amount of consumption points is determined
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by the number of stocks you own. The expected consumption is higher if you own more
stocks, since on average you would have earned more from dividend payments. We act as if
the sequence continued and in each additional period you would consume your entire income
plus all dividends and you would neither buy nor sell any stocks.
Payment
Your payment in this experiment consists of two parts. First, you get 7 Euro show-up
fee for participating in the experiment. Additionally, you receive some money based on your
performance.
After the end of the last sequence the computer randomly selects 10 periods for payment.
You are paid in 5 periods for your consumption and in 5 different ones for your stated
expectations. Clearly the first period within a sequence can never be selected for the payment
of your expectations, since no stock return in this period is defined.
If the last sequence was not completed due to time constraints, the additional periods can
only be selected for the payment of consumption points. These periods do not contribute to
determine the payment for your expectations.
The points you earned in these selected periods are converted into Euros. The exchange rate
is 15 cents per point, independently from the fact that the point was earned for consumption
or forecasting.
If you have earned for example a total of 90 points for your consumption and 75 points for forecasting
in the selected periods, you will receive a total of 31,75 Euro. ((90+75) points * 0.15 Euro/point + 7
Euro = 31,75 Euro).
You will now familiarize with the computer interface and conduct a test period. When
you finish reading the instructions, please click trough the introductory period. The remarks
on the screen explain you the different parts of the interface. After all participants have
completed this introductory period, we will ask you some questions to make sure you have
understood. You can answer to these questions directly on the computer. In case you have
some questions after completing the introductory period or need help with the understanding
questions, please raise your hand. Then we will clarify your question personally.

Chapter 4
Determinants of Asset Price
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4.1 Introduction
The behaviour of stock prices has been a prominent subject of interest in financial eco-
nomics. Explaining asset price movements and identifying the mechanism driving those has
been at the core of the macro-finance literature, starting from the early contributions by
Lucas (1978) and Grossman and Shiller (1981). Consumption-based asset pricing models be-
came workhorse models, serving as major reference for understanding asset price dynamics.
Though very popular, their baseline variant with standard time-separable consumption pref-
erences performs very poorly when it comes to matching stylized facts about asset prices. In
particular, the model implications under rational expectations are at odds with the observed
high persistence and volatility of the price-dividend ratio, the high volatility of stock returns,
the long-term predictability of excess returns and the risk premium.1 However, a recent con-
tribution by Adam et al. (2016) shows that a simple consumption-based asset pricing model
is able to quantitatively explain the observed price volatility patterns, once the assumption
that agents know perfectly how prices are formed in the market is relaxed.
In a baseline Lucas (1978) model, an investor has to solve a simple investment decision,
i.e. she has to choose how much to save and how much to consume. Under rational expect-
ations, the basic asset pricing equation resulting from the first-order optimality condition of
that investment decision implies that price volatility in equilibrium results from two different
sources: a volatile stochastic discount factor (SDF) and volatile future asset payoffs. Under-
standing which of these two factors drives asset price fluctuations is particularly challenging
with field data as it requires assessing the individual intertemporal consumption decisions
together with individual future asset return expectations. A laboratory instead provides an
ideal setting where one can keep track of individual trading decisions and expectations in a
stationary environment. We therefore conducted a lab experiment in which only one of the
two theoretical sources is present in each treatment so to assess which of the two theoretical
sources of volatility can explain the observed volatility better and gain further understanding
on the reasons why Lucas asset pricing model predictions are not met.
Experimental economics has extensively studied asset market price dynamics, both in finite
and infinite horizon models, starting from the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988). Their
experimental design of a finite 15 period asset market became the benchmark for several
1See Campbell (2003) for a review of consumption-based asset pricing models, both in its original version
and later modifications resulting from relaxing its assumptions.
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other finite horizon asset market experiments, such as Dufwenberg et al. (2005) and Haruvy
et al. (2007). In the latter study, participants trade an asset living 15 periods and they are
asked to forecast the price of the asset for all the remaining trading periods. Haruvy et
al. (2007) find that short terms beliefs about future prices are adaptive and informative of
future price movements. Beliefs are then shown to play a crucial role in explaining the price
deviation from fundamentals, with fundamentals being defined by the theoretically defined
rational expectation equilibrium price.
Recently, infinite horizon asset pricing models, which before have only been very popular
in the theoretical literature, have become of interest to experimentalists. Crockett and Duffy
(2013), Asparouhova et al. (2016) and Donini (2016) brought the Lucas (1978) asset pricing
model to the lab in order to study intertemporal consumption smoothing, cross-sectional
predictions (e.g. equity premium puzzle) or the cyclicality of asset market booms and busts.
Differently from the earlier asset market experiments based on Smith et al. (1988) design, this
strand of the literature considers an asset which lives for an uncertain number of periods.
So to implement the equivalence of an indefinite asset market into the lab, at the end of
each round a random draw determines whether the market ends or another period follows.
Subjects carry their asset holdings (the “tree” in Lucas (1978) terminology) from period to
period, while the their cash balances (the “fruits” in Lucas (1978) terminology) experimental
currency are out of the economy at end of each period, i.e. they are consumed. Similarly
to the finite horizon asset market experiments, the infinite horizon experiments have shown
that the trading price differs substantially from the fundamental value of the asset and it is
usually excessively volatile. Moreover, the mentioned papers provide evidence that subjects
adjust their asset holdings across states of the world, i.e. they smooth their consumption
intertemporally. These results point at a key finding of the adaptive learning literature that
considers belief dynamics to be responsible for market price deviations from fundamentals,
see e.g. Branch and Evans (2011). Moreover, they validate Adam et al. (2016) results by
showing that the market clearing prices are consistent with internally rational agents whose
price beliefs are only approximately correct.
In this paper we follow the path of the latter experiments with the main goal of identifying
the role of the stochastic discount factor and the payoff volatility on the observed asset
price volatility. In order to discern the two theoretical sources of volatility, we design two
treatments, in which either only the stochastic discount factor varies (SDF treatment) and
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the expected asset payoffs are constant or the other way around (PAYOFF treatment). In the
SDF treatment the volatility of asset prices comes solely from a volatile stochastic discount
factor, while in the PAYOFF treatment price fluctuations are only due to the volatility of
the future asset payoff. We also elicit subjects’ beliefs about future returns of the asset, as in
Bottazzi et al. (2011) and Donini (2016), and can therefore explore the relationship between
individual return expectations and trading decisions.
In the experiment we find that market clearing prices are substantially less volatile than
the fundamental value of the asset, i.e. negative excess volatility. The latter pattern is
puzzling since over a sufficiently long horizon the price should reflect fundamentals and their
volatility. Average trading prices are co-moving with the state of the world, but less than
the theory would predict. In particular, price volatility is higher in the PAYOFF treatment
than in the SDF, pointing at subjects having difficulties in understanding (or applying) the
optimal intertemporal trading strategy. If subjects were to behave optimally, then in high
states of the world, prices should be higher than in the low states due to both a wealth
effect, since participants have more money to spend in high states than in low states, and for
intertemporal consumption smoothing motives, i.e. since consumption has a decreasing value,
then participants should be willing to postpone consumption to future periods. Moreover, the
latter pattern should be emphasized by the dynamics of individual expectations, with more
optimistic participants being even more willing to buy asset in high states of the world aligned
with their valuations of the asset. However, subjects seem to have difficulty in understanding
the optimal trading strategy and expectations dynamics are shown to have a milder effect on
individual asset allocation decisions in the experimental framework than predicted in theory.
The latter difficulty reveals particularly in the SDF treatment, where the price clears the
market most of the times at a value in between the two state dependent fundamental values.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: next section describes the theoretical
set-up, while Section 4.3 presents the experimental design and the hypotheses we test. In
Section 4.4 we discuss the experimental results and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical model
We consider a simple version of the consumption based asset pricing model à la Lucas
(1978) with time-separable consumption preferences. The economy is populated by a unit
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mass of infinitely living risk-averse agents (i = 1, 2, 3...I) endowed with a stock (St).2 This
stock is traded at an ex-dividend price Pt on a competitive market and pays every period
t a perishable consumption good Dt, i.e. the dividend.3 Moreover, each agent receives an
additional perishable endowment Yt, chosen to be proportional to the dividend Yt = αDt, α >
0.4
Each agent i is an expected utility maximizer with time-separable preferences over con-
sumption Cit . Every period, she has to take an investment decision of the following type:
max
Ci
t
>0,Si
t
∈[0,S]
EP
i
t
∞∑
t=0
δt · (C
i
t)1−γ
1− γ (4.1)
subject to
Cit + PtSit = (Pt +Dt)Sit−1 + Yt (4.2)
Sit ≥ 0 ∀t (4.3)
Sit ≤ S¯ ∀t (4.4)
Cit ≥ C with C > 0 ∀t (4.5)
Si−1 given (4.6)
where δ denotes a common discount factor, Cit individual consumption demand at time
t, Sit the individual stock holdings and Si−1 being a given individual initial endowment, Yt
the exogenous additional income, S¯ the total number of outstanding shares and P i indicates
the subjective probability measure of each agent i, as in Adam et al. (2016). In particular,
we consider each agent to be internally rational in Adam and Marcet (2011) sense, i.e. she
takes fully optimal decisions, given her system of beliefs about price realizations and future
dividends, i.e. about ω = {Pt, Dt}∞t=0, where ω ∈ Ω, element of the space of all possible
realizations.5
Hence, an agent makes contingent consumption plans Cit subject to a budget constraint
(2), two asset limits constraints, i.e. a no-short selling constraint (3) and an upper bound on
holdings (4) and a positive lower bound for consumption C (5). All these constraints have to
2Time sub-index always indicates beginning-of-period variables.
3The dividend process is defined depending on the treatment.
4Proportionality of the exogenous income has a twofold goal, on one side, it is mimicking the real eco-
nomy cycle, on the other it allows us to have a stochastic discount factor independent of the initial stock
endowment of participants.
5See Adam and Marcet (2011) for further discussions of the underlying probability space.
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hold for all t almost surely in P. Since the objective function is concave and the feasible set
is convex, the agent’s optimal consumption plan is characterized by the following first order
condition:
(
Cit
)-γ · Pt = δ · EPit ((Cit+1)−γ (Pt+1 +Dt+1)) (4.7)
i.e. the marginal loss of utility an investor bears if she buys an additional unit of the asset
at time t is equal to the marginal gain she obtains from an extra payoff at time t+ 1.
Solving the above specified infinite horizon investment problem has the following well-
defined solution under rational expectations:6
PREEt =Et
 ∞∑
j=1
δj
(
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
·Dt+j
 (4.8)
=
∞∑
j=1
δj
Et
((
Dt+j
Dt
)−γ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionSDF
· Et (Dt+j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionPAY OFF
+Covt
((
Dt+j
Dt
)−γ
, Dt+j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionCOV
 (4.9)
where contributionSDF is the contribution of the stochastic discount factor to the asset
pricing in REE, contributionPAY OFF is the contribution that future payoffs give to the asset
pricing in REE and contributionCOV is the contribution that the covariance between the two
factors gives to the asset pricing.
Hence, in equilibrium price volatility comes from three sources of variability: volatile
stochastic discount factor (SDF), volatile future payoffs (PAYOFF) and the co-movement
between these two (COV). The first factor represents the inter-temporal marginal rate of
substitution, the so called pricing kernel. It identifies the rate at which an investor is willing
to substitute consumption at time t + 1 for consumption at time t. In our case, due to the
proportionality of income to the dividends, the pricing kernel is simply defined by the expect-
ations at time t of the growth rate of the dividends process. Therefore, in equilibrium, state
dependent dividends would contribute to time-varying prices. As a matter of fact, an iid
dividend process would imply a constant contribution of the PAYOFF factor to the pricing
6See the Appendix 4.6 for a precise derivation of the rational expectation equilibrium prices in the two
treatments.
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of the asset, i.e. no contribution in terms of price volatility. In this case, SDF would drive
price volatility together with the covariance term between SDF and PAYOFF.
The second factor (PAYOFF) identifies how much an investor receives in expectation in
the consecutive period from one unit of the asset. In our case, the payoff is defined by the
expectations at time t about next period dividend. A dividend process characterized by a
time varying mean would therefore transmit into volatile equilibrium prices. Consequently, a
dividend process characterized by a constant unitary growth would net out the contribution
that the SDF factor gives to price volatility. Hence, PAYOFF would be the driver of asset
price volatility together with the covariance term between the SDF and PAYOFF.
The third factor (COV) represents an additional source of volatility of prices that is additive
to the latter two. A negative covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the payoff
would therefore have a negative impact on the equilibrium price as it will introduce an asset-
specific risk correction. As we will argue in the next section in more detail, this third factor
can determine asset price volatility to a smaller extent than the other two factors, for the
chosen parametrization of the experiment.
4.3 Experimental design
4.3.1 General set-up
The experiment consists of two treatments, each of them composed of rounds and sequences.
A sequence contains a random number of rounds and each round consisted of a forecasting
and a trading part. The main difference between the treatments is the dividend process, as
explained later in Section 4.3.6. In both treatments, 8 subjects participated to each market.
At the start of a sequence (the start of the first round t = 0), all participants are endowed
with 20 units of stock (Si−1 = 20∀i = 1, 2..., 8, so S¯ = 160).7 Additionally, at the start of every
period subjects receive some cash income, denominated in the experimental currency Taler.
The income is composed of two parts, which are both paid at the beginning of each period.
A part is independent of the number of stocks a subject possessed, but depend on the state
of the world. The other part relates to the dividend payments for each stock an individual
own and therefore depend on the state of the world and the individual stock holdings at the
beginning of the round. Due to the stock independent part of the income it was ensured that
7 Each session contained two groups of 8 subjects with the exception of session 1 (SDF treatment) where
only 7 subjects per market, therefore S¯ = 140.
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subjects could buy the asset, even if they did not receive any dividend income. Similarly to
Asparouhova et al. (2016), the total income co-moved with the dividend draw (high income
in high-dividend states and low in low-dividend states) to mimic the real economy booms
and busts cycles.
Each round is composed by two parts. First, subjects state their expectation for the return
of the stock (see Section 4.3.2 for definition of the return) and in the second part of the round
the asset could be traded via a double auction mechanism among all participants within a
group. When making the forecast, subjects knew the dividend paid by the stock in this
round (as dividends are paid at the beginning of each round), but not the market price of
the stock for this round, since the market price is determined in second part of the round by
the trading of subjects. The number of stocks outstanding, S¯ remained constant during the
entire experiment and the structure of a round was identical in both treatments (see Figure
4.1). The timing within a round was as follows:
1. A random draw from a known distribution determined the state of the world and
therefore the dividend Dt and the income Yt.
2. Each participant stated a forecast of the expected return of the asset conditional on an
information set ωt , EPit (Rt+1 | ωt), knowing Pt−1, Dt, Rt−1 , Sit−1 and Sit .
3. Participants could trade the asset on a computerized double auction market. A trading
phase lasted 2 minutes (90 seconds from the sixth period of a sequence onwards).
4. After the trading ended the average market price for the asset (Pt) and her or his
individual stocks (Sit) and cash holdings were reported to each individual.
5. All cash left the economy and was converted to consumption points (CP) for each
individual via an induced utility method. Also subjects received forecasting points
(FP) for their return forecast depending on their return statement in the previous
round and the realized return of the asset. Participants were only informed of their
own CPs and FPs, but not of those of other subjects.
6. A random draw determined whether another round in the same sequence took place.
The draw was identical for all subjects in a session, meaning it was equivalent for
both groups within a session.8 If the sequence continued, then another round with an
identical structure was started. If there was no further period the sequence ended.9
8 This ensured that the experiment lasted the same amount of time for all subjects in a session.
9Further, there was a protocol in place that ensured that a session did not go over the 2:45 h time limit. After
120 min of the experiment a sequence was put on hold. "Synthetic" periods were added to the actually
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Figure 4.1: Structure of a sequence for both treatments
4.3.2 Stating the returns expectations
At the beginning of each round, the state of the world was determined by a random draw,
hence subjects got to know the dividend and their corresponding income available for trade
and consumption. The first task they performed was to forecast the return of the asset from
this to the next round. The return is defined as follows:
Rt+1 =
(
Pt+1 +Dt+1 − Pt
Pt
)
(4.10)
where Rt+1 is the return that will realize at time t+ 1 expressed in percentage points, Dt+1
is the dividend in period t+1, Pt is the average market price in period t and Pt+1 the average
market price in the consecutive period (t+ 1). The average market price is the average price
of all transactions completed in a trading period. In the instructions this formula was given,
together with numerical examples and an intuitive definition of asset return.10 In order to
facilitate the task participants were provided with a calculator in which their own estimations
of the end of period market price, the expected dividend and expected market price for the
consecutive round could be entered and then the corresponding return was displayed.11 The
played rounds in which subjects received CP based on their asset holdings at the end of the last played
period. No FP could be earned for these synthetic rounds. This procedure was explained in the instructions
and ensured that subjects’ behaviour in later rounds was not distorted because subjects expect the session
to end due to time limits.
10See Appendix 4.9 for an English translation of the original German version of the instructions.
11In line with other asset market experiments, e.g. Hommes et al. (2008), subjects had a visualization of
the entire time series of realized returns for the current sequence on their screens when stating their
expectation. In addition to this graphical representation all past prices, dividends and realized returns up
to t− 1 within the same sequence were displayed in a table.
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screen informed subjects about the dividend in the current round, their available cash and
their stock holdings. Subjects stated their expectation in percentages, up to one decimal of
precision and could move to part two only after entering a return expectation.
4.3.3 Trading the asset
Trading took place through an anonymous, electronic continuous open book system based
on the double auction mechanism in zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). The trading screen was
intuitive and enabled subjects to make offers or bids for trading a single stock. Trading took
place at integer values and an improvement rule was in place for submitting a new ask or
bid.12 Subjects could accept outstanding bids and asks at any time, given that they possessed
the necessary funds to pay the asking price (ask) or owned at least one stock (bid).13 In each
round the trading period lasted 2 minutes (or 90 seconds in rounds 6 and later of a sequence).
At the end of the trading period all outstanding asks and bids were cancelled.
4.3.4 Result of a period
After trading ended subjects were informed about Pt, the average trading price in the
period, the resulting return of the asset (if the round was not the first round of the sequence)
and their end of period cash and stock holdings.
At this point the cash of each individual was converted into consumption points and then
disappeared from the economy. Cash was converted into CPs in both treatments using the
following induced concave function, with Cit being the end of period t cash holdings of subject
i:
CP = U
(
Cit
)
= 100− 200 · Cit−0.5. (4.11)
As discussed in Crockett and Duffy (2013), the concave payment for consumption results
in induced risk aversion for by nature risk neutral and very slightly risk-loving participants
and pushes risk aversion even further for by nature risk-averse subjects. The conversion was
explained intuitively to subjects in the instructions, which contained also the formula itself
and a table converting the most common Taler values to CPs. CPs were converted to Euro
at the end of the experiment, see Section 4.3.7 for the detailed payment procedure.
12Each new bid had to improve the highest outstanding bid by at least one Taler and each new ask had to be
at least one Taler lower than the lowest outstanding ask.
13A screen-shot of the trading screen is provided in Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.8.
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4.3.5 Length of a sequence
To introduce the infinite horizon model feature into the lab, we followed previous experi-
ments on the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model (Asparouhova et al. (2016) and Crockett and
Duffy (2013)) and approximated the infinite horizon via an indefinite horizon. At the end
of each round a random number was drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
For draws above 1112 the sequence stopped. For all other outcomes another round was played,
i.e. in 1 out of 12 cases the sequence comes to an end. When the sequence continued, the
individual asset holdings were carried over to the next round, while if the sequence ended the
assets became worthless.
Furthermore, to ensure a stationary economy, we defined a termination protocol along the
lines of Asparouhova et al. (2016) one. At the beginning of the experiment it was announced
that the experiment lasts until a pre-specified time (i.e. 2:45 hours) and that there are as
many replications (sequences) of the economy as possible during this time. If a sequence
ended and more than 30 minutes were left of the two hours and forty five minutes maximum
session time, a new sequence started. Otherwise it was announced to the participants that
the experiment was over.
In contrast, if a sequence was still running by the closing time, the sequence was kept on
hold. 12 synthetic periods were added to the individual consumption to ensure stationarity
of the environment. Each subject received her expected income, i.e. dividend plus income
payment, based on her stock holdings at the end of the last played round.14 Therefore in these
synthetic consumption periods participants received their expected number of consumptions
points assuming no trade.
4.3.6 Treatments
We defined two treatments mainly differing for the dividend process. Each subject par-
ticipated only in one treatment and in each session only one treatment was conducted. In
the SDF treatment the dividend followed an iid process, while in the PAYOFF treatment it
followed a unit root process.
The dividend in the SDF treatment was randomly selected from a binomial distribution
with two equally likely realizations, Dlow = 0.25 and Dhigh = 0.5. As stated earlier the
14Meaning an individual received the mean income plus the mean dividend payment times the number of her
stocks for each of the 12 added periods.
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dividend also determined the income a subject received at the beginning of the period. In each
state the subject received the respective dividend for each stock she owned and additionally
30 times the dividend. The second part of the income ensured that subjects with no or very
few stocks could still participate in the trading of the asset if they wanted.15
Subjects were informed about the dividend process since the beginning of the experiment.
Due to the iid nature of the process, the expected dividend is constant over time and there
is no variation in the expected payoffs. Since the expected dividend does not vary over time
and it is independent of the state of the world, the payoffs volatility will not be the source of
the price volatility. Conversely, the stochastic discount factor clearly depends on the state.
Therefore, only the stochastic discount factor would be accountable for any resulting asset
price volatility.
In the PAYOFF treatment the dividend process was as follows:
Dt = Dt−1 · εt (4.12)
withDt being the dividend in round t and εt being an iid shock with equally likely realizations
εlow = 0.8 and εhigh = 1.2. In the first round in each sequence the dividend process was
applied to D0 = 0.375, such that the dividend in the first round was either 0.45 or 0.3 with
equal probability.16
Differently from the SDF treatment, in the PAYOFF treatment expected payoffs vary from
round to round as function of the dividend, i.e. future dividends depend on current dividend
and the expected dividend payment varies over time. Consequently, the payoffs are volatile,
opposed to a stochastic discount factor that is constant due to a constant unitary growth of
the chosen dividend process. Hence, in this treatment, the only source of asset price volatility
would therefore be the volatility of payoffs.
4.3.7 Subjects’ payments
Subject earned money for both task they performed: predicting the return of the asset and
trading the asset. Additionally, they received a show-up fee of 4 Euro. The statement of their
expectation about the return of the stock was incentivised such that predictions closer to the
15All income payments were rounded up to entire Taler values, since only integer steps were possible during
the trading.
16If necessary the dividend was rounded to three digits.
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realized return yielded higher payments. Since the REE prices of the stock substantially
differ between the treatments, the expected asset returns in REE are very different. The
scoring rules for the belief payments were adapted in such a way, that entering the REE asset
returns yielded similar expected payoffs. This was achieved by changing the parameters of
the scoring rule. For each belief statement subjects could earn money (FP) calculated with
the following scoring rule:
SDF treatment: FP = max{0.01 ∗ (230− | f |) , 0} (4.13)
PAYOFF treatment: FP = max{0.046 ∗ (50− | f |) , 0} (4.14)
where f is the forecast error in percentage points. For instance, in the PAYOFF treatment
a positive number of forecasting points was associated with individual forecast errors smaller
than fifty percent, while the maximum number of points (2.3 FP = 2.3 €) corresponded to
exact predictions.
At the end of the experiment 10 rounds were randomly chosen for payment. Since subjects
performed two task in each round and possibly could have used their belief statement and
their trading behaviour to ensure themselves a payoff if both tasks would have been paid,
in each round only one of the two tasks could be chosen for payment to avoid the potential
hedging problem described by Blanco et al. (2010). In four of the selected rounds subjects
were paid for forecasting and in six different ones for consumption.17 Each consumption
point was converted to 5 Euro cents. Additionally, a zero lower bound was imposed on the
payment scheme, so that a subject could not make negative profits with the consumption. If
the sum of consumption points for the six selected periods was smaller than zero, the subject
received no money for consumption.
4.3.8 Asset prices in REE
Under the assumption of rational expectations, asset prices in equilibrium can be derived
from equation (4.9). These REE prices serve as our benchmarks in the empirical analysis.
In the SDF treatment the REE price is given by
17Synthetic rounds and the first period of each sequence could not be chosen for forecasting points, since
either no return prediction was stated (synthetic rounds) or no return can be calculated (first period of a
sequence).
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PREEt,SDF =
δ
1− δ D
γ
t (2B − Cµ) =
δ
1− δ
 Dγt B︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionSDF
+ Dγt (B − Cµ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionCOV
 (4.15)
where B, C and µ are constants depending on the dividend process and the chosen para-
metrization of the utility function. They are respectively defined as
B ≡p · (DH)1−γ + (1− p) · (DL)1−γ ,
C ≡p · (DH)−γ + (1− p) · (DL)−γ and
µ ≡p · (DH) + (1− p) · (DL) i.e. the mean of the dividend process.
The dividend process (DL = 0.25 and DH = 0.5 each realisation being equally likely)
results in two different state-dependent asset prices that are proportional to the value of the
dividend rescaled by the risk-aversion parameter γ. The two prices are reported in Table 4.1
using the parametrization of the utility function used in the experiment with δ = 0.917 and
γ = 1.5.
Dividend state
Low High
Covt
((
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
, Dt+j
)
= 0 2.347 6.639
Covt
((
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
, Dt+j
)
6= 0 2.792 7.896
Table 4.1: REE prices in the SDF treatment
Given that the covariance between the SDF and the stochastic discount factor contribute
only marginally to the variance of the fundamental value across states of the world, we
consider the REE prices with the zero covariance to be the benchmark for the analysis
presented later.18
Similarly, REE prices can be derived for the PAYOFF treatment. Differently from the
18The volatility of the REE prices across states, measured as standard deviation of the REE prices, is 3.60,
while if the covariance term is ignored, it reduces to 3.03.
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SDF treatment, in the latter case the chosen dividend process implies a series of REE prices
that are dependent on the current dividend realization. Given that the dividend follows an
autoregressive process REE prices will vary depending on the previous period dividend real-
ization. For illustration purposes we report the derivation of the REE price in the PAYOFF
treatment and the resulting prices for the two possible dividend states in the first period of
a sequence in Table 4.2.
PREEt,PAY OFF = Dt
[
δλ
1− δλ −
δ(λ− φ)
1− δ(λ− φ)
]
(4.16)
= Dt
δλ
1− δλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionPAY OFF
− Dt
(
δ(λ− φ)
1− δ(λ− φ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionCOV
(4.17)
where λ, φ, µ are constants depending on the dividend process and the utility function. These
constants are defined respectively as
λ ≡ E
(
ε1−γt+i
)
= p · (εH)1−γ + (1− p) · (εL)1−γ
φ ≡ E
(
ε−γt+i
)
= p · (εH)−γ + (1− p) · (εL)−γ
µ ≡ E (εt+1) = pεH + (1− p)εL = 1 i.e. the mean of the shock on the dividend process.
In the PAYOFF treatment the REE price of the asset is proportional to the state-dependent
level of the dividend, but differently to the SDF treatment, the REE prices are independent of
the risk-aversion parameter. This results in the REE prices for the first period of a sequence
listed in Table 4.2.
Dividend state
Low High
Covt
((
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
, Dt+j
)
= 0 4.037 6.056
Covt
((
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
, Dt+j
)
6= 0 4.234 6.352
Table 4.2: REE prices in the PAYOFF treatment
Dividend states and prices reported are those corresponding to the first period in a sequence.
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Following the same line of reasoning of the SDF treatment, given that the covariance
between the SDF and the stochastic discount factor contributes only marginally to the volat-
ility of the fundamental value across states of the world, we consider the REE prices with
the zero covariance to be the benchmark for later analysis.19
4.3.9 Hypotheses to test
As previously mentioned, the main difference between the two treatments pertains the
dividend process. The two dividend processes were chosen such that only one of the two
sources of volatility influences the equilibrium price. Therefore the two designed treatments
allow us to study whether subjects take the varying stochastic discount factor into account
when pricing of the asset. We hypothesize that subjects do not understand the meaning of
the stochastic discount factor.
Since the changing stochastic discount factor is the only reason for the different REE prices
of the asset in the SDF treatment, if subjects disregard changes in the stochastic discount
factor the price should be stable, reflecting the expected dividend value, rather than being
dependent on the dividend draw in a given round.
Hypothesis 1. In the SDF treatment the market price of the asset is independent of the
dividend realization and on average between the two REE prices.
In the PAYOFF treatment the stochastic discount factors is constant, hence it does not
influence the equilibrium market price. The volatile dividend results in variations of (expec-
ted) payoffs, which affects the equilibrium market price for the asset from round to round.
The actual market price of the asset should therefore co-move with the dividend payments
independently of whether subjects do or do not understand the stochastic discount factor.
Hypothesis 2. In the PAYOFF treatment the market price of the asset co-moves with the
dividend.
REE predicts prices that result in a larger price volatility in the treatment SDF, since
the expected changes in the stochastic discount factor leads to a lot more volatility in the
equilibrium asset prices. But if Hypothesis 1 and 2 are confirmed and subjects do not take into
19The volatility, measured as standard deviation, of the REE price across states in the presence of a non-zero
covariance is 1.49, while if the covariance term is ignored, the variance of the REE prices across states
reduces to 1.42.
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account the stochastic discount factor, then only prices in the PAYOFF treatment should be
volatile. Consequently, a higher price volatility should be observed in the PAYOFF treatment
when compared to the SDF treatment.
Hypothesis 3. Price volatility in the PAYOFF treatment is larger than in the SDF treat-
ment.
4.4 Results
The experiment was run between October and December 2014 in the experimental lab of
the University of Mannheim. Six repetitions of the experiment took place, three for each
treatment, with participants being mostly undergraduate students of the same university.
Each session involved 16 subjects (14 in the case of the first session) with no prior experience
of this experimental design (94 subjects in total) and no individual participated in more than
one session. In each session, we run two markets (groups) with 8 participants each (7 in
the case of the first session). The two groups participated simultaneously to the experiment
facing different economies characterised by the same number of sequences and periods within
a sequence.
The experiment lasted approximately 3 hours, including the time reading the instructions
and the time for participants to familiarize with the trading interface. Table 4.3 provides
details of the experimental sessions, with each session composed of several sequences of dif-
ferent lengths. In total 21 sequences (358 periods) were played by 94 subjects. The longest
sequence was played in the sixth session, while the shortest one lasted only one period during
the first (and second) session.
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Session Number of Number of Periods
Number Sequences Treatment (Total by Session, Min within Session, Max) Subjects
1 6 SDF (58, 1, 14) 14
2 5 PAYOFF (56, 1, 12) 16
3 2 PAYOFF (50, 12, 13) 16
4 3 PAYOFF (60, 4, 15) 16
5 3 SDF (66, 4, 15) 16
6 2 SDF (68, 5, 29) 16
Overall 21 (358, 1, 29) 94
Table 4.3: Summary data of all experimental sessions (both treatments)
In the following we focus on the analysis of the experimental results, first considering each
treatment separately, then a treatment comparison is provided.
The experiment tries to answer to two research questions: first, we are testing whether
the Lucas (1978) model actually predicts the trading behaviour of subjects. Based on the
previous studies discussed in the introduction, one could presume it not to be the case. Hence,
our second and main objective is to test whether the observed asset price volatility is mainly
driven by variations in the stochastic discount factor or by the variations in expected payoffs.
To provide an answer to the first question, we compare the observed market prices with
the REE prices, while regarding the second question we analyse the co-movement of the
transaction prices with the dividend. Since a double auction market delivers multiple prices
for each trading period, we consider the average trading price per period for later analysis,
aligned with other double auction experiments, e.g. Asparouhova et al. (2016). This price
is the mean price of all completed transactions within a given period, stated in Taler, the
experimental currency used within the experiment.
A look at the summary statistics, see Table 4.12 in Appendix 4.7.1 for details, reveals a lot
of heterogeneity across sessions and groups within a treatment. The latter is not surprising,
since the value of a stock depends on the dividend paid and the dividend payments are
independent between groups. In order to compare prices between groups and sessions within
a treatment Tables 4.4 and 4.6 consider the average trading price for each session and group
in the two states of the world in the SDF treatment (high or low dividend) and for dividends
above and below the median in the PAYOFF treatment, where the median is calculated at
the group level. We first discuss the average trading prices in the different states separately
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for the SDF and PAYOFF treatment. The prices observed in the SDF treatment are relevant
for testing Hypothesis 1, while the trading prices in the PAYOFF treatment allow to test
Hypothesis 2. We then try to compare the importance of the two difference sources for asset
price volatility in our experiment so to verify Hypothesis 3, before looking at the volatility
and the individual trading behaviour.
4.4.1 Prices in the SDF treatment
The iid dividend process defines two different states of the world, each of them dependent
on the realized dividend and resulting in two different REE asset prices. In Table 4.4 the
average trading price for each group is summarized separately in correspondence of each state
of the world. These prices suggest a higher average trading price in the high-dividend state.
Testing the difference of the average per period trading price between the two states on a
group level using a Mann-Whitney-U test (MWU) leads to four significant differences out of
six comparisons on the 10% level or lower, as reported in the seventh column in Table 4.4.
Performing an MWU test on the pooled data for all 6 groups of the SDF treatment yields
to a significant difference at the five percent confidence level (p-value 0.0255). However,
this test uses repeated observations within a group and it might therefore be misleading.
Alternatively, we run a sign test using the difference between the average trading prices per
group. Since in all six groups the higher average trading price is observed in the high state
periods, this test results in a significant difference (p-value 0.0313). Hence, the state of the
world matters for the pricing of the asset in the SDF treatment.
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Average Trading Price MWU test Wilcoxon t-test
Dividend Mean SD Max Min p-value p-value
Session 1
Group 1 0.25 2.2 0.8 4.1 1.2 0.0075 0.3087
0.50 3.0 0.7 4.4 2.2 0.0022
Group 2 0.25 6.2 0.8 7.4 4.6 0.0072 0.0010
0.50 7.0 0.7 7.8 5.1 0.0735
Session 5
Group 1 0.25 3.4 0.5 4.4 2.6 0.0001 0.0004
0.50 4.4 0.6 5.6 3.5 0.0003
Group 2 0.25 4.4 0.6 5.4 3.2 0.1719 0.0010
0.50 4.7 0.6 5.4 3.6 0.0010
Session 6
Group 1 0.25 2.4 1.4 5.0 0.0 0.0509 0.7676
0.50 3.1 1.1 5.1 1.9 0.0015
Group 2 0.25 2.9 2.4 10.4 1.2 0.1571 0.4459
0.50 3.1 2.3 11.3 1.8 0.0032
Pooled data
0.25 3.6 1.9 10.4 0 0.0255 0.0000
0.50 4.1 1.8 11.3 1.8 0.0000
Table 4.4: Average trading price statistics in the SDF treatment
By column: dividend realisation, average trading price statistics by state in the SDF treatment, i.e. mean,
standard deviation, maximum and minimum. The MWU test refers to a between-states comparison at group
level, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test refers to a mean comparison to the REE equilibrium. REE price in
the low state is 2.347 and in the high state is 6.639. All values besides the p-values are stated in Taler.
The latter finding, though being in line with the REE predictions of two distinct as-
set prices, contradicts Hypothesis 1 stating that subjects do not take the variation in the
stochastic discount factor into account. If the variation in the stochastic discount factor was
completely ignored, we should observe no difference between the prices in the two states.
At a first sight, the clear conclusion from this observation would be that subjects take the
state of the world and therefore the stochastic discount factor into account when trading the
asset. However, the difference between the prices in the two states is rather modest once it
is compared to the REE predicted prices. The eighth column of Table 4.4 reports for each
group the result of Wilcoxon t-tests of the equivalence between the observed average trading
prices and the predicted REE price, depending on the state. Only in three out of the 12
cases the difference between the observed trading prices and the REE price predictions is not
significant, all cases being in correspondence of the low state of the world.
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The graph in Figure 4.2 plots the average trading price for all periods and the corresponding
rational expectation equilibrium (REE) prices for group 1 of session 1. The vertical lines
indicate the start of a new sequence and the lower panel in the graph display the dividend
paid in each trading period. The pattern observed for this group is typical for the SDF
treatment, i.e. the difference in the REE prices between the two states of the world is larger
than the one in the realized trading prices. In rational expectations, a price of 6.6 Taler
is defined for the high state of world (dividend of 0.5 Taler), while an equilibrium price of
2.3 Taler for the low state of the world, i.e. a dividend of 0.25 Taler. While the theoretical
difference between the REE prices in the two states is 4.3 Taler, the actual difference between
the means is only 0.8 Taler for this group, while in the pooled data it is even smaller at 0.5
Taler. In several periods the average trading price is in between the theoretical equilibrium
prices and in all other periods it is even lower than the REE price in the low state. Moreover,
the average trading price reduces along the course of the session and in the last sequence
played the average trading price is below the REE prediction in all 14 periods of the sequence.
Besides the stochastic discount factor, a second factor might lead to a difference in the
average trading prices between the two states in this treatment, i.e. the different liquidity
in the two states of the world. The income a subject receives independently of the dividend
payments is proportionally to the state, i.e. in the high state a subject receives an additional
income of 15 Taler and in the low state individuals receive 8 Taler. It follows that even an
individual with no stocks would be able to buy more stocks in the high-dividend state than
in a low-dividend state, while for subjects owing a positive amount of stocks the liquidity
difference is even larger due to the dividend payments.
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Figure 4.2: Price and dividend dynamics in the SDF treatment
The graph reports price and dividend dynamics for Session 1 Group 1 in the experiment. All values are stated
in Taler.
Even if subjects do not take the stochastic discount factor into account and consequently
have state independent asset valuations, if subjects asset valuations are heterogeneous, this
liquidity difference could lead to the different average trading prices. On the one hand, in
the high state all subjects have more money available, therefore subjects that value the asset
more can buy more stocks in these periods. On the other hand, individuals that value the
asset less and therefore are more likely to sell stocks, instead of buying them, can always sell
independently of the state. Selling, differently from buying, is not influenced by the available
liquidity. Hence, it could be the case that a higher average trading price emerges in high
states even if the stock valuation for all subjects is independent of the dividend. The higher
liquidity in the high state compared to the low state could result in an increased demand for
the stock in this state, while the supply remained constant in the two states.20
If our reasoning was to be verified in the data, then we should observe a difference in the
trade volumes depending on the state. The higher liquidity in the high-dividend state should
result in more completed transactions. Given the small difference in the average trading price
documented earlier, we should observe this difference in trading volumes despite the increased
20Clearly, price increases in the high-dividend state are not purely liquidity driven. Instead this could be
interpreted as the price increases are possible even if subjects do not take the SDF into account, hence the
equilibrium arguments for higher asset prices in the high state do not apply.
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price, since the liquidity per subject more than doubles in the high state compared to the low
state, while the price increase is in the neighbourhood of thirty percentage points. Hence,
the liquidity effect should outweigh any price effect on trade volumes.
No. of Number of trades MWU test
Dividend periods Mean SD Min Max p-value
Session 1
Group 1 0.25 17 10.76 6.47 3 22 0.2046
0.50 12 14.17 6.86 5 28
Group 2 0.25 19 6.05 1.27 4 8 0.0029
0.50 10 8.50 2.64 3 13
Session 5
Group 1 0.25 16 7.38 3.63 3 15 0.0031
0.50 17 10.59 2.81 6 16
Group 2 0.25 19 16.16 5.87 10 35 0.0461
0.50 14 19.50 6.38 12 36
Session 6
Group 1 0.25 21 4.00 2.61 0 11 0.0011
0.50 13 7.77 2.65 2 11
Group 2 0.25 18 12.61 3.79 7 21 0.1316
0.50 16 14.44 3.22 9 20
Pooled data
0.25 110 9.4 5.96 0 35 0.0000
0.50 82 12.68 5.84 2 36
Table 4.5: Number of trade statistics in the SDF treatment
By column: dividend realisation, number of trades (per period) statistics by state in the SDF treatment, i.e.
mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. MWU test p-values refers to across states comparison at
group level.
Table 4.5 shows that in periods with a high dividend on average more trades took place
than in periods with a low dividend. On average 12.7 trades were executed in a period with
a dividend of 0.5, while only 9.4 transaction took place in a period with a low dividend.
Similarly to Table 4.4, the MWU on the pooled data is problematic due to the repeated use
of observations within in a group. Performing a sign rank test with the group differences
yields a significant difference at the five percent confidence level (p-value 0.0313, for all six
groups more trades are completed in the high-dividend state). Using a MWU test on the
individual groups yields a significant difference (at five percent confidence level or higher) for
four out of the six groups. These comparisons support our presumption that more trades
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might take place in the high state of the world due to the higher liquidity.21
As additional evidence for the influence of the available liquidity we perform an OLS regres-
sion of the number of completed transactions on the dividend and several control variables,
i.e. period, sequence number, average trading price and group fixed effects. The regression
reported in Table 4.13 in Appendix 4.7.2 shows that for the SDF treatment the number of
trades is larger in the high-dividend states. Moreover, the larger liquidity available in periods
with a higher dividend partially explains the observed differences in the average prices.
To summarise, four are the main results for the SDF treatment. First, the average trading
price is larger in the high-dividend state than in the low state contradicting Hypothesis 1.
Second, this difference is considerably smaller than in the REE predictions. Third, the price
difference seems to be at least partially be driven by the difference in liquidity in the two
states and fourth, we do not observe an overvaluation of the stock, since in most periods the
average trading price is between the two REE prices or in certain occasion below the lowest
REE price.
4.4.2 Prices in the PAYOFF treatment
In the PAYOFF treatment the unit root dividend process results in a constantly changing
dividend, since the dividend is either 80% or 120% of the dividend in the previous period, with
equal probability. Table 4.6 summarizes the average trading prices for all periods splitting
the sample in period with a dividend above and periods with a dividend below the median of
the dividend. The median of the dividend is defined at group level, so that this classification
allows us a similar state-dependent analysis as in the SDF treatment. Similarly, we can
therefore test whether the average trading price depends on the dividend state. According to
Hypothesis 2 higher dividends should result in higher asset prices. Consequently, the average
trading price for periods with a dividend above the median should be larger than the average
trading prices for periods with a dividend below the median.
21These results are qualitatively unchanged if the first five or ten periods of each session are excluded from the
analysis to check whether the difference goes away over time. The role of the varying liquidity is discussed
in more detail when we analyse the individual trading behaviour.
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Average trading price MWU test
Dividend Mean SD Max Min p-value
Session 2
Group 1 below median 2.73 0.43 3.45 1.89 0.0927
above median 3.25 0.78 4.85 2.20
Group 2 below median 1.43 0.89 3.00 0.00 0.0033
above median 2.52 0.37 3.34 1.94
Session 3
Group 1 below median 1.21 0.60 2.74 0.43 0.0002
above median 2.63 0.75 4.15 1.50
Group 2 below median 8.66 1.18 11.00 6.11 0.2208
above median 8.30 0.50 9.17 7.29
Session 4
Group 1 below median 2.60 1.40 6.40 1.53 0.0618
above median 2.87 1.41 7.67 1.85
Group 2 below median 0.85 0.63 2.15 0.00 0.0001
above median 2.28 0.65 3.67 0.82
Table 4.6: Average trading prices in the PAYOFF treatment
By column: average trading prices statistics by dividend in the PAYOFF treatment, i.e. mean, standard
deviation, maximum and minimum. MWU test p-values refers to across dividend comparison at group level
(below versus above median dividend).
All values besides p-values are expressed in Taler.
Table 4.7 reports the mean dividend for all groups and sequences of the PAYOFF treatment.
There is a large variation in the dividends paid between the groups and also between different
sequences of the same group. The dividend payments in the PAYOFF treatment varied
between 0.06 Taler and 1.55 Taler, with an average dividend of 0.40 Taler. Using the above
described classification for periods and testing whether the average trading price is larger
in periods with a high dividend yields significant differences for all but one group at ten
percent confidence level. This clearly shows the importance of the dividend of the pricing of
the asset. In periods with a higher dividend the stock is traded at higher prices. Also the
absolute difference in the pooled data (0.8 Taler) is larger than in the SDF treatment (0.5
Taler), while the average trading prices seem generally to be lower.
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No. of Dividend Dividend
Sequence periods Mean SD Max Min Mean SD Max Min
Session 2
Group 1 1 1 0.30 - 0.30 0.30 Group 2 0.30 - 0.30 0.30
2 12 0.41 0.11 0.29 0.65 0.52 0.11 0.36 0.72
3 1 0.30 - 0.30 0.30 0.45 - 0.45 0.45
4 2 0.27 0.04 0.24 0.30 0.50 0.06 0.45 0.54
5 12 0.35 0.09 0.23 0.55 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.45
Pooled 28 0.37 0.10 0.23 0.65 0.38 0.17 0.13 0.72
Session 3
Group 1 1 13 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.30 Group 2 0.49 0.10 0.35 0.69
2 12 0.90 0.33 0.45 1.55 0.77 0.33 0.43 1.48
Pooled 25 0.51 0.45 0.06 1.55 0.62 0.27 0.35 1.48
Session 4
Group 1 1 4 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.30 Group 2 0.60 0.14 0.45 0.78
2 11 0.28 0.08 0.16 0.45 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.35
3 15 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.54 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.54
Pooled 30 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.54 0.30 0.16 0.09 0.78
All sessions
Pooled 166 0.40 0.26 0.06 1.55
Table 4.7: Summary statistics dividend in the PAYOFF treatment
By column: summary statistics of the dividend in the PAYOFF treatment at sequence level by group, i.e.
mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. All values a part from the number of periods are expressed
in Taler.
As highlighted earlier for the SDF treatment, however the difference in the average trading
prices can be partially due to the difference in the aggregate state-dependent liquidity. In
general the argument also holds in the PAYOFF treatment, with two differences with respect
to the SDF treatment. First, the difference in liquidity from period to period is not as big as
in the SDF treatment, since the dividend process leads to a smaller variation in the dividend.
Second, while in the SDF treatment the iid process leads to comparable average dividends
across groups, due to the path dependency of the dividend in the PAYOFF treatment this
is not the case. Nevertheless, the OLS regression of the number of completed transactions
reported in the second column of Table 4.13 in Appendix 4.7.2 shows a similar influence of
the dividend on the number of trades. Hence, also in the PAYOFF treatment more trades
take place in periods with a higher dividend, hinting at that higher liquidity in these periods
also influencing the average trading price.
Following the earlier analysis, Figure 4.3 shows price and dividend movements for a rep-
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resentative group for the PAYOFF treatment. The REE price seems to move more than
the average trading price, whilst the realized prices are generally below the REE predictions.
However, the difference between the theory prediction and the actual realized trading price
appears to be very large only for periods with relatively high dividends. The general move-
ments in the dividend and in the realized average trading price seem to be very similar, in
most of the groups in the PAYOFF treatment.
To consider whether dividends and price movements are aligned, Table 4.8 classifies each
period of the PAYOFF treatment according to the dividend change in regard to the previous
period. The column Down means that the dividend decreased from the last period to this
period and Up lists all periods with a dividend increase.22 Therefore if the average trading
price follows the dividend we should observe most periods to be in the (Up, Up) or (Down,
Down) cell. While a Fisher’s Exact probability test yields a significant difference at the one
percent confidence level (p-value 0.004) between the two columns, which supports the claim
that the average trading price moves together with the dividend. To note that the test uses
multiple observations from each group leading to dependent observations and therefore the
result should be taken with care.23
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Figure 4.3: Price and divided dynamics in the PAYOFF treatment
The graph reports price and dividend dynamics for Session 4 Group 2 in the experiment. All values are stated
in Taler.
22Since the dividend changes between every period only the first period of a sequence cannot be classified.
23A Chi squared test yields the identical result, p-value 0.004, but also assumes independent observations.
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To sum up, three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the PAYOFF treatment.
First, the average trading price is larger in periods with lager dividends, confirming Hypo-
thesis 2. Second, the number of transactions increases in periods with a higher dividend,
which hints that at least part of the price increase could be driven by the higher liquidity
being in the market in high-dividend periods. Finally, the movements of the dividend and
the average trading price seem to be highly correlated.
Average trading price change Dividend changeDown Up Total
Down 56 34 90
Up 21 35 56
Total 77 69 146
Table 4.8: Dividend and direction of the price changes in the PAYOFF treatment
4.4.3 Treatment comparison
We now compare the influence of the dividends on prices for the two treatments directly.
We further analyse whether there is a treatment difference with regard to the asset price
volatility between the treatments by means of a regression whose results reported in Table
4.9. We run an OLS regression of the average trading price separately for both treatments on
several explanatory variables so to gain understanding of the effect of the dividend payments
on the trading price. The main independent variable is Dividend which is the dividend paid
in the respective period expressed in Taler. Furthermore the regressions include a dummy for
the first period of a sequence (New sequence), the period number (Period) and the sequence
number (Sequence).24 Both regressions also include group fixed effects to account for the
between-group heterogeneity and the dependence of repeated observations within a group.25
24Period number counts periods over sequences within a session, so if the first sequence lasted 5 periods,
period 3 of sequence number two has the period number 8.
25In order to increase the readability of the table, these group fixed effects are not reported in Table 4.9. The
estimated group fixed effects vary a lot between groups, indicating high degree of heterogeneity between
the groups.
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(1) (2)
SDF Treatment PAYOFF Treatment
Dividend 2.04∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.34)
New Sequence 0.35 0.29
(0.28) (0.26)
Period −0.06 −0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02)
Sequence 0.00 0.21
(0.12) (0.14)
Group FE
√ √
Obs. 192 166
R-squared 0.93 0.97
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4.9: OLS regression average trading price
Average trading price regressed on dividend, new sequence dummy, period, sequence and group fixed effect
for both treatments. Standard errors clustered at group level are reported in brackets.
The first column reports the results for the SDF treatment, while the second column,
the results for the PAYOFF treatment. For both regressions the coefficient of Dividend is
significantly positive (at the 5%-level for the SDF and at the 1%-level for the PAYOFF
treatment). These coefficients confirm an earlier finding that the average market price reacts
to the dividend, i.e. a higher dividend leads to, on average, higher market prices for the asset
in both treatments.
The estimated coefficient values are both around 2, which means that a dividend increase
of 1 Taler translates in an average trading price that is about 2 Taler larger. However, an
increase of 1 Taler for the dividend is basically impossible in the used set-up. In the SDF
treatment, the dividend varies between 0.25 and 0.5 Taler. The increase of the dividend is
therefore limited to 0.25 Taler, therefore the coefficient on the Dividend corresponds to an
increase in the asset price of 0.51 Taler (2.04·0.25 = 0.51). The detailed derivation of the REE
price in Appendix 4.6, in particular equation (4.26) shows that an increase of one Taler in
the dividend should result in an increase in the average trading price by 4.977 Taler. Clearly,
the regression results in a much smaller coefficient confirming the findings from above that
prices co-move with the dividend, but to a smaller extent than predicted by theory.
Similarly, for the PAYOFF treatment the coefficient on Dividend yields a coefficient of 2.36.
But also in this treatment the expected dividend changes are much smaller. In Appendix 4.6
the predicted relationship between the dividend and the REE price is derived, see equation
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(4.38). For an increase of the dividend of one Taler the REE price should increase by 13.45
Taler. Clearly, the estimated coefficient of 2.36 is much smaller than the theoretical value
the regressor should have. Therefore the regression confirms the finding that also for the
PAYOFF treatment the dividend has a significant influence on the asset price, but that the
change in the asset price is much smaller than predicted.
Therefore in both treatments the average market price co-moves with the dividend, in-
dicating that subjects in the respective treatments took the stochastic discount factor (SDF
treatment) or the volatility of payoffs (PAYOFF treatment) into account and in both treat-
ments the REE predicts a stronger reaction of the market price than the one observed in the
experiment.
The only other significant coefficient besides Dividend is Period in the PAYOFF treatment.
This negative coefficient confirms the downward time trend observed in Figure 4.3 above for
one group for the entire PAYOFF treatment. On the contrary, the time trend coefficient in
the SDF treatment is not significant.
These results contradict Hypothesis 1, and rather confirm Hypothesis 2.
While regarding Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the co-movement of dividend and trading
price should be stronger in the PAYOFF than in the SDF treatment, the regression does not
yield a very clear result. While both the SDF and the expected payoff influence the dividend,
the REE predicts a stronger movement of the REE price as reaction to a dividend change
in the PAYOFF treatment than in the SDF treatment. However, the OLS regression shows
very similar effects of the dividend in both treatments, but mainly because the effect of the
stochastic discount factor is stronger than assumed in Hypothesis 1. Given that the size of
the coefficients and that the prediction was a stronger effect for the PAYOFF treatment our
data does not support Hypothesis 3.
We now focus our analysis on the asset price volatility observed in the experimental sessions.
In line with previous experiments, we first measure price volatility as the standard deviation
of the average market clearing price (σPricejk) for group (j) for sequence level (k). In the
following tables we report the volatility of the market price and the one of the correspondent
rational expectation price computed for each treatment at sequence level. As stated in Table
4.10, in the SDF treatment, market clearing prices are substantially less volatile than the
fundamentals, as confirmed by a Wilcoxon sign-test.
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No. of Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility
Sequence periods Trading Price FV Trading Price FV
Session 1
Group 1 1 1 - - Group 2 - -
2 7 0.47 2.29 0.36 2.29
3 3 0.33 0 0.59 2.48
4 2 1.56 3.03 0.22 3.03
5 2 0.58 3.03 0.14 3.03
6 14 0.51 2.24 0.84 1.88
Session 5
Group 1 1 4 0.58 2.14 Group 2 0.55 2.14
2 15 0.72 2.22 0.62 2.22
3 14 0.64 2.22 0.44 2.20
Session 6
Group 1 1 5 0.23 1.92 Group 2 3.37 2.35
2 29 1.16 2.19 0.70 2.18
Table 4.10: Summary statistics average market price volatility in the SDF treatment
Summary statistics volatility of the average market price volatility versus volatility of fundamentals (FV) in
the SDF treatment. All values are rounded to two digits.
No. of Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility
Sequence periods Trading Price FV Trading Price FV
Session 2
Group 1 1 1 - - Group 2 - -
2 12 0.58 1.45 0.38 1.47
3 1 - - - -
4 2 0.10 0.57 0.50 0.85
5 12 0.31 1.25 0.72 1.32
Session 3
Group 1 1 13 0.75 0.95 Group 2 1.19 1.35
2 12 0.81 4.50 0.49 4.43
Session 4
Group 1 1 4 1.64 0.60 Group 2 0.75 1.90
2 11 0.69 1.09 0.66 0.56
3 15 0.39 1.50 0.88 1.86
Table 4.11: Summary statistics average market price volatility in the PAYOFF treatment
Summary statistics volatility of the average market price versus volatility of fundamentals (FV) in the PAYOFF
treatment. All values are rounded to two digits.
A similar picture emerges for the PAYOFF treatment, as summarized in Table 4.11. We
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observe negative excess volatility, i.e. the realised price volatility is significantly lower than
the theoretical one in both treatments. So to understand the driving forces of the latter excess
volatility, we construct a treatment-invariant measure of volatility that takes into account the
different theoretical volatility participants were facing in the two different set-ups. We rescale
the standard deviation of the average trading price at sequence level with the corresponding
one of the fundamentals, as
Pex−vola =
σPricejk − σFVjk
σFV jk
(4.18)
where σPricejk is the standard deviation of average trading price for group j in sequence k
and σFVjk is the standard deviation of the average fundamental value for the same group and
sequence.26
We then compare the rescaled volatility measure across treatments and find that a Mann-
Whitney test indicates no statistical different between the two. Whilst the difference is
not statistically significant, it appears to be the case that the price volatility in PAYOFF
treatment is higher than in SDF.27 Hence, even if mildly, the stochastic discount factor seems
to have a more limited effect in predicting the volatility of prices than the payoffs. This can
arise from the difficulty associated with understanding the stochastic discount factor itself
that needs some further investigation by means of the individual trading data.
4.4.4 Individual trading
The analysis so far concentrated on aggregate data for the two treatments. In this section
instead, we investigate the individual trading behaviour of subjects. One way to determine
the individual valuation of subjects for the asset is to use the detailed trading data from the
double auction market. We use the offered or executed bid prices to construct a willingness-
to-pay (wtp) measure for each subject in each period. The willingness-to-pay of a subject is
the highest bid she made during a period that was either executed, standing at the end of the
period or deleted because the subject made another trade.28 In order to determine if subjects
had a different valuation for the asset in the SDF treatment depending on the state of the
26We exclude those sequences that lasted only one period and the ones where the fundamentals were constant.
27The latter result is confirmed also if we exclude the first periods or the first sequence, with similar level of
significance.
28Subjects could make multiple offers for buying/selling the stock, but execution of one order deleted all the
other standing asks/bids. This procedure excludes cancelled bids. If the highest wtp of a subject in a
period was a bid that was deleted, then a seller accepted a lower bid from the same subject. Otherwise,
the deleted bid would not be the highest, hence not the bid being used to determine the wtp .
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world we perform MWU tests separately for each individual of the SDF treatment, testing
whether the wtp of subjects was different in high-state periods versus low-state periods. Ten
subjects out of 46 have a significantly different wtp in the two states (at the 5% level).
Therefore, only 22% of all participants to the SDF treatment seem to take the stochastic
discount factor variation significantly into account when trading the asset.
We also perform a similar analysis for the PAYOFF treatment, using the median dividend
at the group level to sort periods into high and low-dividend periods. Seventeen of the 48
subjects in the PAYOFF treatment have a significantly different wtp in the two "states" (again
5% significance level). This value indicates that the dividend value seems to be important
for more subjects’ asset valuation in the PAYOFF treatment when compared to the SDF
treatment. However, still only 35% of the participants to the PAYOFF treatment show a
significant difference in their wtp.
To further assess whether subjects actually realise the importance of the stochastic discount
factor in the SDF treatment is to analyse their consumption behaviours. With the actual
asset prices described in the previous sections a subject that is aware of the stochastic discount
factor should consume relatively more in the low state of the world and less in the high state.
In the SDF treatment average prices are below REE prices in the high state of the world
and above the REE in the low one. Therefore, the asset is undervalued if the dividend is
high, while it is overvalued if the dividend is low. A subject understanding the role of the
stochastic discount factor should therefore consume relatively more in low states than in high
states, while she should buy the assets in the high state of the world.
In order to check how many subjects followed such an optimal strategy we rank subjects
within their trading group according to their relative consumption.29 A subject that follows
the outlined trading strategy be ranked relatively high with regard to consumption in the
low-dividend state (since the stock price is likely above REE and therefore the subject should
sell), but rank low in high-dividend states, since the subjects buy the undervalued asset.
Only ten out of 46 subjects in the SDF treatment (22%) can be classified as following such
a strategy. We use individual consumption in a given period to classify subjects according
to their ranking within their group, then use all position rank of a subject to test whether
there is a difference between the position ranks the participant was assigned in the low versus
high dividend states. The difference in ranks is significant for 14 subjects (using a two sided
29Essentially, we rank subjects in each period within their trading group since they all face the same sequence
of dividends. Between groups or between treatments comparison is not considered.
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t-test), but only for 10 the consumption is higher in the high state.30 Using this (very broad)
classification 80% of subjects do not fully take the stochastic discount factor into account in
their consumption behaviour.
The analysis of the individual trading behaviour shows that only a small fraction seems to
fully understand the role of the stochastic discount factor. Both approaches, using the stated
individual willingness-to-pay or the relative rank of a subject with respect to consumption,
result in about 80% of subjects in the SDF treatment that do not follows trading strategies
that are in line with fully understanding the stochastic discount factor. However, their
"imperfect" reaction to the changes in the stochastic discount factor and the 20% of subjects
that seem to take the stochastic discount factor into account result in average trading prices
that lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 1.
4.4.5 Beliefs
We now have a look at the individual expectations about the future asset returns. At the
beginning of each trading period, subjects were asked to predict the future asset return, i.e.
the return that they believe will realize at the end of the consecutive period of trade.
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Figure 4.4: Expected returns statistics in the SDF treatment
The graph reports mean, median, maximum and minimum of the elicited beliefs for Session 6 Group 2 in the
experiment. All values are stated in percentage points.
30In the other four cases, the difference in the average rank is significant, but they consume relatively less
in the high state than in the low state. Therefore their trading behaviour is exactly the opposite of the
described strategy.
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In the following, we report the evolution over time of the first moment of the expected
return, together with the median, the highest and the lowest expected return. We use the
interval with the upper bound of the most optimistically stated future expected return and
the lower bound of the most pessimistic one to measure the dispersion of individual beliefs.
The latter is possible since our experimental design allows us to keep track of the entire
cross-sectional belief distribution in every market, for each period traded. One representative
group of each treatment has been chosen for illustrative purposes.
In the SDF treatment, we notice a substantial degree of heterogeneity of beliefs in the first
period played that persists during the experiment, but shrinks towards the end of it. Less
polarized beliefs at the end of last sequence played point at a common agreement about the
profitability of the asset. The latter occurs once the market price has stabilized and volumes
of trade are very low. Moreover, median and mean of the distribution are pretty stable over
the entire length of the experiment, hinting at no time variation of the degree of optimism.
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Figure 4.5: Expected returns statistics in the PAYOFF treatment
The graph reports mean, median, maximum and minimum of the elicited beliefs for Session 3 Group 2 in the
experiment. All values are stated in percentage points.
A similar picture is displayed for the PAYOFF treatment. Interestingly, the dynamic of
expected returns is characterized by more dispersed beliefs at the beginning of a sequence
played that vanishes along the way once market price is steady, as in the SDF treatment.
Furthermore, even though more stable than in the SDF treatment, also in the PAYOFF
treatment the mean and the median of the cross-sectional distribution are mostly identical,
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i.e. the time variation of fundamentals does not go hand in hand with the expectations.
Essentially, in our set-up there is room for adaptive learning dynamics and expectations
feedback into prices only at the beginning of the experiment.31
Only a weak link between beliefs and prices is observed in our set-up. Differently from
Donini (2016) where beliefs are shown to affect price dynamics by shifting individual demand
schedules, in our experiment we observe a rather mild link between individual demands and
stated return expectations. We relate this to the complexity of the experiment itself that
might induce the stating of wrong beliefs or a general difficulty of participants to relate
returns with intertemporal trading decisions.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents a new experimental set-up for testing which of the two theoretical
sources, the stochastic discount factor or the payoff volatility, is accountable for the observed
price volatility in (experimental) asset markets. In line with recent experiments bringing the
Lucas asset pricing model to the laboratory, we design two treatments where only one source
of price volatility is in place in each of them. In the SDF treatment, the theoretical source
of volatility is identified by the stochastic discount factor, whilst in the PAYOFF treatment
the volatility of payoffs is responsible for the theoretical price volatility.
Our results show that, while both sources lead to variation in the asset prices, in both
treatments the observed price volatility is much smaller than predicted by the REE. In
particular, in the SDF treatment most observed prices are in between the two state dependent
fundamental values. Therefore, while subjects seem to take the stochastic discount factor into
account, the resulting price changes of the asset imply that subjects do not fully internalize
the effect of the stochastic discount factor in our setting.
The results in the PAYOFF treatment are similar with regard to the observation that
subjects react in their pricing behaviour to the changes in the volatility of payoffs, but as
in the SDF treatment the resulting market clearing price volatility is much smaller than
predicted by theory.
Hence, we find that both sources of price volatility lead to asset prices that change with the
dividend, which implies that the stochastic discount factor as well as the volatility of prices
are important for the observed price volatility in asset markets. The fact that subjects find
31The average expected returns in comparison to the realised returns are plotted in Appendix 4.7.3.
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difficulties in applying the concept of intertemporal consumption smoothing in our setting
is at odds with previous experiments by Asparouhova et al. (2016) and Crockett and Duffy
(2013). However, our set-up differs substantially from the latter studies and the benchmark of
a rational no-trade equilibrium in our experiment might be harder to obtain in our framework.
Possibly due to the complexity of the environment or the fact that subjects had to solve
two tasks (predicting returns and trading the asset), as highlighted in Bao et al. (2013),
we do not find evidence for a significant link between expected asset returns and trading
behaviour of individual subjects. Given the observed dynamics of the beliefs about future
return of the asset, the belief-price feedback loop that should amplify price oscillation around
fundamentals is almost absent in our set-up since the price stabilizes relatively quickly and
beliefs become very homogeneous after the first few periods played.
Our experiment provides a first approach to shed some light on the sources of the observed
asset price volatility in experimental asset markets. We are able to show that both the
stochastic discount factor, as well as the volatility of payoffs matter for the pricing of the asset,
but which is the major driver for the volatility remains unclear. While the used environment
might be too complex for some participants, hence lead to noisy trading that complicate the
identification of the different sources of volatility, a likely conclusion from our results is that
both sources matter, with a slightly higher probability that the volatility of payoffs might
matter more. Given that we find a lower volatility of prices than expected and therefore no
price bubbles occur in our experimental market, it is possible that the combination of both
sources for price volatility results in a bigger effect than the two effects separately. Further
research should be done in order to confirm our results in a possibly simpler experimental
set-up, focusing on the role of the interaction effect between the two theoretical sources of
asset price volatility.
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4.6 Appendix I: REE prices in the two treatments
In the following we report the detailed calculations of the rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) prices in the two treatments.
4.6.1 REE price in SDF treatment
PREEt,SDF = Et
 ∞∑
j=1
δj
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γ
t (2B − Cµ) (4.24)
= δ1− δ
 Dγt B︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionSDF
+ Dγt (B − Cµ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contributionCOV
 (4.25)
where B, C and µ are constants defined as
• B ≡ p · (DH)1−γ + (1− p) · (DL)1−γ
• C ≡ p · (DH)−γ + (1− p) · (DL)−γ
• µ ≡ p · (DH) + (1− p) · (DL) , mean of the dividend process
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An alternative formulation of the REE price, that states the REE price for the SDF treatment
only as function of the dividend is given below
PREEt,SDF =
δ
1− δB︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·Dγt (4.26)
where A for the chosen parametrization is 18.77.
For a change in the dividend from 0.25 to 0.5 (low to high state) this formula implies a
change in the REE price of:
∆PREEt,SDF = γ A D
γ−1
t ∆Dt (4.27)
= 1.5 · 18.77 · 0.50.5 · 0.25 (4.28)
= 4.977 (4.29)
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4.6.2 REE price in PAYOFF treatment
PREEt,PAY OFF =Et
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where λ, φ, µ are constant defined as follows,
• λ ≡ E
(
ε1−γt+i
)
= p · (εH)1−γ + (1− p) · (εL)1−γ
• φ ≡ E
(
ε−γt+i
)
= p · (εH)−γ + (1− p) · (εL)−γ
• µ ≡ E (εt+1) = pεH + (1− p)εL = 1, mean of the shock on the dividend process
with | δ · λ |< 1 and | λ− φ |< 1.
An alternative formulation of the REE price, that states the REE price for the PAYOFF
treatment only as function of the dividend is given below
PREEt,PAY OFF =
δλ
1− δλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
·Dt (4.38)
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where F for the chosen parametrization is 13.45.
For a change in the dividend from 0.3 to 0.36 this formula implies a change in the REE
price of:
∆PREEt,PAY OFF = F ∆Dt (4.39)
= 13.45 · 0.06 (4.40)
= 0.807 (4.41)
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4.7 Appendix II: additional analysis
4.7.1 Average trading prices
Table 4.12 summarizes the average trading prices for all sessions and groups by sequence.
SDF treatment PAYOFF treatment
Sequence No. of Average Sequence No. of Average
periods trading price periods trading price
Session 1 Session 2
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
1 1 4.077 6.429 1 1 2.190 3.000
2 7 3.477 7.157 2 12 3.599 2.580
3 3 2.156 7.190 3 1 3.455 2.684
4 2 2.843 6.988 4 2 2.839 2.321
5 2 2.726 6.900 5 12 2.477 1.171
6 14 1.955 5.878
Session 5 Session 3
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
1 4 4.919 3.938 1 13 1.338 8.665
2 15 3.847 4.342 2 12 2.609 8.262
3 14 3.735 4.890
Session 6 Session 4
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
1 5 4.821 7.520 1 4 5.810 2.798
2 29 2.304 2.162 2 11 2.484 1.799
3 15 2.100 1.064
Table 4.12: Summary statistics average trading price in both treatment
By column: average trading price in all sessions, both in the SDF and in the PAYOFF treatment. All values
except the number of periods composing a sequence are expressed in Taler.
4.7.2 Trading volumes
An OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of completed trades within a
period is reported in table 4.13. In both treatments, more trades took place in correspondence
of higher dividend values and trade decreased over time.
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(1) (2)
SDF Treatment PAYOFF Treatment
Average price −1.36∗ −1.65
(0.55) (1.81)
Dividend 13.38∗∗∗ 11.78∗∗
(2.42) (4.04)
Period −0.35∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10)
New Sequence −0.06 −0.48
(0.66) (1.77)
Period −0.06 −0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02)
Sequence −0.93∗∗ 0.00
(0.34) (1.73)
Constant 18.96∗∗∗ 21.48∗∗∗
(2.31) (5.98)
Group FE
√ √
Obs. 191 165
R-squared 0.644 0.728
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4.13: OLS regression trading volumes
Trading volumes regressed on average price, period, new sequence dummy, dividend and group specific fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at group level are reported in brackets.
4.7.3 Beliefs
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 report realized returns for the same sessions and sequences considered
in section 4.4.5. In both groups the realized returns are much more volatile then the state
return expectations. One possibility for this finding is that subjects converged to the same
mean belief when they realized that they are unable to match the true return. Therefore
returns converge quickly on a value that is roughly between the realized returns.
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Figure 4.6: Expected and realised returns in the SDF treatment
The graph reports mean and median of the elicited beliefs together with the realised return for Session 6
Group 2 in the experiment. All values are stated in percentage points.
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Figure 4.7: Expected and realised returns in the PAYOFF treatment
The graph reports mean and median of the elicited beliefs together with the realised return for Session 3
Group 2 in the experiment. All values are stated in percentage points.
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4.8 Appendix III: Screen-shots trading screen
Below you see a screen-shot of the trading screen used in the experiment (in German). The
shown screen is for the first period of a sequence. In later periods the history of the average
market prices for the asset in the same sequence was shown.
Figure 4.8: Screen-shot of trading screen
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4.9 Appendix IV: Instructions (English translation)
These are the translations of original instructions in German for the SDF treatment. The
instructions for the PAYOFF treatment are equivalent with a different description of the
dividend process and the payment rule for the return belief. The instructions are available
from the authors upon request.
Welcome
Thank you for your decision to take part in this experiment. The experiment will take up
to 2 hours and 45 minutes and you will receive your payment directly after the experiment
in cash. It is very important that you do not talk to other participants during the entire
experiment. In case you have questions after reading the instructions, please raise your hand.
An experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.
General instructions
The experiment today consists of one or multiple sequences. Each sequence consists of one
or multiple periods. The exact number of periods and sequences is random and therefore not
previously known. At the end of each period a random draw decides whether there will be
another period or not.
In each period we ask you to perform two tasks. On the one hand we will ask you to make
prediction of the return of a stock. On the other hand you have the possibility to trade this
stock with other participants. You can earn money with both tasks.
At the start of each sequence you receive a fix number of stocks and at the start of each
period you receive some cash. While cash can only be used in the given period, you keep the
stocks for the entire sequence, meaning for several periods, if you do not decide to sell the
stocks. Money you cannot transfer from one period to the next.
In this experiment there are two groups. The set-up and procedures are the same for each
group. A random move determines in which group you are.
We will now describe the details of the experiment. In case you still have questions after
reading the instructions, please raise your hand.
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Structure of a period
Each period consists of three parts. First, we ask you for your expectation regarding
the return of the asset. Then, you can use your cash and stocks to trade those with other
participants. Finally, you receive the information about how many points you earned in the
given period.
At the start of each sequence you receive 20 stocks. Additionally, at the start of each
period you receive additional money. The money in this experiment is called Taler. How
many Taler you receive depends on (1) how many stocks you own and (2) on the magnitude
of the dividend.
At the start of each period you receive for each stock you own a dividend payment. The
dividend is either 0.5 or 0.25 Taler per stock. In each period each dividend payment is equally
likely. Additionally you receive in each period an income of 15 or 8 Taler. This income is
independent of the number of stocks you own, but it depends on the dividend. If the dividend
is 0.5 Taler you receive 15 Taler and if the dividend is 0.25 Taler you receive 8 Taler as income.
Example:
You own 20 stocks. If the dividend is 0.25 Taler you receive a total of 13 Taler: 20*0.25
Taler as dividend and additionally an income of 8 Taler. Income and dividend are paid at
the start of each period. This means you receive a dividend payment for each stock you own
at the start of a period. Therefore there are two reasons to hold stocks: (1) You receive
some additional money through the dividend payment for each stock you own. (2) You can
possibly sell the stock in a later period.
(1) Prediction of the return
In each period you will be asked for your expectation about the return of the asset. The
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return of the stock captures how profitable it would be to buy a stock in this period and
sell it in the next. The return consists of the price change of the stock from this to the next
period and from the height of the dividend in the next period.
Return = Dividend in next period + Price change from this to next periodPrice in this period ∗ 100
Returns are measured in percent. If the return of a stock is positive, than the sum of the
price change and the dividend was positive. When you buy a stock in this period and sell it
in the next, than you make money if the return is positive. The higher your expected return
is, the higher is the profit you expect from buying a stock.
If the return in a period is negative, then the price of the stock decreased by more than the
dividend payment. If you buy a stock in this period and sell it in the next, then you would
loss some money.
When you state your return expectation you can test with the calculator which prices and
dividends result in which returns. For this task there will be a "return calculator" on the
screen. We will show you this calculator in a trial round after all participants have read the
instructions.
You state your return expectation in percent, with increments of 0.1% steps. When you
state your return expectation you always know the dividend of this period. You do not know
the price of the stock in this or the next period and you do not know the dividend of the
next period. You do not know the price for the stock in this round, since the price will be
determined by the trading which follows after entering the return expectation. At the end of
the next period you receive money for the precision of your predictions. The closer you match
the return, the more points you will receive. Your payment for the prediction is calculated
in the following way:
Points for return prediction = max{0.01 ∗ (230− |f |), 0}
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f is the absolute deviation of your prediction from the realized return in percentage points.
If f = 13, then your prediction was either 13% points higher or smaller compared to the
realized return.
If your prediction exactly matches the realized return you receive 2.3 Euro. The larger
the deviation between your prediction and the realized return is, the fewer points you will
receive. If you make a prediction that is more than 230 percentage points larger or smaller
than the true return you do not receive a payment for the prediction in that period.
An exception is the first period in each sequence. Since there is no market price from a
previous period you do not receive a payment for your return prediction in the first period
of a sequence. The return prediction you state in the first period determines your payment
in the second period (and your statement in the second period determines your payment in
the third period etc.).
(2) Trading the stocks
After all participants have stated their expectations the trading period starts. Each trading
period lasts 2 minutes. During this time each participant can use her stocks and cash to buy
or sell stocks. (After the first five periods in a sequence the trading period is shortened to 90
seconds.)
All participants can make bids to buy or asks to sell one stock. Each participant can make
an offer for selling a stock by stating a Taler amount in the field "ask price" at which he or
she is willing to sell one stock and then clicking on "make ask". The offer then appears in the
column "Sell offers" and can be seen by all participants. If a participant wants to make a bid
for buying a stock he or she states the price he or she is willing to pay for one stock in the
field "bid price" and clicks on "make bid". The offer is then shown in the column "Buy offers"
for all participants. [The entire screen will be shown and explained to you again before the
start of the first period].
Please note that all bids/asks are for buying/selling one stock. It is not possible to buy or
sell multiple stocks in one transaction. Also the bids/asks need to be an improvement of the
existing bids/asks. This means a participant can only make an offer to sell a stock at a lower
price than the currently lowest ask price. Similarly, each bid to buy a stock has to be higher
than the currently highest bid price from other participants.
Each participant can accept each displayed buy or sell offer, except for own offers. The
own offers will therefore be shown in BLUE, while all other offers are shown in BLACK. Each
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participant only sees which offers are made by him- or herself. He or she cannot distinguish the
offers made by other participants. A participant accepts an offer by selecting the appropriate
offer in the column "Buy offers" with the mouse and then clicking on "selling" at the lower end
of the column. By doing this, one stock of the participant is transferred to the participant
who made the bid and simultaneously the seller receives the offered Taler amount.
Buying a stock can be done in a similar way by marking a sell offer in the column "Sell
offers" and then clicking on the button "buying". By accepting an offer, all other asks and
bids of the same participant are removed from the list. However you can make new offers.
You can sell and buy as many stocks within a trading period as you wish, as long as you
have sufficient money to buy the offered stocks or you own at least one stock to accept a
bid. You can also "cancel" asks/bids you made, but which have not been accepted by another
participant. To do this select the ask/bid and click on the appropriate button.
WARNING: By "cancelling" ALL your outstanding bids and asks are deleted. It is not pos-
sible to cancel a single bid/ask. After cancelling your bids/asks you can make new bids/asks.
The number of stocks and Taler you own are always shown to you. Also the average prices
and returns from previous periods are displayed in a table and a graph with the average
prices in all previous periods is shown.
As said before, we will show you the trading screen before the first period and explain it
again.
(3) Result of a period
If multiple trades are completed within one period, it is possible that these trades results
in buying/selling stocks at different prices. To determine a market price for the stock, which
we need for the calculation of the return, we will calculate an average market price at the
end of each period.
At the end of each period you will see the average market price, the number of Taler and
stocks at the end of the trading period as well as the return of the stock in this period (except
for the first period of a sequence). It is also displayed how many Euro you received for your
prediction of the return in the previous period and you can see how many points you earned
from you consumption. You consume all Taler, which you own after buying or selling stocks.
This means you cannot transfer Taler to the next period. But all stocks you own at the end
of a period are transferred to the next period.
You always have to consume at least one Taler, therefore one Taler of your income will
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always be excluded from your trading budget. You cannot use this Taler to buy stocks.
The more Taler you own at the end of the period, the higher is the number of consumption
points you receive in a given period. More Taler always result in more consumption points.
However, the difference in consumption points for smaller Taler amounts, e.g. 10 and 20
Taler, is larger than between larger Taler amounts, e.g. 40 and 50 Taler. The table below
shows you for several Taler amounts how Taler are exchanged for consumption points. Also
all not Taler amounts that are not displayed, are exchanged for consumption points using
the same formula. E.g. the number of consumption points you receive for 51, 52 etc. Taler
is larger than the number of consumption points you receive for 50 Taler, but less than for
55 Taler.
Taler Consumption points Taler Consumption points Taler Consumption points
1 -100.0 17 51.5 33 65.2
2 -41.4 18 52.9 34 65.7
3 -15.5 19 54.1 35 66.2
4 0.0 20 55.3 36 66.7
5 10.6 21 56.4 38 67.6
6 18.4 22 57.4 40 68.4
7 24.4 23 58.3 42 69.1
8 29.3 24 59.2 44 69.8
9 33.3 25 60.0 46 70.5
10 36.8 26 60.8 48 71.1
11 39.7 27 61.5 50 71.7
12 42.3 28 62.2 55 73.0
13 44.5 29 62.9 60 74.2
14 46.5 30 63.5 70 76.1
15 48.4 31 64.1 80 77.6
16 50.0 32 64.6 90 78.9
The exact conversion formula is: Consumption points = 100− 200 ∗ (Taler)−0.5. At
the end of a period if you have a number of points that is not listed in the table,
then your points will be calculated with this formula.
Note: You can never consume less than one Taler. In case you have less than zero
consumption points for all paid periods you receive 0 Euro for your consumption.
Therefore you can not make any loses.
How the number of periods and sequences is determined
As stated above, the experiment consists of one or multiple sequences, while each sequence
consists of one or multiple periods. At the end of each period the computer determines
whether there will be another period. On average there will be another period in 11 out of 12
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cases (∼ 91.7%) in the same sequence. In one of 12 cases the sequence ends with this period.
This is identical to a situation in which you throw a dice at the end of each period with a
twelve-sided dice. If the result is a 12, then this period was the last period in this sequence.
If anything but a 12 shows up, then a new period in the same sequence starts.
In case a sequence ends, you will be informed about its end on your screen. Then all stocks
you own at that point become worthless. The next period is then the start of a new sequence.
This means you receive again 20 stocks at the start of this new sequence, independently of
the number of stocks you owned at the end of the previous sequence.
If the sequence does NOT end with this period, after the end of the period automatically
a new period starts. In this period you own the number of stocks you owned at the end of
the previous period. This means within a sequence you carry all your stocks from one period
into the next.
Please note that the chance that a sequence ends after a given period does not depend on
the number of previously completed periods. This is like throwing the dice again after each
period and only if the result is a twelve there is no additional period in the same sequence.
This means, at the end of each period the chance of this being the last period is equally large.
There will be as many sequences as possible in the 2:45 hours of experiment time. Therefore
after the end of a sequence there will always start a new sequence as long as the start of the
first sequence is less than 75 minutes ago.
In the unlikely event that the last sequence takes so long to finish, that the experiment
cannot be concluded in the planed 2:45 hours, we will put this last sequence on hold. In this
case the sequence does not end, but we add to this last sequence the expected number of
periods, which would most likely been played without the time limit. The stocks you own in
this last played period are not worthless. Since these periods cannot be conducted due to time
reasons we will add the expected number of consumption points for each of these periods. The
number of consumption points you receive for these added periods depends on the number
of stocks you owned at the end of the last conducted period. Your expected consumption is
higher, if you own more stocks at the end of this last period, since your expected dividend
income is higher. We simply assume that the sequence would have continued and in each
additional period you would have consumed your income and the entire dividend payments
and you would not have traded any stocks.
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Payment
Your payment in this experiment consists of two parts. In any case you receive 4 Euro for
your participation. Additionally to this you receive a payment dependent on your performance
which is calculated as follows.
At the end of the last sequence the computer randomly selects 10 periods for payment. In
six of these periods you will be paid for your consumption and in 4 other periods you will be
paid for your return predictions. Clearly the first period of a sequence can never be selected
for the payment of your prediction, since in this period there is no stock return.
If the last sequence was not completed due to time constraints, then the additional periods
can only be used for the payment of consumption points. These periods will not be used to
determine your payment for the return predictions.
If the sum of all six selected periods for the consumption payment is negative, then your
payment for the consumption part is zero. This means you cannot lose money with the
consumption. The points you earned in the selected periods will be exchange to Euro. The
exchange rate is 5 Cents for each point.
If in the selected period you earned a total of 300 points for your consumption and 6 Euro
for your predictions, then you receive a total of 25 Euro for the experiment: 300 points * 0.05
Cent/point + 4 Euro + 6 Euro = 15 Euro + 10 Euro = 25 Euro.
We will now show you the program and conduct a trial period. When you are finished
with reading these instructions, please click through the trial period. The explanations on
the screen provide you with details about the different elements. Afterwards we will ask you
several understanding questions. These can be answered directly at the computer. In case
you still have questions after the trial period or need help with the understanding questions,
please raise your hand. We will clearly your questions directly with you. After all participants
have completed the trial period the actual experiment will start.
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